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Abstract: A necessary consequence of the nature of neural transmission systems is that as change in the physical state of a time-varying
event takes place, delays produce error between the instantaneous registered state and the external state. Another source of delay is the
transmission of internal motor commands to muscles and the inertia of the musculoskeletal system. How does the central nervous
system compensate for these pervasive delays? Although it has been argued that delay compensation occurs late in the motor
planning stages, even the earliest visual processes, such as phototransduction, contribute significantly to delays. I argue that
compensation is not an exclusive property of the motor system, but rather, is a pervasive feature of the central nervous system
(CNS) organization. Although the motor planning system may contain a highly flexible compensation mechanism, accounting not
just for delays but also variability in delays (e.g., those resulting from variations in luminance contrast, internal body temperature,
muscle fatigue, etc.), visual mechanisms also contribute to compensation. Previous suggestions of this notion of “visual prediction”
led to a lively debate producing re-examination of previous arguments, new analyses, and review of the experiments presented here.
Understanding visual prediction will inform our theories of sensory processes and visual perception, and will impact our notion of
visual awareness.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Time delays in the nervous system
Time delays are intrinsic to all neural processes.
Helmholtz, an eminent physicist and neurophysiologist
of the nineteenth century, was among the first scientists
to provide a clear measure of the speed of signal trans-
mission within the nervous system. Using a nerve–
muscle preparation, he electrically stimulated the motor
nerve at two different points and noted the time of con-
traction of the connected muscle. The distance between
the stimulated points divided by the time difference with
which the muscle responded, gave the speed of neural
transmission along the given section of the motor nerve.
Before this seminal experiment in 1850, many well-
known scientists including Johannes Mu¨ller had specu-
lated that transmission of neural signals would be too
fast to allow experimental measurement. However, to
the surprise of the scientific community, the experiment
revealed not only that the speed of neural conduction
was measurable, but also that it was an order of magnitude
slower than the speed of sound through air! In this article,
I focus on visual delays, the problem of measurement of
visual delays, and the effect these delays have on neural
representations of change – such as those that result
from visual motion – and on perception and behavior. In
addition, the focus is on potential mechanisms that
might compensate for visual delays.
Visual processing occurs in a series of hierarchical steps
involving photoreceptors, retinal bipolar cells, ganglion
cells, the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), the primary
visual cortex (V1), and beyond. Neural delays have been
extensively investigated at various levels within the visual
system. For example, in response to retinal stimulation,
significant neural delays (.10 msec) have been measured
within the retina and at the optic nerve (Dreher et al.
1976; Kaplan & Shapley 1982; Ratliff & Hartline 1959).
Schiller and Malpeli (1978) electrically stimulated axons
of the optic nerve at the optic chiasm and measured the
delay (2–3 msec) in the response of cells in the
magno- and parvo-cellular layers of the LGN. Many
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studies on the macaque have recorded the delay with
which neurons in the primary visual cortex (V1) respond
to retinal stimulation (Raiguel et al. 1989; Maunsell &
Gibson 1992; Schmolesky et al. 1998). An estimate based
on a large database yields an average delay of approxi-
mately 72 msec of V1 neurons (Lamme & Roelfsema
2000). However, there is usually a range of delays with
which neurons in a given area of the cortex respond.
Different neurons in the macaque inferotemporal cortex,
for example, respond to complex visual information with
delays ranging from 100 to 200 msec (Nakamura et al.
1994).
1.2. Neuronal and behavioral delays for discrete stimuli
Discreteness of stimulation is key to defining time delays
for both neural responses and in behavioral tasks. For
visual neurons, time delays are typically measured in
response to light flashes, light onsets/offsets, or short elec-
trical pulses applied to some point in the visual pathway.
Neural delay is defined as the time interval between the
discrete change in stimulation and change in neural
activity at the target site. The onset time of a discrete
stimulus is easily determined. However, the definition of
neural delays becomes more complex for time-varying
stimuli that are a continuous function of time. For such
stimuli, neural delay can only be defined with respect to
an instantaneous value of the stimulus.
Discreteness of stimulation is central also to defining
behavioral delays. The paradigm that formed the corner-
stone of experimental psychology in the latter half of the
nineteenth century with the work of Helmholtz, Donders,
Wundt, and Cattell, involved measurement of simple
reaction times (Meyer et al. 1988). In simple reaction-
time tasks, the participant produces a prespecified overt
response – for example a button press – in response to a
discrete suprathreshold stimulus such as a flash of light,
a sound burst, or a tactile stimulus. The stimulus–response
interval for the light stimulus is 200–250 msec, whereas for
sound or touch it is about 150 msec. The minimum latency
for a voluntary learned motor response appears to be
around 100–120 msec (Woodworth & Schlosberg 1954,
p 9). Simple reaction time is directly related to input–
output delays of single neurons and of neural chains (see,
e.g., DiCarlo & Maunsell 2005). Neural delays vary sub-
stantially across cell types and modalities. For example,
the transduction of mechanical stimulation by the mechan-
oreceptors of the touch system, and the response of hair
cells to mechanical movement of the cochlear fluid
caused by sound, is much quicker than the speed with
which light is transduced by the photoreceptors. The fact
that reaction time to a light flash is longer than that to a
sound burst, for example, is thought to be a direct conse-
quence of the faster processing of auditory neurons. Like-
wise, a response requiring a longer neural pathway will be
slower. Thus, reflex behaviors such as the knee jerk can
be produced in about 40 msec via a shorter pathway invol-
ving only the spinal cord, whereas behaviors such as
in “choice reaction time” experiments, which involve
additional cortical processing, are decidedly slower.
Additional variables that impact behavioral delays are: the
size of the neurons involved, whether the neurons have
myelinated axons or not, the number of synapses between
the peripheral receptors and the central nervous system
(CNS), the types of the intervening synapses, the strength
of stimulation, and to an extent certain qualitative aspects
of the stimulus.
Several investigators have directly studied the relation-
ship between neuronal latency and reaction time. In
measurements of reaction time, presentation of a discrete
stimulus starts a time-counter, which the subject’s overt
motor response stops. In measurements of neuronal
latency, however, discerning the neural event used to
stop the time-counter can be more challenging. In one
study, researchers recorded from single neurons in the
monkey motor cortex while the animal performed a
learned flexion/extension arm movement in response to
a visual, somatosensory, or auditory stimulus (Lamarre
et al. 1983). They reported a constant delay between the
change in the firing rate of the motor cortical neuron
and arm movement, irrespective of the stochastic and
modality contingent variation in reaction times. Whether
change in a neuron’s spike rate following the stimulus,
on a single trial, can be used in the measurement of neur-
onal latency (i.e., to stop the time-counter) is debatable.
Individual spikes provide a sparse sample of the
assumed underlying rate function of the neuron. Thus,
even if one were to assume a step change in the underlying
rate function triggered by a discrete stimulus, the variance
in spike times dictates averaging over many trials to deter-
mine the precise time of the “true” change in the firing
rate triggered by sensory stimulation (DiCarlo &Maunsell
2005).
1.3. Neuronal and behavioral delays for continuous
stimuli
Animals encounter both discrete and continuous environ-
mental events. At one extreme are discrete stimuli result-
ing from unexpected events in nature (Walls 1942). At the
opposite extreme are stationary stimuli, for example,
nearby objects such as trees, that can be just as behavio-
rally relevant as changing stimuli, but for which the issue
of neural delays arises only when the animal itself moves
(see further on). Between the two extremes of the
discrete–continuous continuum, there are a multitude of
time-varying stimuli unfolding as smooth functions with
respect to time. Consider the role of neural delays in a situ-
ation where a potential prey confronts a predator who has
appeared in a surprise encounter. In relation to the speed
at which changes occur in the prey’s retinal images, the
central transmission of retinal information can be extre-
mely slow. In other words, a significant environmental
event, such as the predator adopting the attack posture,
can take a significant fraction of a second to be communi-
cated to and be processed by the parts of prey’s CNS that
control the escape response.
Properties of neurons allowing for higher transmission
speeds confer an enormous advantage to animals, and
adaptations related to faster conduction of neural infor-
mation are well known. For example, the myelination of
nerve fibers, which is not found in invertebrates, allows
for much faster conduction speeds in vertebrate nervous
systems. However, slowness of neural response does not
necessarily mean a disadvantage to the animal. In fact,
some slower processes appear to be linked to the
animals producing more adaptive behaviors. First, there
is the well-known speed–accuracy tradeoff, where
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increased speed of actions necessarily leads to lower accu-
racy (Woodworth 1899; Meyer et al. 1988). Second,
although visual response is slower than touch, it does not
necessarily lead to a disadvantage for the animals, as
vision allows for objects to be detected at a distance, so
animals are able to plan behaviors (Sarnat & Netsky
1981). Within limits, animals are able to plan their beha-
vior when conditions are stationary or are changing
smoothly, but they must rely directly on sensory input
when there is a discrete change in conditions for which
there are no priors.
A temperature drop over time and an object changing
position over time are common time-varying stimuli.
A closer look at neural delays in the context of such
stimuli reveals some complexities and a puzzle. At the
stimulus end, neural delays in the processing of a continu-
ously unfolding stimulus can be meaningfully defined only
in relation to an instantaneous value of a continuous vari-
able (IVCV; e.g., 08 temperature). The IVCV at a given
instant of time is what would, so to speak, start the time-
counter. As discussed earlier, the question of determining
the neural event that may be used to stop the time-counter
is challenging enough for discrete events, but an even
more difficult problem arises in discerning the neural
event that should stop the time-counter for a continuous
stimulus.
Suppose a scientist wants to determine the latency with
which a spiking neuron responds to a continuous stimulus.
Delay in the neural response can only be measured in
relation to event IVCVt0 (IVCV at selected time t0). Typi-
cally, a neuron tuned to a particular variable will respond
to not just one value of the variable but to a range of values.
Thus, the neuron will respond not just to IVCVt0 but also
to IVCVs in the neighborhood of IVCVt0. Consider a
hypothetical V1 neuron with narrow orientation selectiv-
ity. Suppose further that this neuron responds with a
latency of 70 msec and produces a maximum spike rate
to vertical line orientation (08). If a line rotates continu-
ously at speed v, and is presented within the receptive
field of this neuron, then the neuron’s response will vary
as a function of line orientation. Narrow orientation selec-
tivity means that this cell will produce its strongest
response when the line is vertical, and a somewhat
weaker response to the line orientation that deviates
from the vertical by a small angle (v†70 msec). For a con-
tinuously rotating line, neural delay may be defined, for
example, between the two following events: (1) the line
reaching the vertical orientation, and (2) the moment the
neuron’s spike rate reaches maximum. In this experiment,
the signal to stop the time-counter would be “spike rate
to line orientation 08” – “spike rate to line orientation
08 – (v†70 msec),” where the negative sign means line
orientation before the line reached vertical. Because
spikes are collected in time bins, detecting such a signal
can be challenging (Bialek et al. 1991).
However, even if it were in principle possible to pick up
the neural signal for IVCVt0 in order to determine latency,
there is a more basic issue. The method described here
would require the following assumption to be true:
Neural response to IVCVt0 (in the preceding example
the vertical line orientation) is the same whether the
stimulus is presented in isolation, or as part of continuous
stimulus presentation. This assumption may be valid for
“early” neurons in the vision pathway. However, such an
assumption is almost certain to be invalid for neurons as
one moves higher up in the visual hierarchy. This is
simply because neurons in the “later” parts of the visual
pathway are stimulated not just by direct sensory input,
but also by ongoing perceptual and motor processes
(Treue 2003).
The question of where a neuron is located in the visual
hierarchy and how its response properties change has
been revisited recently. One can define a neuron as
being “stimulation centered” or “perception centered,”
depending on its response properties. Recent neurophy-
siological studies suggest that the activity of neurons
earlier in the visual pathway corresponds more with
sensory stimulation, whereas behavior of later neurons
seems to correspond more with perception (Treue 2003;
Williams et al. 2003). Depending on whether a
given neuron is stimulation centered or perception
centered, one can or cannot define its sensory input
delays in response to continuous stimuli. For example, a
perception-centered neuron’s response may be related to
what the animal anticipates the stimulus would do in the
near future, rather than what the stimulus is doing at a
given moment (Eskandar & Assad 1999). Hence, in such
cases there is the potential of relating a neural signal to
the wrong IVCV – which suggests that if and only if the
IVCVt0 directly drives a neuron’s response, may one
meaningfully define neural delays for that stimulus event.
Interaction of animals with continuous stimuli, such as
moving objects, reveals a puzzle: Behaviors directed at
moving objects seem subject to no appreciable delays.
Among the innumerable examples, this point is brought
forth clearly in the following three examples:
1. In vision-based predator–prey interactions, there is
often extreme pressure on each animal to produce beha-
vior vital to its survival. On the basis of neural and beha-
vioral delays, as revealed in experiments employing
discrete stimulation, the prediction would be that actions
should always lag behind targets in proportion to the mag-
nitude of the delay, irrespective of whether the stimulus is
discrete or continuous. The lags are expected to be large
when the rate of change of the external stimulus, for
example, the speed of a moving object, is large. The
expected lags for smoothly changing stimuli are,
however, never seen in typical predator–prey interactions.
2. Scientists have observed behavior of toads catching
woodlice in extremely low levels of illumination. Close to
the detection threshold of the toad’s retinal ganglion
cells there are one to two photoisomerizations per 100
rods per second. At such low levels of light intensity, the
ganglion cells sum signals from 400–1000 rods over a
period of 1.0–2.5 seconds, so vision necessarily becomes
slow. Aho et al. (1993) noted that when a worm-like stimu-
lus was presented to a ganglion cell’s receptive field, the
cell response occurred about 3 seconds after the presen-
tation of the stimulus (Aho et al. 1993). Nonetheless,
even under these extremely limited visibility conditions a
toad could still produce an accurate tongue-snap response
to catch a moving worm!
3. The final example concerns the highly practiced
behavior of humans in relation to fast-moving objects. In
the game of cricket, a fast bowler can bowl at speeds of
more than 90 mph. At these speeds, the batsman has a
very short time to decide how to hit the ball, and an
even shorter time in which to decide how to get his head
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(say) out of the line of the ball in case the ball is a bouncer
heading directly towards his head. The required temporal
accuracy could be as small as 5 msec (Tresilian 1993) or
even smaller (Land & McLeod 2000; Regan 1992). As
delays in the output of photoreceptors can be appreciably
longer than 5 msec, common observations in high-speed
ball games immediately bring up the issue of compen-
sation for neural delays.
2. Compensation of neural delays
The delay between the input and output of a black
box – which is a widely used concept in engineering and
systems neurobiology (DeYoe & Van Essen 1988) – is
known as phase-lag. During animal interactions
phase-lags can be large, and appropriate compensation is
necessary for adaptive behavior. According to Ghez and
Krakauer (2000, p. 657): “If [phase] lags are long and
external conditions change rapidly, specific feedback cor-
rections may not be appropriate by the time they are
implemented.” One type of mechanism that could com-
pensate for phase-lags, called feedforward control, relies
on information that the nervous system acquired before
the actual arrival of external input from the sensors
(Ghez & Krakauer 2000).
It is perhaps not a coincidence that Helmholtz was also a
pioneer in recognizing the need for compensation of
delays and proposing feedforward control. Feedforward
control is most clearly seen in situations in which
sensory stimulation results as a consequence of move-
ments produced by the animal itself (reafference). A
famous example by Helmholtz is the “canceling” of the
effects of retinal image motion during voluntary eye move-
ments (Jeannerod et al. 1979); when one voluntarily moves
one’s eyes, the visual world, which shifts on the retina, is not
seen as moving. The notion of feedforward control suggests
that a “comparator” receiving afferent signals from the
retina due to image motion also receives a corollary of the
motor command to the eye muscles (von Holst &
Mittelstaedt 1950; Sperry 1950). The copy of the motor
command “cancels” the retinal input signals, resulting in
perceptual stability of the visual scene. This view is sup-
ported by the fact that when a copy of the motor
command to eye muscles is absent, such as during involun-
tary eye movements (e.g., due to externally forced
movement of the eyeball), the visual environment does
appear to shift.
Predictive or anticipatory control, which are concepts
related to feedforward control, have been demonstrated
at the level of single cells, in modules serving sensory-
motor functions (e.g., the cerebellum), and in psycho-
physical tasks in humans. Single neurons in the parietal
cortex (lateral intrapariental area) have been shown to
respond in a predictive manner to changes in visual
input caused by voluntary saccades (Duhamel et al.
1992). Prediction has also been shown in psychophysical
experiments investigating the grip force required to lift
weights (Johansson & Westling 1988), in a pole-balancing
task (Mehta & Schaal 2002), and in weight unloading
(Diedrichsen et al. 2003). The cerebellum has been ident-
ified as a possible sensory-motor structure contributing to
predictive control (Kawato et al. 1987; Wolpert et al.
1998). However, predictive mechanisms are unlikely to
be localized in any one sub-system of the CNS. For
example, in humans, damage to the cerebellum leaves
predictive responses in the weight-unloading task intact
(Diedrichsen et al. 2003), which suggests that prediction
is a distributed property of animal nervous systems.
The notion that sensory processes per se may be predic-
tive is not widely recognized. In fact, previous suggestions
of sensory prediction (Nijhawan 1994) have led to contro-
versy (Cavanagh 1997; Krekelberg & Lappe 2001;
Nijhawan 2002; Schlag & Schlag-Rey 2002). The position
that sensory processes are predictive should not be sur-
prising for the following reasons. First, there is debate as
to whether the function of parietal neurons, a cortical
area in which predictive processes appear to be prevalent,
is sensory or motor. Second, sensory processes are known
to contribute to prediction in sensory-motor tasks, such as
in the canceling of retinal image motion signals during
voluntary eye movements and reduction in the latency of
parietal neurons (Duhamel et al. 1992). Therefore, in
the very least, sensory processes participate in prediction.
Finally, it is rather unparsimonious to suggest that
although prediction is a general property of the nervous
system found in many different areas, sensory areas are
excluded. This would be particularly awkward for vision,
given that more than 50% of the primate neocortex is
involved with visual processes (Kandel & Wurtz 2000,
p. 497). Indeed, the concept of the “internal model” of
the motor system, which serves a predictive function,
may be generalized to the domain of perception (Kawato
1999). The goal of this article is to place the notion of
sensory prediction in general, and visual prediction in
particular, on firmer ground by addressing the existing
controversies, re-analyzing experimental results, and out-
lining the wide-ranging issues that consequently arise.
3. The problem: Topography of the early visual
system, neural delays, and spatial lags for motion
For humans, moving objects can be targets for perception,
orienting responses, interception, or avoidance. The
concept of prediction as it exists in the literature is a some-
what limited point of view resulting from focus on motor
or sensory-motor processes at the expense of visual pro-
cesses. A majority of the literature suggests that predictive
processes are one step removed from sensory processes.
These processes are located in the parietal and frontal cor-
tical areas, perhaps even beyond the sensory-motor inte-
gration areas, or in sub-cortical structures such as the
cerebellum, with the immediate goal of producing move-
ment. One corollary of the viewpoint that there is no
visual compensation for delays is: Perceptual state of a
changing visual stimulus should trail behind the actual
current state of the stimulus. Changing patterns of illumi-
nation, especially those resulting from movement, stimu-
late the visual system strongly and frequently elicit a
behavioral response from the animal (Barlow 1961a).
However the quintessential stimulus of visual motion
leads to the following conundrum. The retina is mapped
topographically on to many maps of the brain, and particu-
larly well known are topographic maps found in V1
(Felleman & Van Essen 1991; Tootell et al. 1982). As an
object moves over the retina, the representation of the
object (wave of neural activity generated by the object)
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shifts over the cortical surface containing the topographic
maps. Because of neural delays, the object’s represen-
tation in the cortical map should lag behind the object’s
retinal representation (Figure 1a). As our perception is
based in part on neural activity in cortical maps, this
renders a perceptual lag in the position of a moving
object in relation to its actual position (Figure 1b).
The recent statements concerning the perceived lag of
moving objects have lead to a vigorous debate (Cavanagh
1997; Gegenfurtner 1999; Krekelberg & Lappe 2001;
Nijhawan 1994; 2002; Schlag & Schlag-Rey 2002). What
might be the magnitude of the lag? At a simplistic level
the lag should equal the product of visual input delay
and object velocity. However, in order to precisely
measure input delay in perception one would have to
first make several assumptions. The most problematic
assumption is that there is some specific brain site where
neural processes culminate in perception. It has been
possible to measure delays between two neural sites
(Maunsell & Gibson 1992; Raiguelet al. 1989; Schmolesky
et al. 1998) and to show that these delays differ for differ-
ent pathways (Schiller & Malpeli 1978). However, there
are arguments that there is no specific brain site where
the stream of visual processing ends to yield perception
(Dennett & Kinsbourne 1992).
Despite the existing controversies, however, limits can
be imposed on the “where” and “when” of perception.
In response to retinal stimulation significant neural
delays have been measured within the retina and the
optic nerve (Dreher et al. 1976; Kaplan & Shapley 1982;
Ratliff & Hartline 1959). It is generally believed that
neural activity at the level of photoreceptors is not suffi-
cient to yield visual awareness. It follows that if the photo-
receptor delay is 10 msec and object velocity is 10 m/sec
then the lag in perceived position of the moving object
should be at least 10 cm. The same logic holds for
measurements at different points of the optic nerve, the
LGN, and so on; in fact, it may be argued that observers
are not directly aware of neural activity even in V1
(primary visual cortex) (Crick & Koch 1995; He et al.
1996) which involves much longer delays. Therefore, the
perceptual lag postulate may be re-stated as: Neural
delays should cause the perceived position of a moving
object to lag behind its physical position by at least a dis-
tance vDtmax, where v is object velocity and Dtmax is the
maximum cumulative delay in the vision pathway until a
point in the pathway where neural activity can be said to
not yield visual perception.
Because of the slowness of vision, a large chunk of the
delay during visual-motor interactions is due to visual pro-
cesses per se. Which component(s) of the animal nervous
system compensate for visual delays? Although late com-
pensatory mechanisms are frequently invoked, an interest-
ing possibility is that of contribution from the visual system
itself (Ramachandran & Anstis 1990; De Valois & De
Valois 1991). This possibility is related to a conjecture by
David Marr, who, in his famous treatise on vision, con-
sidered the possibility of visual compensation in diving
birds that feed on fish first seen from above the water’s
surface (Marr 1982). Because of the water’s refractive
properties, the fish’s position is optically shifted when it
is viewed from the air, and the bird’s nervous system
must correct for this optical distortion. Although a correc-
tion is not present in humans, who continue to perceive
submerged objects as shifted in relation to their true pos-
itions, Marr speculated that the nervous system of birds
whose survival depends on correctly localizing the fish
might visually correct for the optical distortion. Thus,
the fish’s true position would be given “directly” by the
bird’s visual system, as opposed to through an “inferen-
tial,” non-visual process. For humans, the case of moving
objects (Fig. 1b) presents an analogous situation where
the basis of error and impetus for correction is neural
rather than optical.
4. The phenomenon: Concatenation of continuous
and discrete visual events
Neurophysiological and psychophysical experiments
reveal delays for discrete stimulus events. In a seeming
contradiction, animal behaviors directed at continuous
stimuli (e.g., moving objects) reveal virtually no delay.
Does a similar contradiction exist for visual processes?
In other words, are visual responses to discrete stimuli
delayed, but visual responses to continuous stimuli not?
Were this the case, the concatenation of discrete and con-
tinuous visual events in the same display should reveal
an anomaly. An experimental paradigm, known as the
Figure 1. (a) The retina is shown as a one-dimensional
coordinate system mapped topographically onto the cortex. For
simplicity, the thalamic stage is not included. A moving ball’s
image travels from left to right at constant velocity. It is
assumed that the neural delay between the retina and the
cortex is equal to the time the ball takes in moving from retinal
coordinate x21 to x0. At the instant depicted, the cortical
coordinate of the ball, showing greatest activity is x’21, which
corresponds to retinal coordinate x21, while the ball’s actual
retinal coordinate at the instant depicted is x0. (b) The batsman
in cricket views a ball heading toward him after bouncing some
distance in front of him. The batsman’s perception is assumed
to depend on the cortical activity triggered by the moving ball.
At the instant depicted, the physical position of the ball (filled
circle) is ahead of the ball’s perceived position (unfilled circle).
The lag is proportional to the neural delay and object velocity,
which for a cricket ball can be more than 90 mph. For an
assumed delay of 100 msec, the difference between the ball’s
perceived position and its actual position should be 13.2 ft.
Adapted from Land and McLeod (2000).
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flash-lag effect, combines a discrete stimulus (a light flash)
and a continuous stimulus (a moving object). Indeed,
when observers view a display in which the moving item
is spatially and temporally aligned with the flashed item
(Fig. 2a), the flashed item is seen as spatially lagging
behind the moving item (Fig. 2b) (Hazelhoff & Wiersma
1924; Metzger 1932; Mateeff & Hohnsbein 1988;
Nijhawan 1992).
There is a parallel between the notion of visual predic-
tion emerging from the flash-lag anomaly and the notion of
motor prediction appearing on the basis of behavioral con-
tradiction (Nijhawan 1994) – in both cases there is a dis-
crete event and a continuous event. Visual prediction
suggests that visually guided behaviors, such as hitting a
fast-moving ball, require the observer to have information
concerning the ball’s physical position before contact. If
there were no visual prediction, then for a 100 msec
delay, the observer would see a ball traveling at 90 mph
to be about 13.2 ft behind its actual instantaneous position
(see Fig. 1b). Consistent with Marr’s conjecture that visual
mechanisms of diving birds compensate for optical displa-
cement of submerged objects, the visual compensation
account of the flash-lag effect (Nijhawan 1994) suggests
that the expected lag in the perceived position of moving
objects (resulting from neural delays) is compensated for
by visual mechanisms. In contrast, discrete events such
as flashes have no priors, and their perception can only
be based on delayed sensory input. (There is probably
no neural process that could overcome the delay in the
registration of a flash [van de Grind 2002]). This results
in the flash appearing in a position lagging behind the per-
ceived (spatially extrapolated) position of the moving
object. The goal of visual prediction is to use priors con-
tained in the unfolding visual stimulus to create a per-
ceived state of the world that matches, as far as possible,
the actual state of the world.
5. The flash-lag debate
There is intense debate as to whether the flash-lag effect
does indeed provide prima facie evidence of a predictive
process in vision, and more generally as to whether predic-
tion in vision could serve any function. The controversy is
multifaceted. First, the results of the flash-initiated and
flash-terminated conditions of the flash-lag effect (Eagle-
man & Sejnowski 2000; Khurana & Nijhawan 1995;
Khurana et al. 2000; Nijhawan 1992), both of which
involve unpredictable changes to the moving stimulus,
render results that appear contradictory to the notion of
visual prediction. The second basis for the controversy is
logical. How can prediction, which is typically considered
to be a high-level or cognitive phenomenon (see, e.g.,
Thier & Ilg 2005), be part and parcel of perception – pre-
dominantly a result of processes in the feedforward vision
pathway? On the other hand, how can visual percepts be
influenced by higher-level (e.g., parietal) neurons known
to be involved in prediction? The third source that has
fueled the debate is related to doubts over the functional
significance of visual prediction. There is unequivocal evi-
dence and acceptance that “late” motor or sensory-motor
processes serve a predictive role. These late processes
are certainly capable of compensating for all the delays
in the sensorimotor loop, including those incurred by
visual processes per se. So what could be the functional
significance of prediction in vision? Each of these chal-
lenges is now addressed in turn.
5.1. The standard view and its revision suggested by the
ﬂash-lag effect
I attribute to the “standard view,” which represents one
side of the debate, the following statement: A moving
object should be visible in a position that it occupied in
the recent past. Figure 3 presents this standard view in
space–time plots. One of the two plots in Figure 3
represents an object moving at constant velocity v, and
a flash presented at position x0 at time t0. This plot rep-
resents the physical state of affairs. The second plot rep-
resents how a neuron “sees” these events. This plot,
called the ds-error line, results from the standard view of
neural delays in the processing of physical events.
If the scenario depicted in Figure 3 were true, then
there would be no flash-lag effect (e.g., note that on the
intersection of the ds-error line and the x ¼ x0 line of
Figure 3 the moving and flashed objects coincide). Since
the flash-lag effect occurs, a revision of the view presented
in Figure 3 is in order. Figure 4 shows the revised picture.
The reduced ds-error line in Figure 4 corresponds to
perception. On the generalized visual prediction view
(see below), there are multiple reduced ds-error lines,
some of which will not be relevant for perception but
only for visually guided action.
5.2. Experiments with unpredictable motion
In the flash-terminated condition, a smoothly moving
object disappears unpredictably, simultaneously with the
flash. In the flash-initiated condition, an unpredictable
onset of the moving object occurs simultaneously with
the flash, following which the motion is smooth. The
results of these conditions (Nijhawan 1992) are as
follows: When the flash-lag display “was separated into
two temporal intervals ... [o]ne interval consisted only of
events before the flash (past-interval) and the other inter-
val only of events after the flash (future-interval). The
observers reported no [flash-lag] effect in the past-interval
but did so in the future-interval. The magnitude of the
Figure 2. (a) In a dark room, a single physical rod, made of
three segments, rotates clockwise in the direction of the arrow.
The segment labeled “C” is illuminated with a continuous light
source, while the discrete segments labeled “D” are illuminated
with a brief flash produced by a stroboscope. (b) The percept
of the observers. Adapted from Nijhawan (1992).
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[flash-lag] effect for the future-interval was as strong as
that for the pastþ future interval.”
5.2.1. Flash-initiated condition. In the spatial extrapol-
ation view, the perceived position of the moving object is
based on a type of “guess” as to the object’s actual position.
All guesses are a product of prior information. The crucial
feature of the flash-initiated display is that the physical
time (and position) at which the moving object appears
is unpredictable. Prima facie, one would expect no flash-
lag in the flash-initiated display. Yet, the findings are that
the flash-lag effect in the flash-initiated condition is undi-
minished (Khurana & Nijhawan 1995). This result has
been obtained with real (analog) motion and extremely
brief (100 ms) flashes (Nijhawan 1992), and with digital
displays in which the moving and flashed objects are
aligned in the first video frame for 10 or more milliseconds
(Alais & Burr 2003; Brenner & Smeets 2000; Eagleman &
Sejnowski 2000; Khurana et al. 2000; Sheth et al. 2000).
Since the visual prediction account is strictly spatial, it
might seem that it is necessary to assume a shift in the
coordinates of the moving object occurring in a direction
parallel to the time axis (see Fig. 4), which would necessi-
tate infinite speed of neural processing. Excluding the
sub-millisecond photochemical responses to bright
flashes (Wald 1968), which are unlikely to contribute to
extrapolation, no processes in the visual system are fast
enough. However, this reasoning is flawed, as the flash-
lag effect is a relative judgment that only requires that
the time taken for the forward shift in coordinates of the
moving object is small in relation to the time taken for
the processing of the flash. Therefore, the all-important
questions for visual prediction are: When are the neural
processes responsible for motion extrapolation initiated,
and how long do they take to be completed?
On the spatial extrapolation account, perception of the
moving object in the flash-initiated condition is subject
to an input delay (Dtp) following its abrupt onset, which
is the same as the delay for the flash. Say motion onset
occurs at time t0 (simultaneously with the flash); the
moving object and the flash are both first perceived at
time t0þ Dtp. Further, suppose that retinal coordinate
x0 is represented by coordinate x00 on a cortical retinotopic
map. If the abrupt onset of the moving object occurred in
retinal position x0, and there were no motion extrapol-
ation, then the neural activity as a result of this event
will occur in cortical position x00 after a delay of
100 msec (assuming 100 msec latency). How much
Figure 3. Representation of the “standard” view with space–
time plots of an object moving at constant velocity v (thick line)
and how a neuron “sees” the object with some delay (thin line).
A brief flash (filled gray square) presented in position x0 at
time t0 is “seen” (outline square) by the neuron in position x0
at time t0þ Dtp, where Dtp is input delay to perception. Two
events, the arrival-of-the-moving-object in position x0 (filled
gray circle on the x ¼ x0 line) and the “seeing” of this event by
the neuron (outline circle on the x ¼ x0 line) occur at different
times because of neural latency between the event and its
perception. At a given time (say t0), the physical position of the
moving object spatially leads (filled gray circle on t ¼ t0 line)
the position in which the neurons “see” the object (outline
circle on t ¼ t0 line). The spatial gap between the physical
position and the neurally represented position are referred to
as ds-error. The standard view suggests that the perceived
object travels on the ds-error line. Adapted from Krekelberg
and Lappe (2001).
Figure 4. A revision of the standard view is forced by the flash-
lag effect. This figure shows a new trajectory, the “reduced ds-
error” line, which is a line parallel to the ds-error (and the
physical) line, passing through the point in which the moving
item is seen in the flash-lag effect. The distance along the
x (space)-axis between the reduced ds-error line and the ds-
error is Ds; where Ds is the experimentally determined flash-
lag effect (see, e.g., Nijhawan 1994). The standard view needs
to be revised, as on this view, the moving object is seen on the
ds-error line throughout, and in particular, at t0 – the time of
the flash (open circle). The flash-lag effect shows that the
moving object is seen ahead of the flash by distance Ds at
t0þ Dtp (filled black circle). Thus, for both the standard view
to be true and the flash-lag effect to occur, the moving object
would have to appear to speed up (which corresponds to a
segment of a space–time trajectory, shown as the thin broken
line of different slope). Because the moving object is assumed
to travel at constant velocity, the standard view is untenable.
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additional time over and above the 100 msec delay is
required to generate a neural representation of the
object that is shifted ahead of x00 by a distance correspond-
ing to Ds (see reduced ds-error line in Figure 4)? For
spatial extrapolation to be the correct account of the
flash-initiated result, and for this mechanism to be beha-
viorally relevant (e.g., for producing quick actions), the
additional time must be small.
The following analysis estimates the additional time for
extrapolation to be less than 2% of the “baseline” delay of
100 msec between stimulus presentation and its percep-
tion (De Valois & De Valois 1991). This analysis is based
on a prominent property of the vertebrate visual system
that it consists of two types of pathways (Dowling 1979;
Tessier-Lavigne 2000): the vertical pathway and the hori-
zontal pathway (Fig. 5). In the early visual system, the ver-
tical pathway corresponds to information flow from
photoreceptors to bipolar cells to ganglion cells to LGN
cells, and so on. The horizontal pathway in the retina
includes information flow from one retinal site to a neigh-
boring one via horizontal cells, the amacrine cells, and tan-
gential extensions of dendrites and axon terminals.
Analogous processes are present in the cortex (Bringuier
et al. 1999). In evaluating the consequences of neural
delays and compensation, it is best to treat these two path-
ways independently. Delays in signals traveling along the
vertical pathway are the putative source of lagging retino-
topic coordinates for visual motion. In contrast, the notion
of visual prediction is concerned primarily with horizontal
processes, which transmit neural information between two
neighboring retinotopic sites (Barlow 1953; 1981; Berry
et al. 1999).
It is premature to commit to a specific neural mechan-
ism that would cause a “forward” shift in the coordinates
for moving objects. This shift could be based on the inter-
action of signals between the magnocellular and parvocel-
lular systems (Barlow 1981) (see Fig. 6), on a spatial
reorganization of receptive fields or of retinotopic maps,
or on some other yet more specialized mechanisms (see
further on). Nonetheless, any viable predictive mechanism
would involve two time-consuming processes: “obtaining
a motion sample” and “spatial extrapolation.” How soon
after motion onset can the sampling of motion and the
spatial extrapolation processes be completed to produce
the required forward shift (Ds)? At the outset it must be
recognized that the correct estimate of the time will be
based on the neural representation of Ds (i.e., retinotopic
distance corresponding to Ds) and the time taken by hori-
zontal processes to cover this distance (see, e.g., Anderson
& Van Essen 1987; Berry et al. 1999). In particular, a
correct time estimate will be based on neither the time
the moving object takes to travel the physical distance cor-
responding to Ds, nor on physical or perceived velocity of
the object; rather, it will be based on neural distances and
speed of neural signals (see further on).
5.2.1.1. Motion sampling. In the flash-initiated display,
the sudden motion onset causes neurons at early levels of
the visual pathway, for example, a linear set of photo-
receptors, to respond before the response of correspond-
ing thalamic or cortical neurons. A flash likewise
stimulates photoreceptors before the thalamus or the
cortex. However, there is a crucial difference between
the motion onset stimulus and the flashed stimulus. At
ordinary speeds, the motion-onset stimulus will undergo
a significant shift across several photoreceptors even
prior to the completion of the early-retinal-potential
phase triggered by the flash (Kirschfeld 1983), which is
Figure 5. The pathways in the retina depicting the vertical
(distal–proximal) and the horizontal pathways of information
flow. Adapted from Dowling (1979) and Tessier-Lavigne (2000).
Figure 6. A hypothetical model based on a network with
excitatory and inhibitory interactions. This network involves the
layer 5 pyramidal cells in V1. The vertical processes of the
pyramidal cells are the apical dendrites extending into layer 4.
These dendrites receive horizontal connections from both the
faster transient (Y) cells and the slower sustained (X) cells
located in different sub-layers of layer 4. A moving ball’s
current retinal position is shown at the top of the figure. The
resulting neural representations in layer 4 X and Y maps are
“misaligned” with respect to the retinal representation and with
respect to each other (due to different speeds of the sustained
and transient channels). The excitatory and inhibitory
horizontal connections cause the leftmost pyramidal cell to be
excited, the rightmost pyramidal cell to be inhibited, and the
middle cell’s activity to remain unchanged (because it receives
both excitatory and inhibitory inputs). Thus, the leftmost
pyramidal cell behaves as if it is representing the “current”
position of the ball. Adapted form Barlow (1981).
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well before the impact of the flash on the reduction of neu-
rotransmitter (glutamate) released by the photoreceptors.
Thus, the moving object will have stimulated an array of
photoreceptors even before the output of the first stimu-
lated photoreceptor in the array.
If the onset of the object moving at velocity v occurs in
position x0, the finding in the flash-initiated condition is
that, at the instant the flash is perceived, the moving
object is seen in position corresponding to x0þ Ds. In
the primate visual pathway, a directionally selective
response is first observed in V1 (Hubel & Wiesel 1962).
Input from two neighboring presynaptic neurons is
sufficient to trigger a directionally selective response in
a cortical simple cell (De Valois & Cottaris 1998). In
humans, successive stimulation by a moving object of
two neighboring foveal receptors separated by 2.8 mm
will occur in a very small time window; for example,
within 0.9 msec for an object traveling at 10 deg/s
(Fein & Szuts 1982). Hence, it may be argued that for
objects moving at 10 deg/s, early neurons will have
acquired an adequate motion sample following motion
onset in just under one millisecond. This estimate is
in approximate agreement with previous estimates
(Anderson et al. 1990; Westheimer & McKee 1977).
Note that this does not imply that a full response to
motion (e.g., a directional response) occurs in less than
1 msec, but simply that 0.9 msec after motion onset,
there is motion information in the pathway capable
(later) of a directionally selective neural response. This
information could feed either directly into a motion
extrapolation mechanism or indirectly, after the compu-
tation of a directional response.
5.2.1.2. Spatial extrapolation. The second “spatial
extrapolation” stage involves speed of communication of
neural signals from one retinotopic site to a neighboring
one. A flash-lag effect of magnitude 0.5 degrees of visual
angle corresponds approximately to 0.15 mm of retinal
surface. Frequently cited speeds of signals traveling
along neural pathways in the nervous system range from
0.2 to 120 m/sec. Lateral communication between two
neighboring retinal locations separated by 0.15 mm, via
neural signals traveling even at the slowest speed in this
range of 0.2 m/sec, would occur within 0.75 msec. A
similar scenario holds for other retinotopic maps, for
example, a cortical map, after accounting for cortical
magnification.
According to the estimate1 provided here, for an object
moving at 10 deg/sec, the required input sample and the
resulting extrapolated output will together take only
1.65 msec. This time is less than 2% of the 100 msec base-
line processing time (De Valois & De Valois 1991).
Because the required time for spatial extrapolation is so
small, this represents an extremely efficient mechanism
that could start and finish virtually anytime during the
required baseline (100 msec) delay after motion onset
(Khurana & Nijhawan 1995) (see Fig. 7).
To further clarify, the suggestion here is not that very
early mechanisms accomplish extrapolation, or that within
1.65 msec after motion onset extrapolated output is already
available. It is highly unlikely that extrapolated output is
available before the hyperpolarization response of the photo-
receptors, which has a latency of more than 10 msec. Rather,
the suggestion is that the time taken for an extrapolated
output is only a small fraction of the time longer than the
baseline delay for an “un-extrapolated” output. The added
segment of horizontal pathway responsible for the lateral
shift in coordinates can be interjected at either an “early”
(e.g., at the level of the retinal ganglion cells) or a “late” cor-
tical level. Two further points are worth emphasizing. First,
the time required in the generation of an extrapolated
representation is so short that visual mechanisms could
“over-extrapolate” and place the neural representation of
the moving object farther ahead of the reduced ds-error
line (see Fig. 4) with little computational time cost. There
is already some evidence for over-extrapolation (Berry
et al. 1999; Khurana & Nijhawan 1995; and see further on
in the target article). Over-extrapolation could be useful,
for example, if time-consuming visual processes further
downstream, to which the extrapolation mechanisms
report, cannot compensate for delays (see Fig. 7, inset
“b”). Second, on the present model, further spatial shift
than that depicted in Figure 7, for further reduction or
even complete elimination of the ds-error, is possible.
Such an outcome would be impossible with the differential
latency view (Purushothaman et al. 1998; Whitney &
Figure 7. On the spatial extrapolation view, the latency for the
moving object and the flash, in the flash-initiated condition, is Dti
(input delay). The figure shows how this model applies when the
motion trajectory before the flash is missing, as in the flash-
initiated condition. The reduced ds-error line stops before
intersecting the x ¼ x0 line as the flash-lag effect occurs in the
flash-initiated condition. The extrapolation model brings the
moving object to the correct position on the reduced ds-error
line by two processes: sampling of motion and spatial
extrapolation. These two processes correspond to the thin
broken line consisting of two segments of different slopes,
enlarged in inset “a”. The first segment, parallel to the space–
time plot of physical motion, depicts a motion sample taken by
neighboring neurons in a retinotopic map. The height at which
this segment intersects the x ¼ x0 line is arbitrary and will
depend on whether an early or a late sampling is assumed. The
second segment of greater slope represents the travel of neural
signals along the horizontal visual pathway, which can occur at
higher speed. Inset “b” is made of three segments of different
slopes. It depicts a situation of “over-extrapolation” that
temporarily brings the extrapolated object closer to the thick
continuous (physical) line. The object is brought back to the
reduced ds-error line, as neural processes receiving the over-
extrapolated input are presumed not capable of compensating
for delays (see vertical segment in inset “b”, and see text).
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Murakami 1998), as this would require motion to be pro-
cessed with close to zero latency.
5.2.2. Flash-terminated condition. The foregoing discus-
sion leaves little doubt that an undiminished flash-lag
effect in the flash-initiated condition is not incompatible
with the proposal of visual prediction. I now address
another major empirical challenge for visual prediction
resulting from the flash-terminated condition, in which
the moving object disappears simultaneously with the
flash. At the outset, spatial extrapolation should continue
beyond the time of unpredictable disappearance of the
object. Yet these displays produce no flash-lag effect.
On the spatial extrapolation view, vision contributes to
compensation for neural delays whenever a moving
object is viewed; the flash has only a role of a spatiotem-
poral reference. So, the correct space–time trajectory
for the moving object is the reduced ds-error line.
However, why then does the moving object not appear
to overshoot its disappearance point in this condition
(Fig. 8)?
It is commonly assumed that the full-motion condition of
the flash-lag display is equal to the flash-terminated con-
dition plus the flash-initiated condition. Although this
relationship is correct for describing methodology, neural
responses to the full-motion condition are not equal to
the neural responses to the flash-terminated condition
plus neural responses to the flash-initiated condition. For
example, because of the visual transients generated by the
offset of the moving object, the moving object in the
flash-terminated condition stimulates the visual system in
a dramatically different manner than in the full-motion
condition. The transient generates a strong retinal neural
representation that opposes the previously set-up cortical
representation supporting spatial extrapolation. It is pro-
posed that the newer representation suppresses the
expected “predictive-overshoot” of the moving object and
acts like a “correction-for-spatial-extrapolation.”
The above proposal is inspired by the notion of “biased
competition” in which two neural representations compete
for the control of cell activity (Desimone 1998; Desimone
& Duncan 1995). The assumptions of biased competition
are: that competing representations typically suppress
each other; that competition can occur between two rep-
resentations at a given level, or between low-level (e.g.,
retinal) and high-level (e.g., cortical) representations;
and that the representation that wins the competition
could be “stronger” for one or more of several reasons,
including its recency, novelty, and behavioral significance
to the animal (Desimone 1998). A related notion has been
invoked recently to explain the perceptual phenomenon of
visual masking (Keysers & Perrett 2002). On the spatial
extrapolation view, after some initial motion input, the
neural activity representing the moving object is less
dependent on (external) retinal input, and is supported
more by partially “autonomous” (internal) neural rep-
resentations. These highly processed cortical represen-
tations feed into representations that control limb
movements and typically control actions directed at
moving objects. These representations could, however,
produce their own localization errors if things in the
world abruptly changed. Nonetheless, as these represen-
tations are based on prediction, new retinal input due to
unpredictable change is given a higher relative weight by
the visual system. In addition, greater weighting is
assigned to retinal input, as stimulus offsets strongly stimu-
late the retina (Macknik et al. 2000). It is suggested that
localization errors (predictive-overshoots) are suppressed
by the strong, transient-fed, retinal representation gener-
ated by motion offset. Thus, for example, in the compe-
tition between a high-level cortical representation (RC)
and a low-level thalamic representation (RT), RT domi-
nates (Fig. 8). This leads to a “correction-for-extrapol-
ation” via feedforward competition (Desimone 1998;
Keysers & Perrett 2002). (In section 9.1 of the target
article, I discuss interactions between non-competing
representations.)
The hallmark of competition models is that, when
strengths of the competing representations are changed,
the representation that dominates will change (Keysers &
Perrett 2002). Indeed, there are psychophysical results
that produce the overshoot of moving objects predicted
by the extrapolation model (Freyd 1987; Fu et al. 2001;
Kanai et al. 2004; Whitaker et al. 1998). Interestingly, in
one study an overshoot of the moving object was not
found in human psychophysics, but was revealed in the
monkey visual area V4 (Sundberg et al. 2006). The
authors conjectured that processing at higher cortical
areas beyond V4 must be engaged to fully account for the
lack of overshoot in human psychophysics. I suggest an
Figure 8. In this space–time plot, the moving object stops at
position x0 at time t0, simultaneously with the presentation of
the flash presented in position x0. The fully delayed ds-error line
(from the standard view) stops at the x0 line, which is consistent
with the result of “no effect” in the flash-terminated condition.
However, spatial extrapolation can also explain this result. On
this view, the cortical representation of the moving object (RC),
which is only partially maintained by retinal input, corresponds
to the reduced ds-error (thick broken) line. Once the physical
object is switched off, RC quickly decays (shown by lighter thick
broken line) as retinal input stops. The switching off of the
moving object triggers transient signals, which create a strong
thalamic representation (RT). Because of biased competition,
and because RT is newer input, RT wins and dominates RC and
the percept, overwhelming any predictive-overshoot of the
moving object.
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alternative point of view: Lower-level representations, poss-
ibly thalamic, compete with higher-level representations
such as found in V4. This competition leads to the suppres-
sion of extrapolated V4 output.
Recently, Maus and Nijhawan (2006) empirically tested
the afore-discussed “correction-for-extrapolation” hypoth-
esis (Fig. 9). In the flash-terminated condition, the disap-
pearance of the moving object is an all-or-none event. We
weakened the retinal representation (and its thalamic
counterpart RT) by replacing the all-or-none event by a
luminance ramp. The correction-for-extrapolation hypoth-
esis predicts that in the absence of a strong RT competing
with RC (cortical representation), RC supporting the
moving dot’s extrapolated position will be revealed in per-
ception. Indeed, this was the case. The experiments
(Maus & Nijhawan 2006) revealed a forward extrapolation
of v  175 msec, where v is moving object velocity.
The main empirical challenges for spatial extrapolation
were based on the flash-initiated and flash-terminated
conditions. As has been shown, an unabated flash-lag
effect in the flash-initiated cycle is not inconsistent with
visual prediction, as neural representations supporting
extrapolation can be set up quickly in relation to the input
delay for motion. In fact, the extrapolation times may be so
small that when required, some processes could “over-
extrapolate.” Finally, the “missing predictive-overshoot”
in the flash-terminated condition can be accommodated
by the biased competition model (Desimone 1998),
which suggests a correction for spatial extrapolation
caused by a strong retinal input due to transients. This
new analysis, based on empirical results, reinforces the
general proposal that when possible, the visual system
attempts to minimize localization errors. Both spatial
extrapolation and the correction for it achieve this goal.
6. Further challenges to the notion of visual
prediction
6.1. Luminance contrast dependent variation in the
ﬂash-lag effect
It is known that luminance contrast can influence visual
delay, which in turn can influence the perceptual localiz-
ation and shape of moving objects, as has been shown
by several phenomena. The Pulfrich pendulum effect
occurs when the observer views a moving pendulum bob
with one eye covered by a neutral density filter. As a
result of reduced contrast in one eye, the observer per-
ceives the motion of the swinging bob in a plane as move-
ment along a curved path in depth (Burr & Ross 1979;
Morgan & Thompson 1975). This finding can be explained
in terms of longer visual processing delays for the eye with
the filter, which receives lower image contrast relative to
the other eye. The effect of variations in luminance con-
trast on perceptual distortions in the shape of moving
objects has also been shown (Roufs 1963; Williams & Lit
1983; Zanker et al. 2001). In addition, the effect of lumi-
nance contrast on localization of moving objects has
been studied using the flash-lag effect (Purushothaman
et al. 1998). Purushothaman et al. (1998) found that
value of Ds/v changed from 20 to 70 msec as the lumi-
nance of the moving object was increased (with luminance
of flash held constant) by 1 log unit above detection
Figure 9. (a) The gray background is used only for illustration;
the actual experiment was performed with a homogenous dark
background. A neutral density filter, which decreased in
transmission from 100% (at the 6 o’clock position) to 0.01%
in the counterclockwise direction, was used. Thus, a moving
stimulus (a white dot of fixed luminance) behind the filter
appeared to vary in luminance; it was always visible in the
6 o’clock position and never visible past about the 9 o’clock
position. In condition I, on different trials, the dot moved
back and forth on a short trajectory behind the filter. The
average position of the short trajectory dot was changed from
trial to trial (figure depicts a trial sequence of trials 1, 2, and 3).
A reference line (white radial line segment of shorter length
next to the filter’s edge) was presented on each trial.
Participants said “yes” or “no” depending on whether they saw
the dot at the position of the reference line or not. Detection
thresholds were determined (ThresholdposI, schematically
depicted by the longer line segment). At ThresholdposI, “yes”
and “no” responses were equally likely. (b) In condition II,
the same white dot moved on a long trajectory from the
6 o’clock position into the filter’s denser part until it
disappeared, and again around the 9 o’clock position.
A reference line was presented (white radial line segment
of shorter length). For this task, participants said “ahead”
or “behind” depending on whether they perceived the dot
as disappearing before it reached the reference line or after
it had passed it. From trial to trial, the position of the
reference line was changed to determine the disappearance
threshold (ThresholdposII, schematically depicted by the
longer segment of radial line). At ThresholdposII, “ahead”
and “behind” responses were equally likely. Our main finding
was that (ThresholdposII2 ThresholdposI)/v ¼ 175 msec,
where v is dot velocity. Adapted from Maus and Nijhawan
(2006).
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threshold. Zanker et al. (2001) found a luminance depen-
dent shape distortion for moving objects corresponding to
3 msec. In order for visual compensation to be effective, it
must be flexible, accounting not just for the visual delay
but also for variations in it. Since the flash-lag magnitude
varies with luminance (Purushothaman et al. 1998), this
has been taken to imply that the visual system is not able
to take account of the variations in visual delays. This
has led to the suggestion that visual processes do not con-
tribute to compensation for neural delays (Purushothaman
et al. 1998; Zanker et al. 2001).
This reasoning, however, is questionable. Consider a
related question: How are actions such as catching or
hitting a ball affected by a change in a ball’s luminance
contrast? Depending on the degree to which luminance
contrast varies, performance will either be affected or
not (Anstis et al. 2000). Suppose the change in luminance
contrast is large enough that the catching ability of a player
is affected; that is, at luminance contrast level 1 the player
is able to catch the ball, but at luminance contrast level 2,
he or she is unable to catch the ball. If we follow the
reasoning that luminance contrast–dependent modulation
of the flash-lag effect implies that the visual system does
not compensate, then the luminance contrast–dependent
modulation in behavior would suggest that the nervous
system (as a whole) does not compensate for visual
delays. This is clearly mistaken reasoning because it is all
but certain that the nervous system (as a whole) cannot
function without compensation for neural delays. Hence,
variation in performance, measured either visually (e.g.,
via the flash-lag effect) or through action, cannot be
taken to indicate that there is no compensation for visual
delays; variation in performance simply means that the
output of the system changes when conditions change.
These considerations lead to what I call the fundamental
assumption of compensation for visual delays,2 which
states: “In the absence of mechanisms compensating for
visual delays, many behaviors in otherwise healthy
animals would be disrupted.”
A further question, however, arises. If there is a visual
compensation mechanism, then what might be the range
of environmental conditions (and/or conditions internal to
the animal) within which the mechanism produces an invar-
iant output? All known neural mechanisms have limitations.
Consider the well-known size constancy mechanism. This
mechanism functions well (i.e., produces an invariant size
estimate) only within a limited range of distances – imper-
fect size constancy for distances outside the range does
not mean that size constancy does not occur at all. What
might be the range of luminance contrasts for the moving
object over which spatial extrapolation might produce an
invariant output? It is premature to give a definitive
answer to this question. In the study of size constancy,
zero distance is the natural “anchor point.” One of the diffi-
culties is determining what might be the anchor point for
luminance contrast. There are three possibilities: (a) the
stimulus in an “Off” state; (b) the observer’s absolute detec-
tion threshold; or (c) some “average” photopic luminance
level in which the observer’s visual system evolved.
It is well known that in sports, for example, degradation
of performance occurs outside certain limits of ambient
illumination; play is sometimes stopped because of “bad
light.” From failures of performance meeting task criteria
(e.g., if one is forced to play in bad light), however, one
cannot conclude that compensation for visual delays
does not occur when light is “good” – this would violate
the fundamental assumption of compensation for visual
delays – nor can one conclude that breakdown of per-
formance reflects no compensation for visual delays; beha-
vior can break down because of partial, or inappropriate,
compensation. The only conclusion one can draw from
behavior not meeting task criteria is that compensation is
not appropriate for the total (sensoryþmotor) delay in
the system.
In producing goal-directed behavior, the flexibility of
the animal’s nervous system as a whole would be expected
to be higher than the flexibility of the visual system per se.
This is simply because the activity of single neurons
located relatively late in the sensory-motor stream, for
example, in the spinal cord, can be influenced by many
more neurons, than can the activity of neurons located
early in the visual pathway. Indeed, spinal motor
neurons could receive input from more than two thousand
other neurons (Poritsky 1969). This suggests that if the
visual system contributes to compensation for neural
delays, then this contribution may be less flexible in
accommodating for luminance contrast variations than
the animal’s nervous system as a whole. Therefore, for
different visual delays, compensation could be adjusted
dynamically between visual and motor processes. For
example, for low luminance contrast, where performance
still meets task criteria, the compensation could be
carried out more by the motor than by the visual pro-
cesses. This suggestion is consistent with the results of
Purushothaman et al. (1998) and Zanker et al. (2001),
and reconciles the contrast-dependent variation in the
flash-lag effect with the notion of visual prediction.
6.2. Logical challenges to visual prediction
Compensation for all neural delays can be carried out by
late components of the sensorimotor pathways. As
suggested by Purushothaman et al. (1998), “accurate visu-
ally guided motor actions are likely to depend on motor
instead of perceptual compensation” (p. 424). There is
unequivocal evidence for compensation mechanisms that
are located within the non-visual parts of the nervous
system (Lacquaniti & Maioli 1989). The view challenging
the role of visual prediction and assigning a compensatory
role only to non-visual mechanisms seems parsimonious.
Hence, it has been suggested that visual prediction is
unusual in that, on this proposal, the visual system
somehow attempts to compensate for its own input
delays. In fact, Schlag and Schlag-Rey write: “Clearly,
this is one of the most daring proposals of a top-down
hypothesis. Here, ‘top–down’ means that somehow the
brain is attempting to correct its own input from the
senses” (Schlag & Schlag-Rey 2002, p 197).
On the fundamental assumption of compensation for
visual delays, the delays must be compensated somewhere
within the nervous system. For concreteness, suppose that
the visual delay for a moving ball between the photo-
receptors and the LGN is 50 msec, and the total delay
(for which the nervous system must compensate) involved
in catching the ball is 200 msec. If the 50 msec delay is not
compensated, and if the required precision in performing
the catch is greater than 50 msec, which is common in
even moderately demanding tasks (Tresilian 1993), then
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the animal’s behavior will not meet the task criteria. If, on
the other hand, the animal is able to produce behavior that
meets the task criteria, then it follows that if compensation
for 50 msec (visual delay) is not carried out in the vision
pathway, then it must be carried out in later pathways
before neural stimulation of muscles. If one assumes
only non-visual compensation, then one must also
assume that the non-visual part of the nervous system
has information concerning the 50 msec delay, and that
the nervous system as whole is attempting to correct for
the visual delay. Thus, the criticism that seemed specific
to visual prediction in terms of “correcting its input from
the senses” (Schlag & Schlag-Rey 2002) is not specific at
all, and would apply to any and in fact all predictive mech-
anisms within the CNS.
Furthermore, there are clear examples in which the
CNS does monitor its own input delays. Variables such
as muscle fatigue impact the force a muscle can generate
in response to a given neural signal, so the CNS must
monitor such variables in order to produce a desired tra-
jectory of limb movement (Bullock 2003). Therefore,
mechanisms compensating for delays in the motor system
require information not only about delays resulting from
the sluggish response of muscles to neural stimulation,
but also about variations in these delays caused by
varying degree of muscle fatigue. Helmholtz’s efference
copy notion suggests another example. In order to main-
tain a motionless visual scene during voluntary eye move-
ment, the efference copy of the motor command and the
visual feedback must be available for comparison within
some time window. As change in luminance contrast
changes the retinal input delays, the fact that we perceive
visual scenes as remaining stable under a wide range of
luminance contrasts already supports the view that the
visual system is able to monitor its input delays.
6.2.1. Prismatic adaptation and visual prediction. A
related challenge is posed by adaptation experiments
involving optical distortions (Harris 1963). Humans can
adapt to optical displacements produced by wedge
prisms. Upon first wearing prism goggles, the wearer will
incorrectly reach for objects, but later he or she will
adapt and reach accurately. Such results might suggest
that errors in visual localization, whether resulting from
optical or neural factors, can be dealt with by late
sensory-motor mechanisms, and that compensation for
delays in vision per se is unnecessary for interceptive or
reaching actions.
There are, however three issues that need further atten-
tion. First, there is debate as to whether the adaptation
observed in displaced/inverted vision experiments is
visual or motor (Harris 1980). To the degree that adap-
tation is at the level of vision, the notion of visual predic-
tion would be supported. Second, adaptation to inverted
vision has been tested after days or, at the most, weeks
of the subject’s visual experience while wearing prism
goggles. Although it is not known what the state of the
visual adaptation would be if the experience with displaced
vision was lifelong, the expectation is that adaptation
would be more complete with longer experience. Follow-
ing his famous experiments, Stratton reported that the
difficulty of seeing things as being upright with upright
retinal images (as opposed to inverted retinal images)
seemed entirely due to the “resistance offered by
long-established previous experience” (Stratton 1896).
There are many reports, including those from Stratton in
the 1890s and Kohler in the 1950s and 1960s, indicating
that with time, things appeared more “normal” and, there-
fore, that there was an adaptation at the perceptual level
(Harris 1980). Clearly, with time, the observer’s inter-
action with visual objects improved, so over time the cor-
relation between normalcy in appearance and improved
interaction with things suggests that perception does
impact action. I argue (see further on) that the improved
level of perceptual adaptation feeds into more accurate
action, and more accurate action feeds (via reafference)
into improved perception. A lifetime of experience with
neural delays should no doubt render the visual adjust-
ment complete, and so in this case, action may be influ-
enced strongly by perception. Finally, there are clear
examples of some animal species that do not adapt at all
to displaced vision (Hess 1956). Such animals under dis-
placed vision conditions would starve to death even
though food was nearby. Therefore, if one were to follow
the reasoning that ready adjustment in humans to optical
distortion suggests late compensation, then, by the same
token, a lack of adjustment would imply compensation at
the early stage of visual processing. Because in evolution
older systems are modified, not discarded, the lack of
adaptation in some older systems suggests that some
form of visual compensation, perhaps less flexible than
motor compensation, may also exist in more recent
systems such as humans.
7. Functions and mechanisms of spatial
extrapolation
We have so far considered the effect of extrapolation on
perception. This is indeed appropriate, as the one empiri-
cal basis of the current viewpoint is psychophysical.
Although extrapolation carried out by visual mechanisms
could impact behavior directly with no perceptual conse-
quences, here I consider only processes that can and do
reveal themselves perceptually. Therefore, the discussion
here will keep in view the human flash-lag results. Mul-
tiple retina-, eye-, head-, and body-centered coordinate
systems that encode locations of objects for various func-
tions exist within the CNS. One encounters the issue of
neural delays and compensation not just when these coor-
dinate frames are static, but also when they are moving, as,
for example, when the eyes or the head track a moving
object. Although this situation can be incorporated
within the general framework presented here, detailed
analysis of neural delays for moving reference frames is
beyond the scope of this article – the reader is directed
to previous empirical work on moving reference frames
(Brenner et al. 2001; Nijhawan 2001; Schlag & Schlag-
Rey 2002). A forthcoming article considers the conse-
quences of delay compensation when the whole animal
moves in relation to static objects (Changizi et al., in
press).
The important function of compensation for neural
delays is likely to be carried out by multiple spatial extra-
polation mechanisms at different levels of processing;
the requirements for spatial extrapolation of coordinates
are very simple, and mechanisms that could potentially
accomplish extrapolation are present at virtually all levels
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of neural processing. However, the immediate goal of the
mechanisms at different levels may not be exactly the
same. In addition, these mechanisms may be variants of
one underlying process or could be significantly different
from each other. I now consider these mechanisms.
There is a natural link between mechanisms of spatial
extrapolation and their function. For example, a mechan-
ism serving a high-speed response may be different from
a mechanism for which speed is less relevant. The simplest
function of visual mechanisms compensating for delays
would be to remove errors in localization and support
rapid behaviors such as orienting toward moving objects.
Mechanisms serving this function might be located early
in the visual pathway. Intermediate-level mechanisms
also may serve the function of perception of objects and
of planning of more complex actions that involve coordi-
nation of gross and fine bodily movements over a longer
time frame. Finally, late mechanisms of visual prediction
may be related to visual feedback to the animal about suc-
cesses or failures of actions that have already been
performed. The early-to-late hierarchy mimics the
literal-to-abstract representation of space in the early to
late representations in parietal and frontal cortical areas
(Andersen et al. 1993). The distinction between early
versus late compensation mechanisms may also be under-
stood in terms of the requirements of speed, accuracy, and
flexibility of actions; early mechanisms may feed into fast
relatively stereotyped actions, whereas late mechanisms
might feed into actions in which variability in sensory
and motor delays is likely to be high, or in which infor-
mation about delays in the feedforward vision pathways
is less reliable.
The suggestion that compensation mechanisms may be
ubiquitous within the CNS is not without support. There
exist a great variety of potential mechanisms capable of
spatial extrapolation (see, e.g., Baldo & Caticha 2005).
The required lateral shifts in coordinates could be based
on shifts in peaks of population response already shown
in the retina (Berry et al. 1999) and in V1 (Jancke et al.
1999); shifts in receptive fields, or on the basis of lateral
spread of neural facilitation (Erlhagen 2003; Grzywacz &
Amthor 1993; Kirschfeld & Kammer 1999; Sillito et al.
1994), and other forms of distortion of retinotopic rep-
resentations (Sundberg et al. 2006). Such mechanisms
are known to exist not just in the visual system, but also
in the auditory system (Witten et al. 2006). Other, more
specialized, computational schemes, such as “shifter cir-
cuits,” can also produce a horizontal shift in neural array
activity on the basis of motion information (Anderson &
Van Essen 1987). Finally, there are mechanisms located
in higher cortical areas or the cerebellum that integrate
information from multiple sources. These mechanisms
fall in the general category of internal models (Kawato
1999).
7.1. Prediction in feedforward vision pathways serves
perception for online control of behavior
The goal of visual prediction cannot be solely to inform
perception. Rather, visual prediction must impact the
behavior of animals and ultimately contribute to a survi-
val advantage. Barlow has argued that significant recod-
ing of sensory information occurs within the retina
itself (Barlow 1979), and that retinal processes per se
contribute to transformations of information in prep-
aration for use during behavior. Indeed, mechanisms
for spatial extrapolation have been discovered in the
retina (Berry et al. 1999) and in other early stages of
visual processing (Barlow 1953). Berry et al. (1999)
used isolated retinas of the salamander and the rabbit
in their studies. A moving or a flashed bar was projected
on the retina, and spiking activity from a population of
ganglion cells was recorded simultaneously. The cells
responded with a latency of about 50 msec to the flash.
However, the peak of the population cell response to
the moving bar appeared close to the leading edge of
the bar, instead of trailing behind the bar’s center by
50 msec. (Note that full compensation requires the popu-
lation response to be aligned with the bar’s center. The
forward shift of the population response in relation to the
bar’s center is noteworthy, and will be further considered
later.) This extrapolation of the response of the ganglion
cells may be explained in terms of spatio-temporal filtering,
biphasic response of cells, and contrast gain control (Berry
et al. 1999). These mechanisms are not unique either to
lower species or to the early parts of the vision pathway;
analogous mechanisms exist at higher levels of processing
in primates (Shapley & Victor 1978), which may explain
the flash-lag results in humans.
If one assumes that online behavior is controlled by per-
ception of events (Davidson 1970), then in humans the
simplest possible function of extrapolation in the feedfor-
ward visual pathway, say, between the photoreceptors and
V1, would be to aid interaction with moving objects. On
this view, extrapolation reduces latency-based spatial
error in the perceived position of moving objects such as
tennis balls, which in turn aids successful interceptive
actions such as hitting tennis balls. This possibility,
however, cannot be entirely correct, as humans can
perform goal-directed actions without awareness of the
position of the visual objects (Goodale et al. 1986). Thus,
it cannot be that the perception of the true position of
objects is necessary for action. The general issue of
whether perception is necessary for action has bearing
on this point.
The vision pathway consists of two parallel streams. The
magnocellular stream consists of larger, faster-conducting
neurons; these neurons appear to be specialized for pro-
cessing spatial and motion information. The parvocellular
stream consists of smaller, slower-conducting neurons.
These neurons seem more specialized for processing of
object and color information. The functional specialization
of the two streams, which starts with parvo- and magno-
retinal ganglion cells, continues beyond V1 as the dorsal
and ventral pathways (Mishkin & Ungerleider 1983).
One point of view argues for substantial functional inde-
pendence between the two streams captured by the
dichotomy of “vision for perception” versus “vision for
action” (Goodale & Milner 1992). The suggestion is that
the dorsal stream provides visual information to action
systems, whereas the ventral stream provides visual infor-
mation for perception (Goodale & Milner 1992). Support
for this position comes from findings in humans that
damage to the dorsal stream produces a deficit (optic
ataxia) in the action system but not the perception
system, whereas damage to the ventral pathway impairs
perception and recognition of objects but spares the
ability to produce correct actions.
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If perception and action were based on visual processes
that were completely isolated in independent pathways,
then one might be forced to come to the conclusion that
perception does not affect action systems, and so compen-
sation for delays at the perceptual level cannot contribute
to adaptive behavior. There are, however, virtually no
researchers who believe there to be a complete segre-
gation of visual processes for perception versus action.
For example, Goodale and Milner (1992) have argued
that the visual phenomenon of size constancy plays a
role in the scaling of grasp size. Therefore, it may not be
unreasonable to expect that the delay-compensated per-
ceived position of moving objects, which is a type of con-
stancy phenomenon (see further on), does play a role in
interceptive actions.
7.2. Internal model for visual prediction
Much of the flash-lag debate has centered on the
interpretation of the effect given in section 7.1; that is,
spatial extrapolation is caused by visual mechanisms in
the feedforward vision pathway serving perception.
I now develop a generalized concept of visual prediction
that assumes that spatial extrapolation is not based on
mechanisms in the stream that directly feeds perception,
that is, the parvocellular stream. A modular approach is
adopted, with multiple mechanisms located at different
levels within the CNS. The picture that emerges is consist-
ent with the notion of internal models that have been
useful in describing both motor and sensory systems. In
outlining the internal model for visual prediction
(IMVP), I begin by describing the various processes and
component mechanisms that make up the IMVP.
7.2.1. Prediction in feedforward vision pathways serves
online control of behavior: Impact of “motor maps” on
perception. There are psychophysical (Nijhawan 1997)
and neurophysiological (Sundberg et al. 2006) reports of
color-specific effects that are easiest to explain in terms
of spatial extrapolation within the ventral stream. There-
fore, mechanisms for extrapolation may be located in
both vision streams. However, if one assumes that the
ventral stream is mainly responsible for visual awareness
(Goodale & Milner 1992), then an extrapolation mechan-
ism cannot be located only in the ventral stream. This is
because goal-directed actions can be performed without
awareness of the stimulus, as revealed by the pathological
phenomenon of blindsight (Stoerig & Cowey 1997; Wei-
skrantz 1996) and in normal observers (Milner &
Goodale 1995). For simplicity, and for the purposes of
addressing the debate directly, I assume that visual extra-
polation mechanisms are located only in the sensory path-
ways feeding motor processes for control of behavior.
Cortical and subcortical areas receiving sensory input
that function mainly to control behaviors such as orienting
and reaching towards, or withdrawing from moving
objects, are common in the CNS.
7.2.1.1. Compensation for lag of moving objects in
motor-oriented reference frames. Figure 1 depicted the
effect of visual delays on a wave of neural activity in
a retina-centered cortical frame and on human perception.
In order to execute fast interceptive actions, the CNS
requires not just spatial but also temporal information.
I first consider neural transformations that provide action
systems with spatial information. Visual input is initially
encoded in a retina-centered frame. Interaction with
objects requires that the location of objects be transformed
from a sensory-based representation into a muscle-centered
representation. Intermediate eye- and head-centered maps
contribute to such transformations. In the lateral intraparie-
tal area and the parietal reach region of the cortex, there are
maps for controlling eye movements and reaching move-
ments, respectively (Andersen & Buneo 2002). The
primary function of such maps is to specify the position of
stimuli for action (Taira et al. 1990).
In addition to cortical maps, there are many subcortical
retina-centered frames, for example, in the primate
superior colliculus (SC), which serve mainly a motor func-
tion (Cynader & Berman 1972). Findings of various
studies suggest that the SC represents a “motor map” of
locations for the guidance of orienting responses such as
saccades and head movements (DuBois & Cohen 2000;
C. Lee et al. 1988; Schiller 1984; Sparks & Jay 1986;
Sparks et al. 1990). Many SC cells respond to moving
visual stimuli (Dean et al. 1989). An uncompensated delay
in the retina to the SC pathway will, for example, cause a
saccadic target in motion to lag in the retina-centered SC
frame. This lag, in turn, would affect the direction, ampli-
tude, and velocity of saccades, impeding the animal’s
ability to rapidly orient toward a moving target that might
be of imminent interest or danger to the animal. This
suggests a strong basis for compensation of visual delays
in the retina–SC pathway. Indeed, mechanisms for
extrapolation have recently (Witten et al. 2006) been uncov-
ered in the owl’s optic tectum (homolog of the mammalian
superior colliculus).
There is also a wealth of data related to how the CNS
obtains timing information for potential action. In order
to hit a fast-moving tennis ball (say), the player’s racket
must arrive in the correct position at the correct time; so
in addition to position information, the action systems of
the hitter require precise timing information. One
related line of research is based on the time-to-collision
(TTC) paradigm (Bootsma & Oudejans 1993; D. N. Lee
1976; D. N. Lee & Reddish 1981; Regan 1992; Tresilian
1993; Wagner 1982). Gibson proposed that information
for acting on the world is contained in the stimulus array
in the form of invariants, and can be directly used by the
animal without recourse to internal representations
(Gibson 1961). D. N. Lee (1976) applied Gibson’s
approach to situations in which animals encounter
moving objects. For an approaching object, TTC can be
computed on the basis of the ratio of retinal image size
divided by the rate of expansion of the retinal image.
Recent evidence suggests that computation of TTC is con-
siderably more complex than previously expected (Tresi-
lian 1999), however, the basic premise of much of the
TTC research is that the CNS uses visual information
directly to predict the time of collision. In particular, this
point of view rarely considers internal representations
and perception as necessary for action. The evidence
that optical information is used in the computation of
TTC in lower species, such as pigeons (Wang & Frost
1992), gannets (D. N. Lee & Reddish 1981), and house-
flies (Wagner 1982), underscores this point.
Speeded actions directed at moving targets depend on
precise spatial information. The TTC approach does not
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explicitly address where or how visual delays, which would
contribute to spatial errors, are compensated. I argue that
a corollary of the TTC approach is that visual mechanisms
compensate for visual delays. Consider, for example,
experiments revealing the ability of humans to estimate
the future time of arrival at a predetermined position of
visual objects traveling at constant speed. Observers are
accurate to within 10 msec in estimating arrival times of
objects at positions that are more than 2000 msec in the
future (Bootsma & Oudejans 1993). As the visual proces-
sing delay is much longer than 10 msec, it is clear that in
order to perform such tasks, this delay must be compen-
sated. In addition, visual processing delay is much
smaller than 2000 msec. Thus, the mechanisms that pur-
portedly predict a moving object’s position 2000 msec
into the future can certainly predict the object’s position
over a much shorter time, corresponding to a visual
delay of, for example, 100 msec. Therefore, it is implicit
in the TTC approach that the CNS uses optical infor-
mation to compensate for visual delays. This compen-
sation, however, may be temporal rather than spatial in
nature. Thus, the compensation may not involve an explicit
spatially extrapolated representation.
Frost and colleagues (Sun & Frost 1998; Wang & Frost
1992) have found evidence of neurons that compute TTC
in the nucleus rotundus of pigeons (the homolog of the
pulvinar in the mammalian thalamus), a major midbrain
area receiving input from the optic tectum. Interestingly,
these researchers did not find evidence of neurons that
compute TTC in the optic tectum (Wang & Frost 1992).
Since mechanisms for spatial extrapolation have been
found in the optic tectum (Witten et al. 2006), this
suggests the interesting possibility that neurons in the
optic tectum spatially extrapolate sensory input, and that
this extrapolated output is sent to nucleus rotundus for
computations of timing.
7.2.1.2. Prediction minimizes the interference of non-
veridical percepts with online action. The present hypoth-
esis suggests that compensation for visual delays is not
carried out in the feedforward ventral pathway serving
perception. What, then, is the function of extrapolation in
perception revealed by the flash-lag, and how does it
occur? I suggest that extrapolation in perception occurs in
two steps. The first step is extrapolation carried out by feed-
forward visual processes for online control of action. This
extrapolation is not directly revealed in perception. The
second step is the communication of the extrapolated
visual data to ventral processes at a later stage of the
vision pathway. Thus, the perceptual consequences of extra-
polation are there due to crosstalk between the dorsal and
the ventral pathways at a late stage (Khurana et al. 2006).
The function of this mechanism is to remove conflict
between object positions available to perception and
action systems. Note that the lack of necessity of correct
perceptual information for online action (as noted above)
is one thing, but the perceptual system delivering non-
veridical position information is quite another. This point
is brought out quite revealingly when one reconsiders the
effect of delays in the ventral stream on the perception of
moving objects. In the absence of compensation, the
perceived position of moving objects would be non-
veridical (Fig. 1b). Thus, in light of everyday observations
of successful interceptive actions, a suggestion that there
is no perceptual compensation for delays would imply not
just that perceptual compensation is unnecessary for
online actions, but also that online actions are immune to
non-veridical percepts of moving objects. Contrary to the
expectation that perception may be irrelevant for action,
non-veridical percepts (e.g., geometric illusions) have
been shown to influence actions (Franz et al. 2000). There-
fore, a behavioral advantage would be gained for visual
mechanisms that remove errors in perceptual localization
of moving objects.
7.2.2. Prediction resulting from processes beyond feed-
forward vision pathways: Extrapolated perception
caused by feedback from motor processes. Early
sensory mechanisms and extensions of these mechanisms
found in later areas of the primate visual systems might
explain the flash-lag effect in humans (Berry et al. 1999;
Witten et al. 2006). There is a distinct possibility,
however, that the extrapolation mechanisms revealed in
the early processes in lower species feed only action
systems. Thus, the connection between early mechanisms
and human perception may be less straightforward than
previously suggested (Gegenfurtner 1999).
The currently predominant view is that prediction exists
mainly in the motor components of the nervous system
(Wolpert & Flanagan 2001). In consonance with this
view, I assume that extrapolation mechanisms exist in
neither the action- nor the perception-oriented feedfor-
ward vision pathways, but are located in later brain areas
serving action: Motor mechanisms receive delayed
sensory data consisting a spatial error, extrapolate, and
send the compensated information to the muscles.
Motor extrapolation is carried out during actual inter-
actions, or planning of interactions, or during imagined
interactions (mental rehearsal). Extrapolation in percep-
tion then results either because of predictive motor pro-
cesses interacting with visual processes, or because of a
deep-seated unity between motor and perceptual pro-
cesses (see further on). The interaction could be sup-
ported by feedback from motor areas to the visual areas,
analogous to the efference copy notion of feedforward
control, or by communication between motor and visual
neurons within a given area of the CNS. On the feedback
view, the extrapolated motor output is sent not just to the
muscles, but a copy of this output is also fed back to visual
cortical areas influencing perception. A strong case for the
impact of feedback from higher cortical areas on percep-
tion has been made (Lamme & Roelfsema 2000). In
addition, it is known that in humans, frontal cortical
areas can modulate neural activity in visual areas
(Sterzer & Kleinschmidt 2007). The function of the inter-
action between motor and visual processes is to provide
the animal with visual feedback resulting from actual
actions directed at moving objects. Without this mechan-
ism, there would be an offset between the time–space of
the performed action and the time–space of the visual
feedback resulting from the action.
Similarities between motor extrapolation and its
counterpart in perception may be understood along a
different line. Many influential researchers have suggested
that despite apparent differences, perception and action
are two sides of the same coin (see, e.g., Sperry 1952). Evi-
dence for this position comes from multiple sources. For
example, the perception and production of vocal sounds
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appear to be served by the same underlying neural
structures (Liberman & Mattingly 1985; Williams &
Nottebohm 1985); experiments requiring human subjects
to both produce actions and view events relatable to those
actions (Mu¨sseler & Prinz 1996; Parkinson & Khurana
2007; Stu¨rmer et al. 2000) have found similarities in
results across the two domains; and neurons in many
parts of the CNS respond both when the animal performs
an action and also when the animal views an event relata-
ble to that action. In one study, Port et al. (2001) recorded
neural activity in the monkey motor cortex either while the
animal acted to catch a moving object, or when it simply
viewed the same object without performing an overt
action. A significant proportion of investigated neurons
responded both when the monkey performed the action
and when the monkey simply looked at the moving object.
Many neuroscientists (Arbib 1972; Rizzolatti et al. 1997;
Sperry 1952) have attempted to diffuse the sharp bound-
ary between the sensory and the motor systems on theor-
etical grounds. During evolution, there is no “jump” that
can be discerned between the nervous systems of primitive
species, whose primary function is to produce overt
responses conducive to survival, and of higher species, in
which perceptual-cognitive systems seem to have
become disengaged from action systems (Sperry 1952).
On the single system view, one should not be surprised
to find similar mechanisms performing similar functions
in apparently different parts of the CNS. Parsimony
suggests that if there are mechanisms compensating for
delays within the motor system, then similar mechanisms
are also likely to be present in the visual system, and
vice versa (Nijhawan & Kirschfeld 2003).
It is worth noting that the flash-lag effect in the flash-
initiated condition is better explained in terms of visual
mechanisms in the feedforward vision pathways. Nonethe-
less, the late mechanism described here could modulate
the extrapolated output of feedforward visual mechanisms.
As discussed in section 5.2.1, the time required for extra-
polation in the feedforward vision pathway is vanishingly
small, so a visual mechanism could “over-extrapolate.”
There is, in fact, evidence that the feedforward pathway
does over-extrapolate. First, the flash-lag effect in the
flash-initiated condition is larger in magnitude than in
the complete motion condition (Khurana & Nijhawan
1995). Second, Berry et al. (1999) found the population
ganglion-cell response to be shifted further forward of
the middle of the moving bar. (Note that precise compen-
sation for delays would require the population response to
be aligned with the center of the moving bar.) It is unlikely
that early mechanisms could precisely compensate for the
neural delays or deliver a reliable enough output for the
animal to act on. Thus, over-extrapolation may be a
result of “rough and ready” computation provided by the
early visual pathway. For the purposes of action, the
over-extrapolated output would then require modulation,
which would be undertaken by the late mechanism
described here.
7.2.3. Forward models. There are many types of internal
models. Internal models of the motor system are “neural
mechanisms that can mimic the input/output character-
istics, or their inverses, of the motor apparatus” (Kawato
1999, p. 718). There is also evidence for internal models
within sensory systems; one such model within the
vestibular system functions to represent a stable
orientation of the head with respect to the world
(Merfeld et al. 1999).
There are two varieties of internal models: forward
models predict the next state of the motor apparatus
given the current state and motor command, and inverse
models infer the motor command that caused a change
in state on the basis of feedback from sensory data (e.g.,
vision and proprioception). Forward models are necessary
when delays in the sensory motor loops are significant.
A generalized internal model that combines prediction
and sensory feedback to estimate the current state of the
motor apparatus is known as the “internal forward
model” (Wolpert et al. 1995). In a study testing the exist-
ence of this model, participants moved their unseen arm
in the presence of a null, an assistive, or a resistive force.
When required to estimate their arm position during the
initial stages of movement, participants overestimated
the distance by which their arm had moved (Wolpert
et al. 1995). The overestimation error reduced during
the later parts of movement, suggesting the engagement
of a forward model when sensory feedback from the
limb is relatively weak at the beginning of movement.
(An alternative account of this result is considered later.)
Control and feedback are essential features of the
internal models of the motor system. Muscles and limbs
may be considered part and parcel of the internal model
for the motor apparatus (Kawato 1999), as the cortex con-
trols the movement of limbs, and the limbs in turn send
sensory input to the cortex. An IMVP cannot have visual
objects as its components. This is because visual objects
are “external” entities that cannot be controlled by the
internal model. Likewise, the IMVP cannot include the
retina as its component. (There does not seem to be any evi-
dence that feedback from higher brain areas can descend
down to the retina.) However, such a model can include
any or all components of the visual system up to and includ-
ing the LGN. The LGN receives a massive number of des-
cending fibers from the cortex, and is the lowest known
level of the visual system at which cortical feedback can
modulate ongoing neural activity (Cudeiro & Sillito 2006).
Descending fibers affect the ongoing thalamocortical trans-
fer of sensory information and may, indeed, serve a predic-
tive function (Engel et al. 2001; Sillito et al. 1994).
I suggest that the concept of the internal model for the
motor apparatus may be naturally extended to incorporate
visual prediction, with the qualification that in IMVP
sensory input has a different role than it does in the
motor model. The suggestion here is that neural represen-
tations in the LGN are both stimulus-driven sensory enti-
ties (based on input from the retina) and controlled entities
(receiving descending cortical input), just as the neural
limb representations (not the limbs per se) are in the
motor models. What distinguishes IMVP from the motor
model is the retina-to-LGN segment, which cannot be
controlled. In the motor model, there is no strictly
sensory segment.
The present IMVP model has another unique feature.
In the IMVP, extrapolation can occur within the feedfor-
ward vision pathway, which may provide a rough and
ready over-extrapolated output (Berry et al. 1999;
Khurana & Nijhawan 1995). This suggests an alternative
account of Wolpert et al.’s (1995) results in which partici-
pants overestimated the distance by which their arm had
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moved during the initial stages of movement. This result
may be due to over-extrapolation in the proprioceptive
input pathway, and not due to a greater engagement of a
high-level forward model during the initial stages of move-
ment. The overestimation is revealed during the early
stages of movement because the late modulatory process
that keeps over-extrapolation in check has as yet not
been engaged.
7.3. Support for IMVP
Without doubt, the motor system contributes to compen-
sation for delays during action (Lacquaniti & Maioli 1989).
It follows that if the flash-lag has something to do with
compensation for neural delays, then one should certainly
observe a flash-lag effect for action. Such an effect has
indeed been observed. If during voluntary limb movement
a flash is presented in alignment with the moving, invisible,
limb, then the observer sees the flash in a position lagging
the registered position of the invisible limb (Nijhawan &
Kirschfeld 2003; and see further on in the target article).
One may attempt to explain this “motor flash-lag” result
in terms of shorter latency for limb proprioception relative
to the latency for the flash. However, the average motor
flash-lag corresponds to Ds/v ¼ 128.5 msec. Because
the input delay in the perception of the flash itself is
likely to be in this time range, this explanation would
have to assume an impossible, close-to-zero latency for
limb proprioception.
Two suggestions follow from the motor flash-lag
result. First, the finding of similar effects in perception
and action reinforces previous suggestions that the
sensory and the motor systems have an underlying
unity (Arbib 1972; Rizzolatti et al. 1997; Sperry 1952).
Second, there is little doubt that the two flash-lag
effects, one measured in relation to a moving external
object and the other in relation to the moving invisible
limb under the observer’s voluntary control, belong to
the same category of phenomena. Hence, it is probable
that the two effects have a common origin. Compen-
sation for neural delays via feedforward (Georgopoulos
1986) or anticipatory motor control (Ghez & Krakauer
2000) that readily explains motor flash-lag, has the
advantage of parsimony: the two effects, the standard
flash-lag and the motor flash-lag, can be explained with
one hypothesis.
We employed the flash-lag effect to test for the existence
of an IMVP (Rojas-Anya et al. 2005). A previous study
(Batista et al. 1999) supporting the existence of internal
models found that visually guided reach plans in posterior
parietal cortex are represented in an eye-centered frame;
neural response was modulated by gaze direction irrespec-
tive of retinal position of visual reach targets in this study.
Using the flash-lag effect, in our study we asked whether
the instantaneous position of a moving item is represented
in an eye-centered frame (Rojas-Anya et al. 2005). The
moving item was either a visual target or the observer’s
invisible limb under voluntary control. During movement,
a flash was presented in alignment with the moving item.
The observers’ gaze direction was manipulated such that
at the time of the flash, the moving item (visual target or
observer’s limb) either approached the fovea or receded
away from it. We found that in both cases, a much stronger
flash-lag effect occurred when the item approached the
fovea than when the item receded away from the fovea.
The asymmetric flash-lag for visual motion is consistent
with previous results with visual stimuli (Mateeff &
Hohnsbein 1988). However, the same asymmetry for the
voluntarily moved limb (Rojas-Anya et al. 2005), in the
absence of any retinal image motion, shows two things.
First, consistent with previous observations (Batista et al.
1999), the nervous system uses an eye-centered frame
for representing location of moving limbs. Second, the
similarity of gaze-contingent modulation of the flash-lag
effect across the modalities suggests that the nervous
system uses a common rule for localizing moving items.
These results support the suggestion that the CNS uses
an internal model to perform the important task of localiz-
ing both moving objects and moving limbs.
On a final note, it is likely that there is reciprocal influ-
ence between visual and motor processes – thus, motor
processes not only inform but also receive feedback from
visual processes, and vice versa. As Helmholtz argued (see
Warren & Warren 1968, p. 112), the interactions between
motor and visual representations may be trained by experi-
ences such as the stimulation of the observer’s own retinas
caused by voluntary movements of his or her own limbs.
The suggested interaction between voluntary movements
and vision leading to common localization codes for visual
objects and limbs would require cross-modal plasticity, for
which there is ample evidence (Goel et al. 2006; Held &
Freedman 1963).
8. Visual prediction: New, or another constancy?
Although the proposal of visual prediction has been
deemed to be novel by some, this concept is in consonance
with various constancy phenomena. Consider, for
example, size constancy, which minimizes variation in
the perceived size of objects despite variation in their
retinal image size. Visual prediction may be thought of
as a process that achieves “lag-constancy for moving
objects.” Just as the distance between the observer’s eyes
and objects is variable, so is the velocity of moving
objects. Let an “early” and a “late” neural visual represen-
tation of a moving ball be denoted by RA and RB, respect-
ively, with the goal of the visual compensation being to
reduce discrepancy between RA and RB. Suppose
further that vn and vN are two different velocities of the
ball, with vN . vn. If there were no visual compensation,
then the difference between RA and RB for vN will be
greater than the difference between RA and RB for vn. Fur-
thermore, in the absence of any visual compensation, the
difference between RA and RB would be expected to
increase linearly with object velocity. Visual compensation
for delays would achieve lag constancy for moving objects
by minimizing the variation of the difference between RA
and RB for different velocities. This suggestion is analo-
gous to suggestions concerning motion deblurring (Burr
1980; Burr & Morgan 1997), in which the visual system
removes motion-smear that would otherwise result from
persistence of neural activity. Due to motion deblurring,
a moving object appears relatively constant in shape,
a process termed “sharpness constancy” (Ramachandran
et al. 1974). In the absence of sharpness constancy, the
same moving object, traveling at different speeds, would
appear more or less elongated (smeared).
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9. Implications for neural prediction
Until now, the approach developed here has focused on
visual processes leading to perception or on visual pro-
cesses feeding into action systems, which nonetheless do
ultimately manifest themselves perceptually. However,
the current approach can be easily adapted for visual
spatial extrapolation processes that exclusively supply con-
trollers of end-effectors with no concomitant influence on
perception. The current approach can, furthermore, be
applied to the investigation of prediction in the CNS
more generally – an approach that may be termed
neural prediction. Such an approach would complement
other approaches (Duhamel et al. 1992; Ghez & Krakauer
2000; Kawato 1999; Wolpert & Flanagan 2001) investi-
gating prediction phenomena in the CNS. The general
implication drawn from the present approach is that the
function of predictive mechanisms, located anywhere in
the CNS, is to coordinate neural activity between different
parts of the CNS.
9.1. Coordination of neural representations
It is suggested that a basic goal of the CNS is coordination
of neural activity across various levels within the sensory
and the motor systems. During normal behaviors under
sensory guidance, the animal’s actions depend on many
neural representations existing at multiple levels in different
modalities. Information must be exchanged between rep-
resentations, therefore necessitating the translation of infor-
mation (Andersen et al. 1993). For example, during visually
guided action, information must be exchanged between
visual brain areas representing position of objects in the
environment and somatosensory/motor brain areas repre-
senting the position of the animal’s effectors. Typically the
distances that separate the representations are large, so
the information exchange between the representations is
time consuming. Neural prediction suggests that the goal
of any type of compensation is to produce coordination
between the time-varying neural representations that exist
in parts of the CNS separated by significant delays.
Suppose two neural representations, RA and RB, exist in
two different parts of the CNS. As discussed in section
5.2.2, when there are inconsistencies, these representations
might compete to control cell activity. For non-competing
representations, there are three types of potential errors
between RA and RB, resulting from neural delays: (1) The
moving coordinates of an item in one representation (say,
RA) may lead relative to the coordinates of the same item
in another representation (say, RB); for example, RA and
RB could both be representing the visual position of a
moving ball (say), with one being a retinal representation
and the other a representation in LGN. In another situ-
ation, RA could be located in the visual and RB in the
motor system, with RB representing the position of the
ball in torso-centered coordinates. In yet another situation,
RA could belong to one item (e.g., the ball) and RB to a
different item (e.g., the subject’s arm). Which represen-
tations are created, and which representations interact
during behavior, will depend on the specific behavior. In
general, the distances separating the representations – and
consequently the neural delays – will vary. The task of
coordination would be to minimize the differences
between RA and RB. (2) Different modalities process
information at different speeds. Coordination would
reduce the potential error between two representations
(e.g., vision and touch), created by one object (e.g., an
insect moving quickly on the observer’s arm). (3) The
neural latencies for different stimuli within a given modality
vary depending on various properties (e.g., stimulus inten-
sity). In the absence of a coordinating influence, for
moving objects, the “rule” that connects the object location
in retinal coordinates (say) to the object location in head-
centered coordinates further downstream, would vary as a
function of the contrast level of the stimulus. In this case,
the coordinating influence would act to minimize the
required modification of the rule in different situations.
10. Summary and conclusions
It is clear that predictive phenomena could not have
evolved without input to the CNS from continuous time-
varying stimuli such as those resulting from movement of
objects, or if the world consisted only of discrete aperiodic
events and unchanging objects. It is also clear that predic-
tive responses seen in animals and neurons could not exist
without compensation of the significant time delays that
are intrinsic to all neural processes. Previous researchers
have asked how the CNS reconstructs the continuous
time-varying stimulus from discrete spike trains (Bialek
et al. 1991). However, neurons located far from the recep-
tor epithelia face the additional challenge of reconstructing
the current state of the time-varying stimulus. This current
state of the stimulus may be necessary data for decision pro-
cesses, the outcome of which would directly determine
whether the animal acts or withholds action, or which
action the animal selects. In addition, the current state of
changing stimuli may be necessary for providing the
animal feedback about actions it has performed.
The reconstruction of the current state of the stimulus
could be undertaken by a predictive process within the
visual system; however, at the outset, prediction appears
to be a high-level phenomenon. Hence, previous proposals
of visual prediction led to wide debate. On the one hand,
the debate is intertwined with the flash-lag findings based
on unpredictable motion, and, on the other, with logical
challenges for the notion of visual prediction. New analysis
and data reveal that empirical results with unpredictable
motion, and in particular the flash-terminated and flash-
initiated conditions, are not inconsistent with visual pre-
diction. In fact, the analysis shows that the times involved
by the putative extrapolation mechanism are so small that
the mechanisms may be more efficient than previously
anticipated. In terms of logic, the fuel for the debate is
the assumption that late (non-visual) processes compen-
sate for all the delays during sensory-motor interaction.
The corollary of this viewpoint is that the motor system
receives spatially lagged visual input. Visual prediction
suggests that the lag in the sensory data is compensated
by visual spatial mechanisms in the feedforward vision
pathways or by interactions of vision processes with late
neural process linked to action.
Interception of moving targets is thought to depend on
the motor system’s ability to produce an output with fea-
tures that match properties of the moving target. For
example, when we attempt to catch a ball in flight, our
motor system attempts to match the instantaneous
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position of our moving hand with the position of the
moving ball. However, an opposite position that is not
often entertained is that the goal of the visual system is
to deliver to the animal visual information that is suitably
shaped for action directed at a moving ball. Thus, during
a catch, the visual system modifies the perceived position
of the ball so that it matches the position of the moving
hand.3 On this view, the goal of the visual system is to gen-
erate an output that has shared features with motor pro-
cesses: in particular, predictions (Wilson & Knoblich
2005).
The proposal is that visual representations that receive
feedback from higher cortical areas are susceptible to modi-
fication. Thus, these visual representations are controlled
entities, just like neural limb representations. The descend-
ing visual signals cannot, of course, activate otherwise silent
neurons, which is presumably only possible on the basis of
stimulus-driven retinal input (Hupe et al. 1998). But the
descending signals can, nonetheless, affect ongoing activity
in many areas (e.g., the thalamus) and produce anticipatory
spatial adjustments (Sillito et al. 1994).
Although my somewhat limited goal was to evaluate the
feasibility of visual prediction, during the course of this
endeavor it seems that prediction may be far more perva-
sive in the CNS than originally expected. The novel
approach developed here may be easily adapted to inves-
tigate predictive phenomena in the CNS more generally.
Visual prediction has a strong logical basis and seems con-
sonant with other visual phenomena such as the various
constancies and motion deblurring, as well as theoretical
constructs such as neural competition. Prediction may
be a multi-level, multi-modal phenomenon found in
both sensory and motor systems. Furthermore, prediction
may result from computations carried out by single
neurons, or neural networks, or both. This general
approach to the study of prediction suggests possibilities
that could unify research from single cells to cognition.
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NOTES
1. Since signals within the retina itself are transmitted via
graded potentials, as opposed to action potentials, the time
taken for lateral interactions across 0.15 mm of retina could
take significantly shorter time than the above estimate (Bruce
Bridgeman 2005, personal communication).
2. There could be many reasons for behaviors normally dis-
played by animals to break down. Breakdown in behavior is
known to occur, for example, in nervous systems in which
disease has affected neural processing delays. For example, Mul-
tiple Sclerosis occurs because of demyelination, which affects
neural transmission delays. Commonly observed behavior in
healthy animals leads to the following assumption: In the
absence of mechanisms compensating for neural delays, many
behaviors in otherwise healthy animals would be disrupted. An
analogous assumption holds for visual delays. The fundamental
assumption of compensation for visual delays states that in the
absence of mechanisms compensating for visual delays, many
behaviors in otherwise healthy animals would be disrupted. Note
that this last statement makes no assumption about whether
visual or non-visual mechanisms compensate for visual delays.
3. One significant difference between the treatments of the
visual position of a moving object and the sensed position of a
moving limb is that we appear to have no conscious control
over the position of the moving object, while we do have con-
scious control over the position of our limb. However, we are
aware of only some internal representations that allow us to
predict the future states of our limbs from current states
during movement (Blakemore et al. 2002). Thus, many represen-
tations that allow for prediction of moving visual objects and of
limbs during movement are not available to awareness.
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Abstract: An attention shift from a stationary to a changing object has to
occur in feature – rather than physical – space, in order to bind these
stimuli into a unitary percept. This time-consuming shift leads to the
perception of a changing stimulus further ahead along its trajectory.
This attentional framework is able to accommodate the flash-lag effect
in its multiple empirical manifestations.
The flash-lag effect (FLE) is an empirical fact. Understanding the
effect, however, requires us to build conceptual models that can
range from the biophysical description of neuronal interactions
to global cognitive schemes. Whichever model may be conceived,
it should explain the FLE and related findings, rely on sound
physiological grounds, adopt the smallest set of assumptions,
and predict novel phenomena.
Motion extrapolation, as originally proposed by Romi Nijha-
wan (1994), nicely explains the flash-lag phenomenon in its
purest form. However, in order to accommodate that explanation
with discordant empirical findings, Nijhawan, in addition to
splitting perceptual extrapolation in two successive steps, now
resorts to at least three different putative mechanisms: (1) the
role of lateral communications between neighboring retinotopic
locations, (2) the impact of visual transients generated by
offsets, and (3) a dynamical interplay between motor and visual
processes. Therefore, Nijhawan’s effort to fit motion extrapol-
ation into challenging empirical data has compelled him to
adopt a piecewise mosaic of physiological functions. Also, even
though Nijhawan does a good job in weaving the explanatory
content of his account, he leaves aside a deeper exploration of
its predictive potential.
Both empirical and theoretical evidences point to the ability of
basic sensory operations to generate the FLE (Baldo & Caticha
2005; Berry et al. 1999; Erlhagen 2003). In fact, a simple
neural network model built upon a small set of physiologically
grounded assumptions was able to replicate the standard FLE
(under several conditions), as well as its dependence on stimuli
luminance, priming, trajectory, and predictability (Baldo &
Caticha 2005). This model also helps us evaluate the relative
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underlying involvement of spatial sources (lateral interactions
between neighboring receptive fields) and temporal sources
(time delays required to activate the neurons in the network or
to broadcast signals among them).
However, despite their physiological appeal, simplistic models
are still unable to encompass the phenomenological richness por-
trayed by this illusion, such as has been observed in the chro-
matic (Nijhawan 1997; Sheth et al. 2000), spatial frequency
(Sheth et al. 2000), and auditory (Alais & Burr 2003) domains.
This wide-ranging manifestation of the FLE would call for the
contribution of higher, more integrative, underlying mechan-
isms. Over the last few years, we have been refining a conceptual
framework in which attention plays a role in contributing to the
FLE. As pointed out by Nijhawan himself, “distances that separ-
ate the representations are large, so the information exchange
between the representations is time consuming” (target article,
sect. 9.1, para. 1). Actually, the first conceptual alternative chal-
lenging the motion extrapolation account was based on the time
consumed by a unidirectional shift of (spatial) attention from the
flashed location to the moving location (Baldo & Klein 1995).
Meanwhile, whereas the role of attention in causing the FLE
remained elusive, the modulation of the FLE by attentional
factors was gradually being established (Baldo & Namba 2002;
Baldo et al. 2002; Chappell et al. 2006; Namba & Baldo 2004;
Sarich et al. 2007).
More recently, we have advanced our attentional framework
by proposing that the FLE could originate from the time
needed for attention to bind the flash and moving percept into
a unitary whole (Baldo & Klein, in press). Starting with the detec-
tion of an abrupt event (a stationary flash or a beep, for instance),
a shift of attention from a stationary object to a changing
(“moving”) object has to occur in feature rather than physical
space in order to bind them together into a unitary percept.
This object-based attentional shift would require some time to
be carried out, regardless of any spatial separation between
both visual stimuli, and would naturally lead to a percept consist-
ing of a changing stimulus further ahead along its “trajectory”
(equivalently, we can also consider a non-directional attentional
spread over the object, in feature space, which starts when an
abrupt-onset stimulus is presented – though not necessarily
from where it is presented).
It is easy to see that this feature-based “attentional” expla-
nation is not in conflict with the findings concerning the flash-
initiated and flash-terminated conditions, as claimed before in
relation to the purely spatial attention shift (Alais & Burr 2003;
Khurana & Nijhawan 1995): Whereas the time required for the
attentional binding will lead to the FLE in the former condition,
no FLE will be observed in the latter (in opposition to motion
extrapolation’s predictions), since the moving stimulus
never reaches a position beyond that where it disappeared or
stopped.
The relationship between delays required to bind a spatially
extended object and time-consuming shifts (or spread) of
attention has been extensively reported (Chappell et al. 2006;
Enns & Oriet 2004; Houtkamp et al. 2003; Kanai et al. 2004;
Roelfsema et al. 2000; Sarich et al. 2007). Because the scheme
we propose involves an attentional binding in feature space,
our account unifies empirical findings observed in a broad class
of visual features (such as position, color, luminance, and
spatial frequency), as well as in crossmodal phenomena (Alais &
Burr 2003). It is worth noting that only cognitive-oriented models
are presently able to capture the entire perceptual spectrum
revealed by the FLE. Nijhawan’s motion extrapolation and
the attentional binding account we presently offer are the main
conceptual frameworks embodying this class of integrative
models. Our proposal, however, is favored by a more parsimo-
nious set of assumptions, a deeper physiological root, and a
greater predictive power.
Eventually, cognitive models are to be brought down to the
wiring structure and functional operations of neuronal lattices.
It is conceivable that lateral interactions giving rise to spatio-
temporal facilitations, as evidenced by simple networks (Baldo &
Caticha 2005) and also assumed by Nijhawan, could be further
elaborated and extended to perceptual processing other than
visual. A desirable connection between the fundamental rules of
neural functioning and the large-scale expression of cognitive inte-
gration could thus be envisaged.
In conclusion, it is encouraging to recognize that the decade-
long dispute over the underpinnings of the FLE has already
contributed toward refining, discarding, or amalgamating
fragmented and contradictory conceptions. Whatever the final
consensus turns out to be, Nijhawan’s legacy to the current
debate on visual perception will endure.
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Abstract: To successfully interact with a dynamic world, our actions must
be guided by a continuously changing anticipated future. Such
anticipations must be tuned to the processing delays in the nervous
system as well as to the slowness of the body, something that requires
constant adaptation of the predictive mechanisms, which in turn
require that sensory information be processed at different time-scales.
The target article presents an interesting analysis of visual predic-
tion, and we fully agree with Nijhawan that predictions need to
be made at different levels of the sensory-motor processing.
However, Nijhawan’s article severely underestimates the com-
plexity of anticipation in the sensory-motor system. In particular,
it ignores the important question of how an anticipatory system
can tune its predictions to internal and external delays as a
result of experience. Consider the example of catching a ball. It
is not sufficient that “the visual system modifies the perceived
position of the ball so that it matches the position of the
moving hand,” as Nijhawan suggests (sect. 10, para. 3). Instead,
such a task involves at least the following components that can
be divided into a visual pursuit and a catch component. Even
to just visually focus on the ball, its trajectory needs to be antici-
pated (Balkenius & Johansson 2007). Since visual processing and
the eye movements following it are not instantaneous, it is
necessary to predict where the ball is right now to be able to
fixate it while it is moving. We call this the “anticipated now”
because any sensory code that is synchronous with an external
state must be based on anticipation.
The predictions resulting in the anticipated now may or may
not be correct, but there is no way for the organism to correct
these predictions until at a later time, when the true sensory
input becomes available. At this time, it is possible to adapt the
earlier predictions to the actual sensory input, something that
requires that the earlier anticipation, as well as the sensory infor-
mation used for it, should still be available. This implies that at
every moment, the sensory input is used both to anticipate the
future and to adapt earlier predictions, but because of processing
delays, it cannot be used to code for the current state of the exter-
nal world. Similarly, eye movements cannot be based on the
anticipated now, but must be controlled by the anticipated
future. Looking at a moving object therefore requires that the
Commentary/Nijhawan: Visual prediction
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:2 199
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X08003907
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:09:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
organism simultaneously maintain sensory information at five
different time-scales: the current sensory input, the anticipated
now and future, and previous predictions of the now and the
future. By combining information at the different time-scales in
an appropriate way, it is possible both to change the currently
anticipated now and to make future predictions more accurate.
The most appropriate way to model the combination of time-
scales is presumably to use feed-forward models from control
theory (Grush 2004; Kawato 1999). The predictions can be gen-
erated with different Kalman filters. The Kalman gains of the
scales can be weighted in different ways, depending on the
experience of the organism.
Assuming the gaze system is correctly tuned, via some feed-
forward mechanism, the temporal unfolding of the ongoing inter-
action with the visual target contains the information needed to
predict the location of the ball in the future; but the task for
the hand is not to move to any arbitrary point along the predicted
trajectory of the ball. Instead, the sensory-motor system must
direct the hand to the location where the ball will be once the
motor command to reach that location has been executed. This
introduces an additional type of complexity, since the time in
the future when the hand will catch the ball depends on proper-
ties of the arm and hand as well as on the ball. Although this is
strictly also true for eye movements, the physical lag of the
system becomes more critical for arm movements.
The properties of the flash-lag effect become perfectly sensible
within this framework. Because unexpected events cannot
become part of the anticipated now until after a processing
delay, they will be perceived as lagging any predictable event.
Moreover, since point events are perfect predictors of them-
selves, an adaptive system will learn to let them replace any pre-
diction based on prior information.
In the flash-terminated condition, the flash becomes part of
the anticipated now at the same time as the detection of the dis-
appearance of the target. The flash and the disappearance of
the target should therefore be perceived as simultaneous and
occurring at the physical location where these two events
actually take place. Once this information is received, the
best prediction is that the moving object disappeared where
it was at the time of the flash. This does not mean that the
movement of the object is not extrapolated; it only suggests
that that extrapolation is replaced by better information when
it is available. Although it is possible that biased competition
plays a role in this process, it may be sufficient to assume that
a system that adapts its predictions to actual information will
learn to behave in this way.
It is clear that the number of different time-scales that are
necessary in the brain is much larger than the few described
here. Given that substantial delays influence all processing in
the brain, it appears necessary to compensate for these by predic-
tive mechanisms at all levels. This suggests that predictive abil-
ities should be necessary at the level of individual neurons – or
at least local circuits. The ongoing dynamical interaction among
different parts of the brain is not too different from the brain’s
interaction with the external world.
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Abstract: Neural delays, which are generally defined as visuomotor
delays in interceptive actions, must be compensated to enable accurate
timing in movement. Visuomotor delays can depend on the kind of
task, the use of information, and the skill of the performer. The
compensation for such delays does not necessarily require prediction or
representation but can be made by an attunement of some parameters
in what is called a law of control.
In this target article, Nijhawan proposes that neural delays in per-
ception must be compensated by visual predictions and internal
models. He emphasizes that this compensation is particularly
important in interceptive actions and that this issue remains to
be addressed. We agree, but would like to point out that there
are empirical data and an alternative hypothesis which do not
depend on the use of internal models.
In interceptive actions, researchers generally refer to a visuo-
motor delay (VMD) to define the time period between the pick-
up of information and its use in producing an adjustment in
movement (e.g., Tresilian 1993). It has been shown that VMD
duration depends on the task (Benguigui et al. 2003). Lee et al.
(1983) calculated VMDs that ranged from 50 to 135 msec in a
ball striking task. Whiting et al. (1970) showed, in a ball-catching
experiment, that performance did not degrade when the occlu-
sion of the final part of the trajectory was equal or inferior to
100 msec. This period of time was interpreted as a VMD
during which no information was used for catching. Bootsma
and van Wieringen (1990), in a table-tennis task, observed that
the variability was minimal at about 100 msec before contact.
This phase of minimal variability was described as the end of
the control of the action, reflecting the duration of VMD.
Some researchers have shown that VMD could be longer than
100 msec. McLeod (1987) reported that expert cricket batsmen,
confronted with unexpected changes in the ball trajectory at the
bounce, needed at least 190 msec to adapt their swing to the new
trajectory. Benguigui et al. (2003) demonstrated in a task consist-
ing of intercepting a moving stimulus with a thrown projectile,
that movements were initiated around 200 msec after a specific
source of information had reached a critical value. This delay
was interpreted as a VMD between the pick-up of the infor-
mation and the initiation of movement.
The duration of VMD appears to depend on the use of infor-
mation. It can be as short as 100 msec when information is used
in a continuous mode, but can reach values near 200 msec when
information is used in a discrete mode, such as the beginning of
the movement or some important correction of that movement.
One can assume that (1) a short VMD and (2) an accurate com-
pensation of it are essential for accurate timing. First, because
information is continuously changing during the approach of a
moving object, a reduction in VMD allows later pick-up of
increasingly accurate information as contact draws near. The
later the information pick-up, the more accurate the interceptive
action will be (Lobjois et al. 2006). Le Runigo et al. (2005)
showed that the time required to produce an adaptation in an
interceptive movement after an unexpected change in the
moving object’s velocity was shorter in expert tennis players
(162 msec) than in novices (221 msec). They also showed that
the reduction of VMD was highly correlated to timing accuracy,
suggesting that a reduced VMD provides the opportunity to
improve on-line regulations and to adapt these regulations at
later stages before contact.
Second, the movement itself must compensate for VMD under
the constraint of an incompressible delay. Moreover, the diffi-
culty in compensating for VMD would increase as VMD
increases, as is the case in older adults (Bennett & Castiello
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1995). Lobjois et al. (2006) showed that this increase in VMD
explained the lateness of elderly people in a coincidence-timing
task. Interestingly, elderly people who had a regular sport activity
(e.g., tennis) and who had an increase in VMD that was similar to
that of sedentary elderly people were not late in their responses.
These results suggest that sport practice also allows a better com-
pensation for the age-related VMD increase.
Although the problem of compensation for VMD has not yet
been extensively addressed, some suggestions deserve consider-
ation. When an interceptive movement is very short and con-
trolled in a ballistic mode (movement time: MT  150 msec;
Tresilian et al. 2004), the actors have to estimate temporally
the ensemble of the visuomotor sequence, including VMD and
the MT, and detect the instant at which time-to-collision
(TTC) becomes equal to the duration of this sequence
(Benguigui et al. 2003).
Analogous mechanisms could be also involved when action
must be controlled with continuous regulation. In contrast to
Nijhawan’s claim (sect. 7.2.1.1), the visual system is not an accu-
rate predictor of moving objects when the last part of the trajec-
tory is occluded beyond a duration of 200 msec (or of a VMD).
Numerous studies using prediction motion tasks consisting of
estimating the TTC of a moving object after the occlusion of
the final part of the trajectory have shown that accuracy and
variability in timing responses are dramatically affected by occlu-
sions longer than 200 msec (e.g., Benguigui et al., in press). This
means that for MTs above 200 msec, on-line regulation of move-
ment is indispensable for dealing with both unpredictable and
predictable1 changes in the object trajectory.
Once again, however, on-line regulations require compen-
sation for VMD. This compensation process can be understood
according to the calibration principle laid out by ecological psy-
chologists (Jacobs & Michaels 2006). As motor control is based
on laws corresponding to functional relationships between infor-
mation and movement (Warren 1988), the calibration process
consists in attuning some parameters of the law of control in
order to adapt the movement to the constraints of a specific
task. Regarding VMD compensation, laws of control include
some parameters that do not correspond to a representation of
VMD as is suggested by Nijhawan. Instead, these parameters
have to be set according to the task-dependent effect of VMD
in the interceptive timing. This process could explain why ath-
letes who master a specific set of skills (exploiting a specific law
of control) generally need a few trials of preparation to optimize
their efficiency when beginning a new session of practice. This
process could also correspond to an issue of learning that
remains to be explored.
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NOTE
1. For instance, even if the acceleration of a moving object is detect-
able by the visual system and theoretically predictable, results have
shown that the perceptuo-motor system is unable to make predictions
in extrapolating time-to-collision (TTC) that take into account the vari-
ation of velocity (Benguigui et al. 2003).
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Abstract: 3D FORMOTION, a unified cortical model of motion
integration and segmentation, explains how brain mechanisms of form
and motion processing interact to generate coherent percepts of object
motion from spatially distributed and ambiguous visual information.
The same cortical circuits reproduce motion-induced distortion of
position maps, including both flash-lag and flash-drag effects.
Perceived position of objects is often distorted in the presence of
motion. In addition to the flash-lag effect discussed in the target
article, other examples include flash-drag effects (Whitney &
Cavanagh 2000) and illusory boundary distortion by motion
(Anderson & Barth 1999; De Valois & De Valois 1991;
Ramachandran & Anstis 1990; Weiss & Adelson 2000). The
same neural circuits that carry out directional selectivity,
motion integration and segmentation computations are suggested
to underlie phenomena of distortion of positional maps (Berz-
hanskaya et al. 2004).
The model 3D FORMOTION (Berzhanskaya et al. 2007) is
based on formotion (Grossberg et al. 2001) and employs feedfor-
ward and feedback circuits involving areas V1, V2, medial tem-
poral (MT), and medial superior temporal (MST) to solve both
the motion aperture and correspondence problems (as well as
motion capture, barber-pole illusion, plaid motion, and inte-
gration of object motion across apertures). It incorporates
depth-selective input from V2 (FACADE) to MT (Formotion)
to simulate the separation of ambiguous boundaries in depth
(chopsticks illusion) and motion transparency.
1. Description of 3D FORMOTION features relevant to the dis-
tortion of positionalmaps.The formotion model consists of a few
stages (see Fig. 1). The first stage in the motion system consists of
directionally insensitive transient cells that respond briefly to a
change in the image luminance, irrespective of the direction of
movement. The second stage is the directionally sensitive layer.
Directional selectivity results from a combination of gradient
processing (Reichardt 1961; van Santen & Sperling 1985) and
an asymmetric inhibition mechanism (Jagadeesh et al. 1997;
Livingstone 1998). Further, short-range filters accumulate
motion signals in a certain direction. Finally, spatial competition
weakens ambiguous signals from line interiors and also amplifies
feature-tracking signals. The spatial competition kernel has an
asymmetric shape with its excitation offset from inhibition in
the direction of motion. On the basis of anatomical connections
and directional opponency, these spatial/directional competition
units are allocated to the layer 4B of V1. As will be demonstrated
later, asymmetric inhibition at this motion processing stage may
contribute to the flash-lag effect.
Figure 1 (Berzhanskaya). Schematic view of 3D FORMOTION.
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The signal from the layer 4B of V1 is projected to MT. Long-
range anisotropic receptive fields in MT accumulate evidence
of motion in the direction of their elongation. The final stage of
the model is a “winner-take-all” interaction between MT
center-surround and wide-field motion cells (in MT or MST).
The MT-MST network determines a single motion direction at
each position and may incorporate attentional modulation.
Unambiguous feature-tracking signals propagate to ambiguous
motion regions via MST-to-MT feedback, and anisotropic recep-
tive fields allow motion integration across occluders. Thus, only
at the MT-MST level does the model solve both the aperture
and motion capture problems.
The FACADE boundary computation system includes stages
of contrast-dependent orientation-selective cells (simple cells in
V1), contrast-independent orientation-selective cells (complex
cells in V1 and V2), hypercomplex cells that support both orien-
tation competition and spatial competition, and finally, bipole
grouping cells (Grossberg & Mingolla 1985). In the current
model, the hypercomplex cell layer is the site of projection
from the motion stream to the form stream, carried out by
MT-V1 feedback. This projection plays a role in assigning
depth order to the object boundaries in ambiguous displays.
The same projection, at the MT-V1 (simulated) level and possibly
also at the MT-V2 level, is suggested to influence object bound-
aries in the flash-drag effect.
2. Motion distortion of boundary positions: modeling insights
into neuronal mechanisms. In the flash-lag effect (Nijhawan
1994), a flashed object is perceived to be lagging behind a
moving one. 3D FORMOTION suggests that when a spatial/
directional competition filter in V1 is activated by a moving
stimulus, the trailing surround suppression shifts the peak of
population activation of a flashed stimulus in the direction oppo-
site to the direction of motion (Berzhanskaya et al. 2004); see
Figure 2. A similar phenomenon may exist at levels higher than
V1. However, based on the size of the shift (a few degrees of
visual angle) and on the limited spatial scope, one can suggest
that the main mechanisms are localized in V1.
In an opposite effect, flash-drag (Whitney & Cavanagh 2000),
a flashed stimulus is shifted in the direction of motion. It can be
explained by the feedback from MT to V1 (implemented in 3D
FORMOTION) or MT to V2. In these experiments, a motion
stimulus occupies a larger area (and presumably activates
larger MT/MST fields more efficiently), and the effect, a positive
peak shift in the direction of motion, can be observed at larger
spatial distances (see Fig. 3).
Another category of visual displays, gratings with ambiguous
(Gaussian envelope) boundaries (DeValois & DeValois 1991;
Whitney et al. 2003) and illusory contours formed by random
dots (Ramachandran & Anstis 1990), demonstrates that an ambi-
guity (low contrast, brief, or illusory) in the boundary presen-
tation is a key to a shifted percept. Although not specifically
analyzed here, differences in latencies resulting from weaker
and slower-developing boundary signals may play a role at the
later stages (a possibility discussed in the target article). Feed-
back projection from large, motion-sensitive MT receptive
fields in 3D FORMOTION to lower areas such as V1 might be
interpreted as carrying a predictive signal (also addressed in
the target article). However, in our application of 3D FORMO-
TION to flash-lag and flash-drag phenomena, first presented at
the Visual Science Society Conference in 2004, we were mainly
interested in gaining insight into the neuronal mechanisms of
these effects.
Our model makes multiple predictions: (1) It predicts that the
flash-lag effect is a consequence of directional selectivity mech-
anisms. This effect would exist not only in V1 or later visual
areas, but also in any area, sensory or otherwise, in which direc-
tionality of the stimulus can be processed. This was confirmed by
flash-lag demonstrations in multiple domains (Alais & Burr 2003;
Cai & Schlag et al. 2001; Sheth et al. 2000). (2) Flash-lag is a func-
tion of local motion processing and is only weakly affected by
a global motion signal. An elegant demonstration by Anstis
(2007), in which the flash-lag is influenced by a local motion
and not by (an opposite) global motion of the chopsticks, provides
some support to this idea. (3) A disruption of inhibition, and
therefore of directionality mechanisms, near the flashed object
should cancel the flash-lag effect. (4) A disruption of feedback
from MT to V1 [e.g., by transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS)] will interfere with the flash-drag effect (McGraw et al.
2004). In agreement with the model’s predictions, neurophysio-
logical evidence of interactions between form and motion
streams that may contribute to object mislocalization has been
presented in both single-neuron recordings (Fu et al. 2004;
Sundberg et al. 2006) and fMRI (functional magnetic resonance
imaging) (Whitney et al. 2003).
In summary, motion distortion of position maps can arise as an
emergent property of directionality mechanisms, and, for the
visual system, via interactions between the form and motion
streams. An integrative approach, including analysis of multiple
position distortion phenomena, will provide an insight into poss-
ible neuronal mechanisms.
Figure 2 (Berzhanskaya). Illustration of motion inhibition
effect on flashed stimulus position.
Figure 3 (Berzhanskaya). Illustration of MT contribution to
flash-drag.
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Abstract: The hypothesis that there has been selection pressure for
mechanisms which enable us to perceive the present tends to be
conflated with the hypothesis that there has been selection pressure
for mechanisms that compensate for inevitable neural delay.
The relationship between the two is more subtle, because increases
in neural delay can be advantageous for building more useful
perceptions.
Proponents of the hypothesis that the brain has mechanisms for
perceiving the present (i.e., mechanisms designed to generate a
perception at time t that is representative of the scene at time
t) typically say that the advantage is that it helps overcome
inevitable neural delays. That is, “latency compensation” and
“perceiving the present” have gone hand in hand. I, too, have
made this equation in my own articles on how these ideas may
be integral to a unified account of illusions (Changizi 2001;
Changizi & Widders 2002; Changizi et al., in press; although
see Changizi 2003, pp. 75–77). The implicit assumption can
often seem to be that natural selection has attempted to minimize
neural delays – by shortening wires, speeding up signal propa-
gation, and using rapid computational algorithms for generating
a visual percept – and whatever latency between retina and per-
ception is left is handed over to the compensation mechanisms to
deal with. Although this is an open possibility, the hypothesis that
we perceive the present is not committed to this possibility; it is
only committed to the idea that perceptions belong to the
present. What is left open is how long the delay is, and
whether it is all “inevitable” or whether the delay may be much
longer than it would be if selection for short processing times
trumped all other selection pressures.
Consider computer software as an analogy. Computer proces-
sing speed has risen by many orders of magnitude over the course
of the last 20 years, but you may have noticed that many of your
programs still take considerable time to start up. Computer
designers know how long a wait we are willing to endure, and
use that time to carry out fancier computations. That is, when
faster computers arrive, computer designers do not appear to
be saying, “Now we can compute the same old things nearly
instantaneously!” Instead, they seem to be saying, “Now think
about how much more we can compute while the user waits!”
Just as computer software delay is a consequence of a trade-off
between shorter delay and more complex computations, our per-
ceptual delay is a trade-off between shorter delay and fancier
visual computations. For example, if evolution can find a new
clever trick for extrapolating farther out into the future – say
from 30 msec to 120 msec – then it could utilize this trick and
allow itself four times the amount of computation time to build
sophisticated useful perceptions. The resultant latency of
120 msec would not be understood as an inevitable delay left
over after trying to reduce it as much as possible. Instead, it
would be better to say that there is selection pressure to maxi-
mize the delay for which the nervous system is able to compen-
sate, thereby buying more time to prepare the perception.
Counterintuitively, then, it may well be that the slower-to-react
brains are the “smarter” ones.
Visual prediction as indicated by perceptual
adaptation to temporal delays and discrete
stimulation
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Abstract: Analogous to prism adaptation, sensorimotor compensation for
existing neural delays has been clearly demonstrated. This system can also
adapt to new delays, both internal and external. This seems to occur at
least partially in the sensor systems, and works for discrete, stationary
events. This provides additional evidence for visual prediction, but not
in a manner that is consistent with spatial extrapolation.
Nijhawan makes a compelling case that the compensation for
neural delays must occur at some level, and possibly many
levels, of the human central nervous system. In the several sec-
tions of this argument, he mentions research from prism adap-
tation. Prism adaptation is clear evidence that the human
central nervous system compensates for its own internal spatial
characteristics. If the sensorimotor system can compensate for
internal spatial characteristics, might it also be able to compen-
sate for internal temporal characteristics (i.e., neural delays)?
As Nijhawan points out, it must, since failure to do so would
yield an organism that cannot interact well with the world.
The field of prism adaptation starts with the observation that
intersensory spatial arrangements are not constant over the
course an organism’s life, but change both slowly (e.g., during
maturation) and rapidly (e.g., when reaching through water).
Any organism that cannot adapt its compensatory mechanisms
to deal with changes in intersensory relationships will have
nearly as much difficulty interacting with the world as an organ-
ism that has no compensatory mechanisms. Prism adaptation
shows that human sensorimotor systems can adjust to both
rapid and slow changes in intersensory relationships (for
reviews, see Bedford 1993; Welch 1978).
Neural delays also change both rapidly and slowly during each
organism’s lifetime (see, e.g., Ahissar & Ahissar 1994). Thus, if
humans can compensate for the temporal characteristics of the
sensory systems like they do for the spatial characteristics, might
not this mechanism also be able flexible enough to respond to
changes in neural delay? Since the 1950s, several researchers
have shown that this does not seem to be the case (see, e.g., Sher-
idan & Ferrel 1963; Smith et al. 1962; 1963). It has, however, since
been conclusively demonstrated that not only do humans compen-
sate for external temporal shifts, but the mechanism for doing so is
remarkably similar to that involved in prism adaptation (Cunning-
ham et al. 2001a; 2001b). In general, the introduction of an exter-
nal visual delay initially impairs performance, but a small amount
of practice returns behavior to nearly normal levels, and the
adapted state generalizes to similar situations. Subsequent
removal of the delay produces a large renewed drop in perform-
ance as the newly adopted state of temporal compensation
ceases to be appropriate (this negative aftereffect is the hallmark
of the semipermanent nature of sensorimotor adaptation). Sub-
sequent work has confirmed this effect (Fajen 2007; Fujisaki
et al. 2004; Miall & Jackson 2006; Navarra et al. 2007; Stetson
et al. 2006; Vatakis et al. 2004; 2007). It is critical here to note
that, unlike the visual prediction effect speculated to exist for
moving objects, the temporal adaptation effect cannot be comple-
tely explained by spatial extrapolation for many reasons, including
the fact that it occurs for discrete, stationary stimuli.
Nijhawan focuses explicitly on compensating for continuous
events, with special emphasis on moving objects. There must,
however, be some form of temporal compensation that also
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works for discrete events. The reason for this is simple: neural
latencies differ drastically for different sensory modalities as
well as within a modality for different stimuli (e.g., Bolz et al.
1982; Sestokas & Lehmkuhle 1986). The absence of a coordinat-
ing influence that can also compensate for brief, non-moving
events would necessarily lead to a fragmentation of the phenom-
enally experienced world. For example, the brighter portions of a
briefly seen object would seem to have occurred at different time
than the darker portions. As multimodal, briefly presented, non-
moving objects are not perceptually fragmented, and because
many of the demonstrations of temporal adaptation have success-
fully used stationary, briefly presented, discrete stimuli, there
must be some form of temporal compensation that does not
involve spatial prediction.
Finally, in their experiments, Cunningham et al. (2001a;
2001b) noted that many participants complained about apparent
perceptual changes during temporal adaptation. More specifi-
cally, as behavior in the delayed conditions approached normal
levels, the participants began to indicate that the visual and pro-
prioceptive events, which were separated by up to 400 msec,
seemed to occur simultaneously. A number of studies have
since empirically confirmed this perceptual shift in the point of
subjective simultaneity (Fujisaki et al. 2004; Navarra et al.
2007; Vatakis et al. 2007; Vroomen et al. 2004). Several of
these studies used brief, discrete, stationary stimuli. In general,
these results suggest that adaptation to temporal delays is at
least partially perceptual in nature. Nijhawan argues that prism
adaptation, to the degree that it occurs in the visual system, is
support for the theory that the visual system is engaged in predic-
tion. Thus, the evidence that humans can both behaviorally and
perceptually compensate for changes in delayed information
would seem to be support for the claim of visual prediction in
general, if not for spatial extrapolation in particular.
In sum, the human sensorimotor systems can compensate
not only for their own internal characteristics, but also for
external changes in both the spatial and temporal relationships
between the senses. Moreover, at least for temporal adaptation,
this compensation occurs partially in the perceptual systems,
implying that they are engaging in some form of prediction.
As temporal adaptation also works for discrete as well as con-
tinuous events and is not necessarily motion based, it cannot be
fully explained by spatial extrapolation. Nijhawan states that,
“The goal of visual prediction is to use priors contained in
the unfolding visual stimulus to create a perceived state
of the world that matches, as far as possible, the actual state
of the world” (sect. 4, para. 2). Given what is known about
how spatial and temporal compensation mechanisms adapt,
this statement might be amended to make the strong involve-
ment of previous experience more explicit: The goal of visual
prediction is to use priors acquired from both previous experi-
ence and the currently unfolding visual stimulus to create a
perceived state of the world that matches, as far as possible,
the actual state of the world.
Asynchronous neural integration:
Compensation or computational tolerance and
skill acquisition?
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Abstract: Nijhawan argues that neural compensation is necessary to
account for couplings of perception and action. Although perhaps true
in some cases, computational tolerance for asynchronously arriving
continuous information is of more importance. Moreover, some of the
everyday venues Nijhawan uses to argue for the relevance of prediction
and compensation can be better ascribed to skill.
It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of
things just so far as the as the nature of the subject admits . . . and not to
look for precision in all things alike.
— Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1094b24 & 1098b5
Nijhawan reviews the need for theoretical consideration of delays
brought about by differential neural transmission time. Such a
need is unequivocal in some situations, and the flash-lag effect,
which Nijhawan has championed for some time, seems reason-
ably accounted for in such terms.
However, not all neural delays need be compensated for.
Instead, there is often wide tolerance for integrating diverse con-
tinuous signals. As an example, consider first the asynchronous
presentation of auditory speech and its visual signal. What are
the tolerances in the perceiver for detecting that anything is
amiss? As it turns out, the window is fairly large and asymmetri-
cal. The auditory delays referenced to the visual signal can be
between 245 msec (an auditory lead) and þ200 msec (an audi-
tory lag; Grant et al. 2004). Rewritten, this is 80+ 120 msec.
The 80 msec value can be taken as a difference in the delay
between the auditory and visual systems. It might need to be
“compensated” for, and it is consistent with Nijhawan’s report.
However, the tolerance window of +120 msec from that mean
value suggests that no compensation is necessary. Instead, infor-
mation in both signals is temporally distributed and, arriving dif-
ferentially from auditory and visual modalities, is seamlessly
integrated within a fairly wide temporal window.
This first example, however, is not about perception and
action, with which Nijhawan is most concerned. Therefore, con-
sider a second case – the disfluency effects of delayed auditory
feedback while speaking. Stuart et al. (2002) reported no per-
formance differences among 0, 25, 50 msec delays, but there
were many disfluencies at 200 msec delays. In other words, the
coupling of auditory perception and vocal action is no more
affected by a 50 msec delay than by listening to oneself normally.
This too suggests tolerance, not compensation.
Of course, this second line of evidence concerns audition,
which is not the modality of Nijhawan’s focus. Therefore, let
us consider, third, the results from the literature on delayed
visual feedback. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study, Farrer et al (2007) showed that subjects had no
differential awareness of a 0 versus 100 msec visual delay in
watching themselves pluck pegs from a board, and their perform-
ance did not suffer either. Moreover, the angular gyrus, which
seems to register awareness of such asynchrony, was not substan-
tially engaged until delays of 150 msec and longer. Again, this
suggests tolerance for de´calage in signals, this time visual and
motor.
Nijhawan’s primary interest concerns the prediction of the visual
location of a moving object in space. The most critical everyday
venues for such needs are in hunting and in ball games. Among
the latter – whether baseball, cricket, tennis, or ping pong – one
can rightly argue for a required accuracy of 5 msec when
hitting a ball with appropriate control (Bootsma & van Wieringen
1990; Land & McLeod 2000; Lobjois et al. 2006; Tresilian 1993;
Watts & Bahill 1990). Nijhawan’s point is that the visual system –
retina to V1 and beyond – is slow by comparison.
Nonetheless, in all of these sports, the best participants are
involved in highly stereotyped, highly practiced situations. More-
over, the relevant behavior of the opponent and the flight of the
ball are distributed over as much as a second and often more. In
baseball, those deemed excellent hitters – that is, they can accu-
rately hit the ball 3 out of 10 times against the best pitchers – earn
well more than US$1000 per swing of their bat.
Skill accrued over many years – and a background of appropri-
ate genetics – is required to perform at this level. Moreover,
there is ample evidence that hitters cannot follow the ball near
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the critical time when they need to hit it (Land & McLeod 2000;
Watts & Bahill 1990), and visual acuity in the periphery, where
the ball arrives when it is hit, is extremely poor. Hitting skills
are not due to higher cognition. Indeed, thinking often interferes
with performance (e.g., Beilock et al. 2004). But such perform-
ance is also not due to the kind of neural compensation that Nij-
hawan addresses. Instead, it is the result of a skill-driven
refinement of perception and action in the context of the infor-
mation distributed in time.
A kind of compensation does occur in a number of situations.
In archery, and in trap and skeet shooting, the sportsperson must
aim to lead the target that is being shot at. Yet it seems unlikely
that one should look for pure sensory or motor accounts in such
feats. Instead, and again, it is the skill of the individual calibrated
over repeated practice that allows targets to be hit.
None of this is to denigrate Nijhawan’s attempt at laying out
the needs for a coherent theory of dynamic neural organization.
My purpose is simply to state that computational tolerance for
the time-staggered arrival of integrable neural information, and
skill acquired over many long bouts of practice, are likely to be
more important than is compensation.
Prediction and postdiction: Two frameworks
with the goal of delay compensation
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X08003889
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Abstract: Although prediction is one of the key tasks of intelligent brains, it
often proves impossible in an unpredictably changing world. Hence, brains
often decidewhat happened retrospectively. This framework of postdiction,
the opposite of prediction, stands as an alternative or complimentary
framework to prediction. I further show how motor-sensory recalibration
demonstrates delay compensation at the perceptual level.
To construct an up-to-date, dynamic picture of the outside world,
brains have to overcome a problem: different sensory signals are
processed at different speeds in different parts of the brain. As
Nijhawan emphasizes, all this processing takes time – time
during which the outside world continues to change. One
clever method by which nervous systems can reduce this
problem is by predicting, whenever possible, the next state of
the world (see Hawkins & Blakeslee 2004; Nijhawan 1994; Sud-
dendorf & Corballis 2007; and the present target article). Nijha-
wan has long championed the idea that prediction happens at the
level of the perceptual system (e.g., Nijhawan 1994), mitigating
temporal delays at early, premotor stages. My comments here
reinforce an emphasis on the brain’s need to compensate for
delays, but I offer some additional methods that the brain may
use beyond prediction.
Prediction and postdiction: Two frameworks with the goal of
compensation. In conjunction with any prediction it attempts,
the brain also appears to implement a postdictive strategy
(Eagleman & Sejnowski 2000). This term simply means that the
brain continues to collect information after an event (such as a
flash) while settling on its best estimate about events and their
timing in the outside world. Postdiction is easily illustrated by
apparent motion: When the first stimulus disappears, one cannot
perceive the motion until after the second stimulus has appeared
(in an unpredicted location). Nonetheless, one has the illusion of
seeing itmove on the fly.Obviously, this can only happenwhenper-
ception is generated retrospectively (Eagleman 2001).
In the context of the flash-lag effect (FLE), three empirical
findings seem to support postdiction: the flash-initiated
(Khurana & Nijhawan 1995), flash terminated (Nijhawan
1992), and motion-reversing (Whitney & Murakami 1998) condi-
tions – all of which illustrate that the motion information after
the flash, not before it, drives the effect (Eagleman & Sejnowski
2000). Nijhawan suggests that these challenges might be
accounted for by a rapidly arbitrated competition between rival-
ing neural representations. Although he avoids the term postdic-
tion, a biased competition model nonetheless requires it. The
competition between a predictive model and new incoming
information cannot be tipped until the new information is
collected after the flash. No matter how rapidly the arbitration
occurs, it still is postdictive.
There are competing explanations for the FLE that do not
require the predictive component at all. For example, one
alternative draws on the fact that motion signals shift localization
judgments (for a review, see Whitney 2002). We have shown that
the motion signals collected after an event are the ones that bias
perceived position (Eagleman & Sejnowski 2007). Our evidence
supports the framework that incoming motion information
updates localizations so that the data do not become stale (for
details, see Eagleman & Sejnowski 2007). This is a purely post-
dictive explanatory framework for the FLE.
To understand why postdiction is necessary, one only has to
examine the tasks and resources of the visual system. As one of
its tasks, the visual cortex tries to get the timing of outside events
correct; for its resources, it has to deal with the foibles of the popu-
lations that feed it. The retina and visual thalamus have circuitries
that cause incoming signals to temporally spread from the first
stages of the visual system based, for example, on their luminance
(Gawne et al. 1996; Lee at al. 2007; Maunsell et al. 1999). For the
visual brain to correctly align the timing of events in the world,
it may have to wait 100 msec for the slowest information to
arrive – thereby allowing the visual system to discount different
delays imposed by the early stages.
The reason for the vigorous debate between prediction and
postdiction is that both sides enjoy strong support: On the one
hand, brains use every available opportunity to predict what
is coming next, thus saving valuable processing time; on the
other hand, experiments show that perceptions can be changed
retrospectively, as may be necessitated by an unpredictably
changing world.
The important thing to note is that both the predictive and
postdictive frameworks have the same goal: to perceptually
place the location of a moving object closer to its real-world pos-
ition. Prediction does this by guessing ahead; postdiction does
this by allowing incoming motion signals to advantageously
adjust location judgments. Both techniques lead to the percep-
tion of a moving object closer to its real-world position. The
advantage of postdiction is its ability to naturally account for
sudden motion reversals such as bounces and ricochets;
however, it is possible that both mechanisms are implemented
in different contexts or in different areas of the nervous system.
Future experiments are required to determine these details.
Perceptual compensation for temporal delays. Finally, I want
to expand on part of Nijhawan’s argument. He correctly points
out that compensation can take place at the level of the motor
output or the perceptual input (or anywhere in between). He
argues on the side of perceptual compensation, a position that
has traditionally received little attention, in part because of the
paucity of direct experimental support. However, in his target
article he leaves out a critical example that supports perceptual
compensation: the recalibration of motor sensory systems when
exposed to delayed feedback.
The recalibration story begins with a mystery: Given that multi-
sensory signals arrive in the brain at different times, how can the
brain decide which events were supposed to be simultaneous in
the outside world? We have proposed that the brain perceptually
recalibrates its expectations about the arrival times of signals by
employing a simple assumption: when the motor system executes
an act (such as knocking on a door), all the resulting feedback
should be assumed to be simultaneous, and any delays should
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be perceptually adjusted until simultaneity is perceived (Stetson
et al. 2006). Although this recalibration is normally adaptive,
note a strange consequence: Imagine we repeatedly inject a tiny
delay (e.g., 100 msec) between a subject’s key-press and a sub-
sequent flash for a dozen trials, and then we suddenly remove
the delay. Because the perceptual systems have recalibrated to
compensate for the delay, the subject now perceives that the
flash occurred before the key-press: an illusory reversal of
action and sensation (Cunningham et al. 2001a; Stetson et al.
2006). Note that this recalibration is no mere party trick – it is
critical to solving the problem of causality, which requires, at
bottom, temporal order judgments. The only way causality can
be accurately determined in a multisensory brain is to keep the
temporal delay of signals calibrated in the face of different
sensory pathways operating at different speeds. This example
serves to buttress Nijhawan’s general argument that compen-
sation for delays can take place at very early, perceptual levels.
Transient signals per se do not disrupt the
flash-lag effect
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X08003890
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Abstract: Nijhawan’s theory rests on the assumption that transient
signals compete with predictive signals to generate the visual percept.
We describe experiments that show that this assumption is incorrect.
Our results are consistent with an alternative theory that proposes that
vision is instead postdictive, in that the perception of an event is
influenced by occurrences after the event.
Nijhawan has presented a predictive theory of visual motion per-
ception. He notes that because of the delays inherent in visual pro-
cessing, the visual system cannot detect events at the instant at
which they occur. He argues that the visual system compensates
by using the information it has to predict the current state of the
world. In other words, he suggests that we do not see reality, but
rather, the visual system’s best guess at reality is based on slightly
out-of-date information. To support this theory, Nijhawan relies
heavily on a particular visual illusion – the flash-lag effect. Here,
we briefly describe experiments that Nijhawan’s account cannot
handle. Although Nijhawan’s predictive theory can readily
account for the standard flash-lag paradigm, the flash-terminated
version poses a problem. In this version of the paradigm, the
moving object disappears at the time of the flash. As Nijhawan
notes in the target article, “At the outset, spatial extrapolation
should continue beyond the time of unpredictable disappearance
of the object. Yet these displays produce no flash-lag effect” (sect.
5.2.2, para. 1). To explain why the flash-lag effect does not occur
under these circumstances, Nijhawanmakes an additional assump-
tion. He proposes that the transient signal produced by the disap-
pearance of the moving object generates a neural representation
(perhaps thalamic) that competes with and eventually overwhelms
the predictive representation (perhaps cortical) that would nor-
mally cause the flash-lag effect.Wewill refer to this as the transient
signal assumption.
The support for this assumption comes fromMaus andNijhawan
(2006, reviewed in section 5.2.2 of the target article). That study did
not employ a flash-lag design. Instead,Maus andNijhawan demon-
strated that when a moving object disappears gradually by moving
behind a variable neutral density filter, it remains visible past its
standard luminance threshold. This finding could be caused by hys-
teresis (Palmer 1999). In any case, it does not address the issue of
whether the presence of a transient signal eliminates the flag-lag
effect (i.e., the transient signal assumption).
To test this assumption, we used a reversed-contrast version of
the flash-lag paradigm in which the background was gray and the
moving object changed from black to white at the moment of the
flash. The resultant transient signal must be at least as large as in
the flash-terminated version (probably larger, since the neurons
in the thalamus are sensitive to contrast polarity; Hubel &
Wiesel 1961). If Nijhawan’s transient signal assumption is
correct, this should abolish the flash-lag effect. Nevertheless,
the magnitude of the effect was just as strong with our stimulus
as in the standard flash-lag paradigm (i.e., with no transient).
Perhaps Nijhawan’s proposed transient signals do not originate
in the thalamus and are generated by cells that are not sensitive
to contrast polarity (Hubel & Wiesel 1962). Such cells respond as
strongly to a white dot as they do to a black dot and somay not gen-
erate a transient signal in the reversed-contrast version of the flash-
lag effect. If it is assumed that it is these cells that need to generate
the relevant transient signals, then this might explain why the flash-
lag effect still occurs in our reversed-contrast version of the para-
digm. We tested this hypothesis by comparing two versions of
the flash-lag paradigm. In one case, the Michelson contrast of the
moving object was reduced from 0.30 to 0.04 at the moment of
the flash. In the other case, it was reduced from 0.04 to 0; that is,
it disappeared. The first condition should produce a larger transient
than the second, yet we found the flash-lag effect to be of normal
strength in the first case but entirely absent in the second. It
appears that, contrary to the transient signal assumption, the
flash-lag effect is not disrupted by transients but only by the
actual disappearance of the moving object.
Why, then, does the flash-lag effect vanish in the flash-terminated
condition?Nijhawan proposes his transient signal assumption as the
reason, but our data fail to support that account. Our data are more
compatible with the postdictive theory of Eagleman and Sejnowski
(2007). In brief, this theory postulates that the apparent position of
themoving object at the time of the flash is influenced by themotion
of the object after the flash. In other words, consistent with our
observations, the flash-lag effect should occur in any situation in
which the moving object does not disappear, irrespective of any
transient signals that might be generated at the time of the flash.
This theory can readily account for all our data without invoking
any additional mechanisms.
Mental and sensorimotor extrapolation fare
better than motion extrapolation in the offset
condition
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Abstract: Evidence for motion extrapolation at motion offset is scarce. In
contrast, there is abundant evidence that subjects mentally extrapolate
the future trajectory of weak motion signals at motion offset. Further,
pointing movements overshoot at motion offset. We believe that mental
and sensorimotor extrapolation is sufficient to solve the problem of
perceptual latencies. Both present the advantage of being much more
flexible than motion extrapolation.
Nijhawan claims that the offset of a smoothly moving object
masks the extrapolated trajectory of the moving object. There-
fore, the flash-lag effect is suppressed in the flash-terminated
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condition. In an experiment using gradual variation of luminance
across the trajectory, the final position was found to be misper-
ceived in the direction of motion (Maus & Nijhawan 2006).
The reason given in this study was that the gradual variation of
luminance reduced the transient at stimulus offset. Contrary to
Nijhawan’s hypothesis, forward displacement of the final position
of a moving target has been repeatedly observed with strong
offsets. Jennifer Freyd (1987) was the first to observe displace-
ment of the final position of an object undergoing implied
motion (see overview in Hubbard 2005). She presented a station-
ary rectangle for 0.25 sec at three different orientations. The suc-
cessive views implied the rotation of the object in a certain
direction. Each view of the object was separated by a blank inter-
val of 0.25 sec, and the remembered final position was probed
after a retention interval of 0.25 sec. It is unlikely that low-level
motion receptors were stimulated in this paradigm. The stimuli
did not even reliably evoke an impression of apparent motion.
Thus, the observed localization error has to be due to high-
level, cognitive processes. In fact, when the motion type was sys-
tematically varied from implied to smooth motion by reducing
the stimulus-onset-asynchrony (SOA) of consecutive presenta-
tions, the forward extrapolation was found to decrease: The
worse the quality of the motion signals, the larger the error
(Kerzel 2003). The interpretation was that observers who are
confronted with intermittent motion signals, may engage in
“mental extrapolation” where they try to predict the upcoming
target positions. Mentally extrapolating the future trajectory
induces errors in judging the last seen object position.
Nijhawan argues that a gradual reduction of luminance con-
trast reveals motion extrapolation because masking by the transi-
ent at target offset is reduced (Maus & Nijhawan 2006).
However, it is just as likely that these conditions reveal mental
extrapolation that is induced by the absence of a clearly visible
offset. Under conditions of high uncertainty, observers are
more likely to predict the stimulus position based on what they
expect, rather on the basis of what they see. Thus, the gradual
luminance variation may bring high-level and not low-level extra-
polation mechanisms to the fore.
Further, one may wonder how much motion extrapolation
contributes to accurate sensorimotor control. Let us consider
the case of a subject placed in front of a touch-sensitive
monitor. When prompted to rapidly hit a moving object with
his index finger, the subject will take 0.3 sec to initiate the
movement, and another 0.35 sec to transport the hand from
a home-key 20 cm in front of the monitor to the screen surface.
Thus, a total of 0.65 msec elapses from the moment the
imperative signal is presented to the moment the screen is
touched. It is clear that subjects who plan to hit the currently
visible position will miss the target considerably (at the most:
0.65 sec  v, where v is target velocity). Hence, accurate inter-
ception of moving objects necessarily implies prediction of
future positions. An intriguing hypothesis is that sensorimotor
computations factor in visual delays. That is, interceptive
actions are directed at the position the target will have reached
in the time required to move the hand to that position plus
visual delays (at the most: [0.65þ 0.1 sec]  v, with visual
delays equaling 0.1 sec). Pointing to the offset position of a
moving object should isolate sensorimotor compensation for
visual delays, as the system does not need to take into account
the future trajectory. In fact, pointing movements overshoot
the final position by a distance that roughly corresponds to the
flash-lag effect (Kerzel & Gegenfurtner 2003). In contrast, per-
ceptual judgments were centered on the true offset position.
Thus, we believe that visual delays are not treated differently
from other types of delays (time to decide, time to move, etc.).
The sensorimotor system aims at positions further ahead that cor-
respond to the respective delays.
A characteristic of sensorimotor compensation is that it is flex-
ible and task-dependent. In a set of experiments on the Fro¨hlich
illusion (Fro¨hlich 1923), we observed that localization judgments
(mouse pointing) were affected by rapidly changing visuomotor
strategies. In the classical Fro¨hlich illusion, the perceived onset
position of a moving object is displaced in the direction of
motion. Possibly, the first part of the trajectory is missed
because of attentional latencies and metacontrast. When the
onset position is predictable because the target always appears
in two narrow regions of space, this error is reproduced with
pointing movements. However, when the onset position is
highly unpredictable because the target appears randomly in a
large region of space, the error is eliminated or even slightly
reversed (Mu¨sseler & Kerzel 2004). Our interpretation was
that with high uncertainty, subjects try to correct for having
missed the initial part of the trajectory by pointing to positions
opposite to the direction of motion. Analysis of the time course
showed that the effect of uncertainty emerged after only about
10 trials. That is, subjects changed their response strategy as
soon as they noticed that the target position appeared in
random places. Further, perceptual judgments, which were unaf-
fected by predictability when run in a separate block of trials,
showed the same effect of predictability when randomly inter-
mingled with pointing movements (Mu¨sseler et al., in press).
Thus, visuomotor strategies may affect the way retinal stimulation
is evaluated.
Given the capacity to rapidly adapt visuomotor translation to
changing circumstances, one may wonder whether motion extra-
polation is needed to deal with visual latencies. Although it
cannot be ruled out that such a mechanism exists, assuming its
existence does not seem parsimonious. Other, more flexible
mechanisms may do the job. Our proposal is that mental extra-
polation of target motion and sensorimotor predictions solve
the problem of visual latencies.
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What’s in a name change? Visual prediction
makes extrapolation real and functional
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Abstract: Nijhawan redraws our attention to the problem of accurately
perceiving an ever-changing visual world via a sensory system that has
finite and significant communication times. The quandary is compelling
and stark, but the suggestion that the visual system can compensate for
these transmission delays by extrapolating the present is not so
unequivocal. However, in this current airing of contradictory issues,
accounts, and findings, Nijhawan trades spatial extrapolation – a rather
specific concept introduced earlier (in Nijhawan 1994) for visual
prediction – a far more expansive notion that forces the issue of both
the perceived reality and functional significance of compensation.
The discrepancy between visual information being delayed and
behavior being accurate is unquestionable. It therefore might
seem odd to take up the functionality of visual compensation.
However, why should there be sensory compensation when
later end effectors can compensate adequately? Of course, here
one might ponder whether perceiving at all has functional signifi-
cance, given that actions can be undertaken in the absence of
accurate vision in terms of position information (Goodale et al.
1986). It is at this juncture in the present exposition that
re-branding spatial extrapolation as visual prediction makes a
tangible and productive difference.
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In its current conception visual prediction does not treat vision
as separate and independent of action. In fact, Nijhawan now
argues for extrapolation being a two-stage process in that com-
pensation first occurs in the dorsal action pathway and then is
communicated to the ventral perception pathway. In this way,
any conflict between action and perception systems is obviated.
While the workings of the action system are grounded in accurate
behavior, how does one go about proving the reality of extrapo-
lated percepts?
The tack that I favor is to look for perception that varies law-
fully as a function of spatial offset. If certain spatial percepts
without recourse to extrapolation result in already established
patterns of performance, and these very percepts can be
created via extrapolation to render equivalent patterns of per-
formance, then extrapolated percepts are no different than
non-extrapolated ones. Furthermore, if the perceptual reality
of the non-extrapolated percepts is unquestionable, then logically
the same must hold for extrapolated percepts.
A spatially modulated phenomenon in face processing pro-
vides the perfect candidate for assessing the perceived reality
of extrapolated vision. When two face halves belonging to two
different individuals are spatially aligned, the resulting “facial
chimera” is difficult to read for the identity of either face half
(Young et al. 1987). However, the introduction of a spatial
offset or misalignment greatly aids identification of the constitu-
ent face halves. Observers viewed facial chimeras that consisted
of one moving face half and one flashed face half (the flash-lag
effect [FLE] facial chimera) in a flash-initiated display with
instructions to report either the offset or identify of the flashed
half. Observers both “perceived” the face halves to be spatially
offset and also produced identification times that were faster,
as is typical for constantly present spatially offset face halves.
Now, if one does not question the account given for the chimeric
face effect without extrapolated stimuli, then the same should
apply to stimuli that are a result of extrapolation. The observed
reaction time pattern with FLE facial chimeras is clearly indica-
tive of extrapolation being part and parcel of the ventral system
and perception (Khurana et al. 2006). The analogous logic
applies to a situation in which the extrapolated percept is one
of alignment and observers both perceive stimuli to be aligned
and produce responses that are concordant with the percept.
Although these findings with FLE facial chimeras provide
clear evidence for extrapolation in the ventral stream by measur-
ing not only perceived offset but also the knock-on effects on
identification latencies, other findings do not sit so comfortably
with the notion that the flow of extrapolated information is from
the dorsal pathway to the ventral pathway. It was also shown that
when the two face halves are of the same familiar individual, the
FLE is lawfully smaller. In the present context, these findings
serve as counter examples. If RD is the dorsal representation
of FLE facial chimeras and RV is the ventral representation in
higher cortical face areas, then the smaller perceived spatial
offset between face halves that belong to the same individual
versus those that belong to different individuals can be
accounted for as follows. The extrapolated moving face half
makes contact with an underlying complete representation of
the known face, thus priming the registration of the flashed face
half. A reduction in the perceived spatial offset of same face
halves is indicative of influences of ventral face processing on
spatial dorsal computations. It might be that Nijhawan’s proposed
two-stage account is in actual fact two parallel processes – one
dorsal and one ventral, each equally capable of influencing the
other.
Until recently, the face data could be thought of as an existence
proof of ventral influences on FLE; however, other well-learned
representations can also reduce the magnitude of the FLE
(Noguchi & Kakigi 2008). For Japanese observers, it was
shown that perceived FLE for Kanji character segments was sig-
nificantly reduced relative to non-meaningful geometrical seg-
ments. Importantly, this diminution was neither observed for
pseudo-Kanji characters viewed by Japanese observers nor for
Kanji characters viewed by non-Japanese English-speakers with
no knowledge of Kanji. Thus, both faces and meaningful
complex visual forms can affect spatial computations.
Although the flash-lag effect is often likened to other non-
veridical percepts such as the Fro¨hlich effect and representation
momentum, the functional significance of extrapolation lies in
the visual system generating a percept that matches reality
at the time of perceptual awareness. Both the examples above
of cortical post-constancy late representations superseding
retinal pre-constancy early representations in visual awareness
are indicative of extrapolated percepts, having real consequences
for behavior.
Perception of direction is not compensated for
neural latency
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X08003920
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Abstract: Neural activity in the middle temporal area (MT) is strongly
correlated with motion perception. I analyzed the temporal relationship
between the representation of direction in MT and the actual direction
of a stimulus that continuously changed direction. The representation
in MT lagged the stimulus by 45 msec. Hence, as far as the perception
of direction is concerned, the hypothesis of lag compensation can be
rejected.
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a brain aiming to
survive in a fast-changing environment must compensate for
time delays. The bone of contention is the processing stage at
which this compensation takes place. Is what we perceive com-
pensated for delays? Or do we perceive the world as it was
some time ago and merely adjust our actions so that they are
appropriate now?
Motion perception is a domain in which latency compensation
could be useful. Imagine a situation where a monkey is chased by
a tiger. The tiger circles the monkey and continuously changes its
direction. It is advantageous to the monkey to extrapolate the
motion changes, such that it can react in a timely manner.
Doing this extrapolation in the motor system would provide all
the benefits to survival. Nijhawan’s hypothesis is that the
monkey perceives the tiger to move in the direction it moves
“now,” rather than the direction in which it moved some time ago.
One major advantage of investigating delay compensation with
motion perception is that – unlike the perception of position
studied in the flash-lag effect – motion perception has been
studied extensively at the neural level. There is convincing evi-
dence to link the middle temporal area (MT) to the perception
of the direction of motion (for review, see Born & Bradley
2005). This strong association betweenMT activity and perceived
direction allows me to pose the question whether visual delay
compensation exists, in a very specific manner as follows:
When a stimulus continuously changes direction, does MT
encode the current stimulus direction, or a direction of motion
that happened earlier?
Figure 1A shows the responses of a single MT neuron to a
random dot pattern that started out moving downward, but
smoothly changed its direction of motion in a counterclockwise
manner. During one second, all 360 degrees of motion direction
were traced out (Krekelberg & Albright 2005; Schoppmann &
Hoffmann 1976).
The perception of direction is related to MT activity through a
labeled line model (Born & Bradley 2005). In this model, each
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spike counts as a vote in favor of a perceived direction of motion
that corresponds to the label of the cell. I will show how the
assumption of latency compensation in this model leads to a
contradiction.
I choose the label of the neuron in Figure 1A such that its
spikes represent the direction of motion as it is “now,” rather
than how it was some time ago. It is easy to see that this lag-com-
pensated label should be225 degrees – the direction of motion
for which most spikes are recorded.
Now consider the response recorded when the same visual
pattern initially moved upward but then gradually changed its
direction of motion in a clockwise direction (panel B). For this
trajectory, the largest number of spikes occurred when the stimu-
lus moved in the 180 degrees direction. The label of the neuron
does not change; hence, this peak activity signaled that a stimulus
moved towards 225 degrees. Because stimulus direction changes
at a rate of 360 degrees per second, the neuron is (1808–2258)/
3608/s ¼ 125 msec too late in signaling this direction of motion.
Clearly the interpretation that a neuron would compensate for
its response latency for clockwise changes in direction, but then
respond 125 msec too late for counterclockwise motion, is non-
sensical. The correct interpretation must be that the neuron’s
true label is the direction that lies halfway between the
maximum response direction for clockwise (CW) and counter-
clockwise (CCW) motion (2038), and the response lags the
stimulus direction equally (62.5 msec) for both clockwise and
counterclockwise motion.
This analysis does not suffer from the problems associated with
comparing flashed and continuous stimuli, because it involves no
onset or offset transients but compares two equivalent patterns of
motion. If a neuron perfectly compensated for lag, the two tuning
curves for clockwise and counterclockwise circular pathways
shown in panels A and B should be the same. To quantify the
similarity between the curves, I calculated the difference
between the stimulus directions at the peaks of the average
response curves. Half this difference, divided by the speed of
the change in direction of motion, equals the time by which
the neural representation lags the stimulus. Figure 1C shows a
population histogram of lags derived from 395 MT neurons
recorded in three awake, fixating macaques. In this histogram,
neurons that compensated for neural latencies are found at
lag ¼ 0. Clearly, there were few such neurons, and on average
the MT population lagged the stimulus direction by 45 msec.
Neural activity in MT faithfully tracks the percept of motion,
even when that motion is illusory (Krekelberg et al. 2003; 2006;
Schlack & Albright 2007). As such, it is clearly a perceptual
area. The analysis presented here, however, demonstrates that
the representation of motion in MT lags 45 msec behind stimulus
direction. If this lag for a predictable stimulus were less than the
lag for an unpredictable stimulus such as a flash, one could still
argue that MT does some (albeit incomplete) lag compensation.
Data from many laboratories, however, show that abrupt visual
onsets can reach MT cells in approximately 40 msec (Bair et al.
2002; Petersen et al. 1985; Price et al. 2005). This suggests
that – as a population – MT does not compensate for lag at all.
These findings do not exclude the possibility that there is some
compensation for time delays in other perceptual subsystems.
However,motion perception is a subsystem inwhich compensation
might be expected to benefit the organism most. If we cannot find
evidence for lag compensation here, it seems prudent to conclude
that while we may act in the present, we perceive the past.
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Unconscious inference and conscious
representation: Why primary visual cortex (V1)
is directly involved in visual awareness
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Abstract: The extent to which visual processing can proceed in the visual
hierarchy without awareness determines the magnitude of perceptual
delay. Increasing data demonstrate that primary visual cortex (V1) is
involved in consciousness, constraining the magnitude of visual delay.
This makes it possible that visual delay is actually within the optimal
lengths to allow sufficient computation; thus it might be unnecessary to
compensate for visual delay.
The time delay problem – that perception lives slightly in the
past as a result of neural conduction – has recently attracted a
considerate amount of attention in the context of the flash-lag
effect. The effect refers to a visual illusion wherein a brief flash
of light and a continuously moving object that physically align
in space and time are perceived to be displaced from one
another – the flashed stimulus appears to lag behind the
moving object (Krekelberg & Lappe 2001). In the target
article, Nijhawan compellingly argues that delay compensation
could be undertaken by a predictive process in the feedforward
pathways in the vision system. Before jumping into the quest for
the mechanism of delay compensation, however, I would like to
Figure 1 (Krekelberg). The lagging neural representation of
stimulus direction in the middle temporal area. (A)
Counterclockwise (CCW) changes in direction. The direction of
stimulus motion is shown on the angular axis; dots represent
spikes recorded while the stimulus moved in a given direction.
Each concentric circle of dots represents a separate trial. The
solid line shows the neural response averaged over trials; the
radial distance represents the firing rate. (B) Responses to
clockwise (CW) changes in direction. (C) Histogram of lags in
the representation of the direction of motion by single middle
temporal area neurons. On average (arrow), the population of
middle temporal area cells lagged 45 msec behind the stimulus
direction.
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argue that the magnitude of delay has been overestimated, and
that it might even be unnecessary to compensate for such a delay.
Although time delay poses a difficult issue for visual motion
perception in particular, there is nevertheless the benefit to
allow large amounts of computation to take place unconsciously.
Presumably, evolution must have set optimal delay lengths that
are short enough to avoid too much delay, but long enough to
allow sufficient amounts of computation. If visual delay is
within such optimal lengths, compensation might be unnecess-
ary. The key issue, then, is to determine the magnitude of
delay inherent in the visual system. As mentioned by Nijhawan,
the perceptual lag of a moving object due to neural delay can
be calculated as v  tmax, where v is object velocity and tmax is
the maximum cumulative delay in the vision pathway before con-
scious percepts emerge. The magnitude of delay is therefore
determined by tmax. This boils down to this question: To what
extent can the visual process proceed in the visual hierarchy
without awareness? The farther the unconscious visual process
proceeds, the larger is the perceptual lag that occurs.
Because humans are not aware of the delay compensation
process, it is tempting to speculate that the brain areas subserving
it might be unrelated to awareness. Indeed, neural activity at the
level of photoreceptors is not sufficient to yield visual awareness,
and some researchers further argue that later stages after the
retina, such as primary visual cortex (V1), are not involved in con-
sciousness. This logic is problematic, however, and can be illus-
trated more clearly when we take a step back to examine a
more general problem in visual perception – what Hermann
von Helmholtz called unconscious inference (i.e., before per-
cepts emerge, huge amounts of computational processes take
place without consciousness). A key notion here is that uncon-
scious inference does not imply that the neural substrates are
unrelated to consciousness. For example, in the binding
problem, a distributed hierarchical network in the brain pro-
cesses different features of an object. The neural substrates
that correctly select and integrate separate neural represen-
tations of features to form coherent object representations are
believed to comprise both parietal and frontal cortex (Treisman
1996). Can we thus infer that activity in parietal and frontal
cortex is unrelated to consciousness? Apparently this is not the
case (Lin & He, in press).
Yet, the notion that observers are not directly aware of neural
activity in the optic nerve, the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN),
and even V1 has been popular among many researchers (e.g.,
sect. 3 of the target article), especially after the appearance of
the influential paper by Crick and Koch in 1995. Although this
idea (Crick & Koch 1995) was initially based on behavioral
studies that show equal adaptation strengths for both visible and
invisible conditions (e.g., He et al. 1996), recent evidence demon-
strates, instead, that V1 is directly involved in visual awareness (for
a review, see Lin & He, in press). Monkey single-unit recordings,
human electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings, and brain
imaging converge to reveal robust awareness-dependent modu-
lations in V1; neural events in V1 are actually attenuated in
response to suppressed (vs. non-suppressed) visual stimuli.
Convergent psychophysical evidence also comes from binocular
rivalry, the phenomenon that when each of the two eyes views
dissimilar images, the two images rival for visibility, with one tem-
porarily dominating perception for several seconds before being
replaced in dominance by the other. With adaptation, a recent
study shows that rivalry suppression weakens the strengths of
aftereffect for low-contrast adaptors (Blake et al. 2006), which is
believed to transpire in V1. It appears that although unconscious
inference per se is beyond consciousness, neural activity in V1 is
actually correlated with consciousness.
Where, then, does consciousness enter into the information
processing sequence? How can one distinguish conscious proces-
sing from unconscious processing in the brain? It is important to
know which neural substrates of unconscious inference are con-
scious and which are unconscious, as measured by correlations
between neural activity and conscious experiences. This
appears extremely difficult, given the unclear mechanisms of
how the brain computes unconscious inference. In addition, it
is almost impossible to isolate the inference processes (e.g.,
feature binding), since we only know that there are such pro-
cesses after we are conscious of the objects. Moreover, although
many studies focus on brain activation differences between con-
scious and unconscious experiences, it is an oversimplification to
classify certain areas as conscious or unconscious based on such
comparison. For example, a recent study shows that although V1
activity is closely correlated with conscious experience, even a
considerable difference in cortical activation in many visual cor-
tical areas does not necessarily lead to different conscious experi-
ences (Jiang et al. 2007). It therefore appears that no single area,
or even network, is sufficient for consciousness. A more dynamic
approach to distinguish consciousness from unconsciousness is to
go beyond isolated activity of certain brain areas, and, instead,
focus on how different brain areas interact with each other.
Lamme and Roelfsema (2000) suggest that when information
first enters the early visual cortex in an feedforward sweep, it is
unconscious; when such information is attentively grouped
through recurrent processing (by means of horizontal connec-
tions and feedforward/feedback projections), it gives rise to con-
sciousness. This might provide important clues as to what give
rise to consciousness.
In sum, although the neural correlates of consciousness are
still elusive, it is now well documented that V1 is directly
related to awareness (Lin & He, in press). This has important
implications for the magnitude of time delay by constraining
tmax (the maximum cumulative delay in the vision pathway
before conscious percepts emerge) to less than 72 msec on
average in V1 neurons (Lamme & Roelfsema 2000). Such a
short delay might be within optimal delay lengths to allow suffi-
cient computations to take place, and might even make it
unnecessary to compensate for the delay.
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Neuronal adaptation: Delay compensation at
the level of single neurons?
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Abstract: Saccades divide visual input into rapid, discontinuous periods
of stimulation on the retina. The response of single neurons to such
sequential stimuli is neuronal adaptation; a robust first response
followed by an interval-dependent diminished second response.
Adaptation is pervasive in both early and late stages of visual
processing. Given its inherent coding of brief time intervals, neuronal
adaptation may play a fundamental role in compensating for visual delays.
Nijhawan presents a compelling argument in support of the
existence of delay compensation in visual processing. Specifi-
cally, he draws a distinction between “discrete” and “continu-
ous” stimuli and focuses on the flash-lag effect as a useful
illustration of differential processing between the two. Our lab-
oratory investigates an important class of stimuli that extends
the discrete-continuous continuum. We use sequential
stimuli, consisting of consecutive stimulation separated by
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brief blank periods. This kind of visual stimulation is frequently
encountered by the retina.
Humans make rapid eye movements, or saccades, approxi-
mately three times per second. These movements shift the pos-
ition of the world on the retina. Thus, the seemingly simple act
of looking at an object, such as a face, involves the successive
repositioning of its image features on disparate locations of the
retina. Importantly, we do not perceive these shifts of the
visual world or the period of lost time during a saccade,
because of a general phenomenon known as saccadic suppres-
sion. Natural vision is therefore largely comprised of stable
visual input that is frequently interrupted by brief periods of sac-
cadic suppression (although continuous stimulation resulting
from object tracking is possible in the form of “smooth pursuit”
movements; for review, see Krauzlis 2004). Saccadic suppression
adds appreciable “dead time” to the normal delays that Nijhawan
reviews; yet we fail to notice all of the lost perceptual time just as
we fail to be disturbed by the afferent delays. Instead, we per-
ceive a world that is spatially and temporally stable.
How do wemaintain this two-dimensional visual stability in the
face of the brain’s physical limitations? Nijhawan discusses feed-
forward signaling as one way of coping with visual delays, and our
earlier work demonstrated the existence of such signaling in a
pathway from the midbrain to prefrontal cortex (Sommer &
Wurtz 2002; 2006). This pathway seems to help keep the brain
and retinotopic visual world in spatial register before and after
a saccade. Our recent work has focused on how the brain main-
tains temporal stability (Mayo & Sommer, submitted). We
sequentially present two visual probes in the receptive field of
neurons in awake, fixating monkeys. We systematically vary the
amount of time between probe presentations (interstimulus
interval, or ISI). The purpose is to mimic the fixation-saccade-
fixation timing of natural vision. We have recorded neuronal
activity in two brain areas: the retinally recipient superficial layers
of the superior colliculus (supSC) and the frontal eye field (FEF),
a “higher” visuomotor area in prefrontal cortex.
Sequential stimulation elicited sequential visual responses in
neurons, with each response separated by a period of baseline
activity equivalent to the ISI. Therefore, the timing of neuronal
responses accurately encodes the timing of real-world visual
stimulation. However, the relative magnitude of the neuronal
responses also varied significantly with ISI (Fig. 1). Second
visual responses were only a fraction of the first; this is a well-
known phenomenon called neuronal adaptation.
We suggest that neuronal adaptation may be useful for timing,
because it carries information about the ISI during sequential
visual stimulation. Extremely short ISIs (,50 msec) lead to neg-
ligible second neuronal responses (Fig. 1, left), whereas longer
ISIs lead to monotonically increasing responses (Fig. 1, right)
until ISI  400 msec, where second responses attain normal
magnitudes (Fig. 2). We found that adaptation followed the
same time-course in FEF and supSC, but was stronger overall
in FEF. As a point of reference with previous studies, our
supSC data matched those reported by other laboratories
(Robinson & Kertzman 1995; Wurtz et al. 1980).
In light of the apparent need for a compensatory physiological
mechanism as described by Nijhawan, we posit that neuronal
adaptation may act as an alternative source of latency encoding.
As the target article explains, the exact timing of neuronal
responses in identical conditions can vary by tens of milliseconds
from trial to trial. Neurons downstream of these time-varying
sensory responses therefore receive an imprecise measurement
of stimulus onset. However, for sequential stimuli presented
within 400 msec of each other, downstream neurons could corro-
borate the raw timing of the neuronal responses with relative
magnitude comparisons of the incoming neuronal responses.
Neuronal adaptation therefore may function as a complementary
latency code. The presence of this code in ecologically relevant
scenarios – in response to sequential stimuli, and at presentation
times that mimic typical periods of fixation and saccades – lends
further support to our hypothesis.
Using the relative magnitudes of sequential visual responses as
a clue to the timing of visual stimuli requires an assumption that
the sequential visual stimuli themselves are nearly identical.
Accepting this assumption means that differences in visual
responses that occur within 400 msec of each other must be
due to timing. The assumption seems valid for many real-world
situations, such as making saccades across continuously textured
images or when an object under inspection is briefly occluded. In
the latter case, neuronal adaptation would provide a robust
encoding of the duration of occlusion.
Although it is still unclear how exactly neuronal adaptation
could account for delay compensation, it has two important
traits that are central to Nijhawan’s proposal. First, neuronal
adaptation is a sensory process that occurs only one synapse
beyond the retina in cats and monkeys (Coenen & Eijkman
1972; Mayo & Sommer, submitted) and has been reported
within the retina in lower species (Schwartz et al. 2007a). Thus,
neuronal adaptation seems to be an immediate, automatic
sensory mechanism. Second, neuronal adaptation is pervasive,
seen at all stages of striate and extrastriate visual processing.
This substantial concordance between adaptation and Nijhawan’s
proposal calls for additional research and computational model-
ing. An improved understanding of the neurophysiology of
timing would provide an important complement to Nijhawan’s
thoughtful analysis.
Figure 1 (Mayo & Sommers). Example visual responses from a
small group of single neurons in superior colliculus. The results
of using two probes presented at interstimulus intervals of
50 msec (left) and 200 msec (right) are shown.
Figure 2 (Mayo & Sommers). Normalized visual responses in
the superior colliculus population. Vertical dotted line indicates
time of first probe onset. Grayscale lines depict mean
responses to the second probe after sequential, paired
stimulation, at various interstimulus intervals. Dashed line
represents typical response to first probe.
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Abstract: Correction of sensory transmission delays is an intractable
problem, since there is no absolute reference for calibration. Phase-
alignment is a practical alternative solution and can be realized by
adaptive filters that operate locally with simple error signals.
Nijhawan suggests that the visual system compensates for delays,
with the perceived position of a moving object being based on a
type of guess as to the object’s actual position. This would be
adaptive, as it is necessary that the output of the visual system
be synchronized with the environment and behavior. However
there is really no way that any part of the nervous system can
be calibrated to correct for transmission delays, since there is
no absolute reference available for calibration. As such, the cali-
bration problem is intractable. This problem can be solved
instead by aligning the relative phase of the signals in question.
This is a common problem in engineering that has relatively
simple and straightforward solutions.
Problems produced by transmission delays are frequently
encountered in electrical engineering. Examples include cancel-
lation of echoes produced in long-distance transmission lines and
adaptive beam-forming from an array of sensors with delayed
outputs (e.g., spatially separated sensors in a sonar system).
These problems can be solved by means of adaptive filters with
delayed inputs (Haykin 1996). The proper delay is selected by
appropriate weighting on the delayed inputs. These weights are
adjusted by some simple characteristic of the output, such as
by minimizing the variance of the signal subject to the condition
that the sum of the weights equals 1.
Adaptive filters capable of phase-aligning signals can be rea-
lized by simple operations that can be implemented either by
algebraic equations or by a few elements of an artificial neural
network. This means that the neural circuitry need not be
complex. The cost function that tunes these filters can be very
simple, so that it is not necessary to appeal to complex cognitive
processes. Some characteristic of the fused signal, such as the
variance, serves as an error signal to adjust the weights given to
the delay elements. All that is required for phase-alignment is
some sort of recursive feedback of the output of a perceptual sub-
system that adjusts the connections of the delayed inputs. The
simplest design is a tapped-delay line filter, although there is
no unique solution to this problem.
The logical point for phase-alignment would be the step in pro-
cessing that precedes the fusion of the to-be-aligned signals, as
this would minimize the length of the path required for the
recursive feedback and ensure the fidelity of the error signal. If
filters are tuned by the output of areas far removed from the
site of sensor fusion, the error signal will not closely reflect the
characteristics of the fusion product. Hence, we would expect
the site of phase-alignment to be the local network involving
both the site of fusion and the immediate sources of its to-be-
aligned inputs.
To the extent that the phase-alignment problem is solved with
adaptive filters, we should expect that there would be no absolute
delay correction employed by perceptual systems. Rather, the
phase correction would depend on the problems encountered
during the recent history of the various perceptual subsystems.
An understanding of how this process works might best be
obtained by observing the plasticity in the calibration of percep-
tual subsystems (i.e., adaptation to the statistics of the observer’s
environment). Fusion of audiovisual speech is an example.
Vatakis et al. (2007) measured judgments of the temporal
order of auditory and visual speech tokens. Participants were
concurrently exposed to audiovisual speech that was presented
either in synchrony or with the auditory stream lagging by
300 msec. They found that exposure to asynchronous audiovisual
speech shifted the point of subjective simultaneity in the tem-
poral order task. These results demonstrate that even the brief
exposure encountered in a typical experimental session is
capable of recalibrating the relative phase of perceptual subsys-
tems. Thus, phase-alignment in this case is an adaptive process.
Phase-alignment by adaptive filters can operate locally within a
relatively simple network using simple error signals. As a result,
the top-down input to perceptual systems does not need to
involve complex cognitive processes from remote higher cortical
regions. Furthermore, the input is in the form of adjustments to
the strength of synaptic weights that tune perceptual filters. This
adjustment occurs in a slow post-hoc manner so that changes
resulting from any current mismatch do not affect on-line proces-
sing. This slow change would occur on a timescale much longer
than that of individual perceptual events. This is in contrast to
the view expressed by Nijhawan, where prediction is based on
an interaction of visual systems with information from areas
much farther downstream.
Prediction is a difficult problem that is not explained by simply
appealing to top-down input to perceptual processing streams.
Phase-alignment is a tractable problem with simple solutions.
Prediction is based on a Cartesian view of the problem that con-
siders the perception of motion to be the instantaneous value of a
continuous variable that starts and stops a counter somewhere in
the brain. Phase-alignment involves a filter that integrates input
from sensors across time to produce an output, the nature of
which is adjusted by prior sensory experience.
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Abstract: In the target article Nijhawan speculates that visual
perceptual mechanisms compensate for neural delays so that moving
objects may be perceived closer to their physical locations. However,
the vast majority of published psychophysical data are inconsistent
with this speculation.
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The last decade has seen extensive debate on the interpretation
of the flash-lag effect (FLE). Unfortunately, the target article
fails to further scientific progress in this area. One problem
is that many terms and concepts used in the article are not
defined precisely. For example, the target article makes no
clear distinction between “prediction” and “compensation”
and claims that: “The notion that sensory processes per se
may be predictive is not widely recognized. In fact, previous
suggestions of sensory prediction (Nijhawan 1994) have led
to controversy” (sect. 2, para. 4). That sensory processes may
be predictive is neither new nor controversial. A multitude of
mechanisms – from inhibition to light adaptation, occurring
at neural loci from retina to cortex – have been discussed in
the context of predictive processes and codes (e.g., Attneave
1954; Barlow 1961a; 1961b; 1961c; Hubel & Livingstone
1987; Grzywacz et al. 1995). What is controversial is the
specific hypothesis proposed by Nijhawan, namely, compen-
sation of neural delays at the perceptual level. A lack of con-
ceptual clarity is exemplified also by the author’s failure to
distinguish between processes that contribute to compensation
and the locus of compensation. The target article incorrectly
attributes to us the suggestion that “visual processes do not
contribute to compensation for neural delays” (sect. 6.1, para. 1).
Our point was that the locus of compensation is primarily
within the motor rather than the perceptual system (Purush-
othaman et al. 1998).
The target article is selective in addressing other published
data and criticisms. For example, Murakami (2001) reported a
FLE of approximately 60 msec for targets moving in random
trajectories. Because the perceptual compensation model
(PCM) proposed by Nijhawan relies on the predictability of
motion trajectories, it cannot explain this outcome. Patel et al.
(2000) and O¨g˘men et al. (2004) showed that the flash misalign-
ment in a flash-lag paradigm depends on when the flash is pre-
sented relative to the onset of motion. If the flash was presented
simultaneously with the onset of motion, a flash-lag was
observed. If, using the same stimulus parameters, the flash
was presented during continuous motion, a flash-lead was
observed. Without ad hoc assumptions, this critical outcome
cannot be explained by the PCM. Our review led to the con-
clusion that “given this large body of contradictory evidence,
the lag-compensation through extrapolation model appears
untenable” (O¨g˘men et al. 2004). We also showed that when
the luminance of a flashed or a continuously moving target is
changed, the magnitude of the FLE varies systematically in
accordance with the predictions of the differential latency
hypothesis (Kafalıgo¨nu¨l et al., in press; O¨gmen et al. 2004;
Patel et al. 2000; Purushothaman et al. 1998). This
luminance-dependent variation in the flash-lag magnitude
implies that the putative delay-compensation mechanism is
unable to take into account stimulus-dependent variabilities in
latencies.
Besides failing to address relevant published data and criti-
cism, empirical data questioning the plausibility of the PCM
based on substantial “compensation errors” are dismissed by
stating that the model operates within an unspecified lumi-
nance range or that “over-extrapolation could be useful”
(sect. 5.2.1.2, para. 3). The inability to specify after a decade
of research even an approximate luminance range within
which visual compensation works suggests that no such range
exists. The Hess effect clearly demonstrates this point by
showing that perceptual compensation for differential delays
in targets of different luminance does not occur, within any
range of target luminance (Williams & Lit 1983; Wilson &
Anstis 1969).
Virtually all of the examples given to illustrate the need for a
perceptual compensatory mechanism include motor action. The
only unequivocal example offered for a perceptual spatial extra-
polation of visual motion is the report by Maus and Nijhawan
(2006). However, in order to demonstrate that perceptual
spatial extrapolation occurs, one needs to show that the per-
ceived trajectory of a moving object extends beyond its physical
trajectory, that is, to locations where no retinal stimulation
occurred. Maus and Nijhawan’s findings can be explained by
spatio-temporal integration along the motion path, which
lowers the detection threshold for a target with a longer trajec-
tory. Our analysis, shown in Figure 1, captures Maus and Nijha-
wan’s findings quantitatively and illustrates that what they
interpret as “extrapolation” is essentially a difference in
sensitivity.
Finally, the target article suggests that the proposed latency
compensation mechanism can be viewed as producing a “lag con-
stancy,” analogous to a putative “sharpness constancy.” It goes on
to state that, in the absence of sharpness constancy, “the same
moving object, traveling at different speeds, would appear
more or less elongated (smeared)” (sect. 8, end of para.). Psycho-
physical data indicate that the length of perceived smear for
moving targets varies systematically with speed (Bedell & Lott
1996; Chen et al. 1995). Because the target article provides no
convincing evidence for visual compensation of latency, the
appropriate analogy between these “constancies” is that neither
has been shown to exist.
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Figure 1 (O¨gˇmen et al.). The results of simulating a unity gain,
first-order low-pass temporal filter with stimuli used byMaus and
Nijhawan (2006). (a) The dotted curve shows temporal filter
(time constant ¼ 63.5 msec) output for a stimulus that
decreases smoothly in log luminance from a value of 104 units
during 360 degrees rotation. The solid curve represents the
filter response to the same stimulus that moves only between
angular positions 178 and 190 degrees. These simulate the long
trajectory and short trajectory conditions in Maus and
Nijhawan’s Experiment 1. The gray vertical bar represents the
temporal window within which the response is summed and
compared for long and short trajectories, under the assumption
that detectability increases with the log of the summed filter
activity. (b) The logarithm of the summed output as a function
of angular position during rotation, for the three conditions
indicated in the inset. The activity produced at any angle of
rotation is always less for short than long trajectory motion.
Further, the integrated activity corresponding to short
trajectories of motion at 184 and 195 degrees of rotation (59
and 129 msec motion durations) are very similar to that for the
long trajectory of motion at 220 degrees rotation (horizontal
dotted line). These three angular positions correspond to the
positions reported by Maus and Nijhawan (2006) for the
detection or disappearance of the moving spot, for the same
durations of target motion.
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Neurophysiology of compensation for time
delays: Visual prediction is off track
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Abstract: Speculation by Nijhawan that visual perceptual mechanisms
compensate for neural delays has no basis in the physiological
properties of neurons known to be involved in motion perception and
visuomotor control. Behavioral and physiological evidence is consistent
with delay compensation mediated primarily by motor systems.
Prediction in skilledmovements has been studied for more than 50
years (e.g., Gottsdanker 1952). Analysis of eye movements show
that baseball and cricket batters and tennis players make an antici-
patory saccade to the expected location of the ball and then pursue
it foveally for a short period of time (Bahill & LaRitz 1984; Land &
Furneaux 1997; Land & McLeod 2000). In conjunction with
physiological evidence discussed below, these data support the
view that compensation for neural latencies is based primarily
on predictive motor plans (Kerzel & Gegenfurtner 2003; O¨g˘men
et al. 2004; Patel et al. 2000; Purushothaman et al. 1998).
Perceptual compensation in early visual areas, as suggested by
Nijhawan in the target article, need not occur. Although Nijhawan
links neurophysiological findings to “perceptual compensation,”
we show here that these links are misconstrued.
As O¨g˘men et al. point out in their commentary in this BBS
issue, Nijhawan fails to distinguish between “prediction” and
“compensation.” As a consequence, he mistakes predictive
phenomena, such as perisaccadic suppression of retinal
motion and remapping of receptive fields (RFs), as evidence
for “compensation of neural delays.” For example, the author
argues that the perisaccadic remapping of RFs in the lateral
intraparietal (LIP) area (Duhamel et al. 1992) implies that
“sensory processes participate in prediction” (target article,
sect. 2, para. 4) and advances a model for perceptual compen-
sation “based on the interaction of signals between the magno-
cellular and parvocellular systems” (sect. 5.2.1) within area V1
(see Fig. 6 of the target article). However, impending motor
action is a prerequisite for the RF remapping reported by
Duhamel et al (1992), which indicates that this phenomenon
is linked to motor preparation and action and does not imply
“compensation of neural delays” at the perceptual level.
Indeed, RF remapping was shown not to occur in area V1
(Nakamura & Colby 2002). As discussed by O¨g˘men et al (this
issue), the only example in the target article of purely percep-
tual extrapolation is from Maus and Nijhawan (2006), which is
accounted for by differences in sensitivity.1
Nijhawan attempts to link the flash-lag effect (FLE) to the
physiological findings of Berry et al. (1999), but the FLE
increases linearly with the velocity of the moving object (Krekel-
berg & Lappe 1999; Nijhawan 1994); and Berry et al. showed that
the neural response to a moving stimulus shifts increasingly in the
opposite direction of motion as the velocity of the moving stimu-
lus is increased. Whether compensation occurs at the perceptual
or motor levels can be assessed by considering the dynamic
response properties of neurons in areas associated with percep-
tion and motor control. Smooth pursuit eye movements exhibit
approximately zero phase lag in response to predictable
low-frequency target motion (see Carpenter 1988, pp. 58–63).
However, in the absence of timing and direction cues, a
pursuit latency of 100–150 msec occurs at motion onset, and
this lag gradually approaches zero as the pursuit system evolves
from its transient to steady-state mode of operation (Bahill &
McDonald 1983; Barnes et al. 2000; Fukushima et al. 2002). In
primates, the middle temporal (MT) area is closely associated
with motion perception (see Britten 2004; Britten et al. 1996;
Liu & Newsome 2005; Purushothaman & Bradley 2005), and
the frontal eye field (FEF), a premotor area, is involved in gen-
erating eye movements (see Bruce et al. 2004; Schall 2004).
Lesions to MT impair motion perception (Newsome & Pare´
1988), whereas lesions to parts of FEF impair predictive
smooth pursuit movements (Keating 1991; MacAvoy et al.
1991). Even with bilateral FEF lesions, monkeys can still
detect target motion and attempt to track it, albeit with very
low gain and high phase lag (Keating 1991). In addition, the
stimulus-driven component of FEF neural responses is modu-
lated significantly by the relevance of the stimulus for impending
visuomotor behavior, and modulated little by the physical fea-
tures of the stimulus (cf. Schall 2004). Finally, electrical stimu-
lation of MT neurons biases perceived movement direction
without causing eye movements (Nichols & Newsome 2002;
Salzman et al. 1990; 1992), whereas stimulation of FEF
neurons directly induces eye movements (Gottlieb et al. 1993;
1994). Thus, the activities of FEF neurons are closely associated
with the generation of eye movements and are relatively unre-
lated to perceptual qualities of the tracking target.
MT neurons show response lags on the order of 100 msec for
step-ramp smooth pursuit tasks (Komatsu & Wurtz 1988;
Newsome et al. 1988). Despite complete compensation exhibited
by smooth pursuit eye movements for predictable stimuli, these
response lags do not diminish for similar stimuli (Lisberger &
Movshon 1999), ruling out delay-compensation at or before
this cortical site linked to motion perception. In the FEF,
neurons active during smooth pursuit (pursuit neurons) veridi-
cally track predictable target motion (Gottlieb et al. 1993; 1994;
MacAvoy et al. 1991; Tanaka & Fukushima 1998). However, no
FLE occurs during accurate pursuit (Nijhawan 2001). Therefore,
the linkage of the FLE to lag-compensation requires the analysis
of conditions in which no smooth pursuit occurs. In the absence
of active pursuit, pursuit neurons in FEF respond very little to
target motion, predictable or otherwise (Gottlieb et al. 1993;
1994; MacAvoy et al. 1991; Tanaka & Fukushima 1998).
Pursuit neurons in FEF that do respond to moving targets in
the absence of active pursuit show “a clear phase lag due to
visual latencies” (Fukushima et al. 2002), just like upstream
MT and MST neurons. Unlike the motion-sensitive neurons in
MT, this lag decreases after approximately one cycle of predict-
able motion (Fukushima et al. 2002).
In summary, the known physiology of motion perception and
motor control is in close agreement with our proposal that the
locus of compensation for neural time delays is primarily within
the motor rather than the perceptual system (O¨g˘men et al.
2004; Patel et al. 2000; Purushothaman et al. 1998).
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NOTE
1. The target article also attempts to link the FLE to other phenomena
in which moving objects are perceived to shift in the direction of motion
(e.g., Chung et al. 2007; DeValois & DeValois 1991; Ramachandran &
Anstis 1990). However, these phenomena differ distinctly from the
FLE in their dependence on velocity and other stimulus parameters,
and are unlikely to share a common mechanism.
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Abstract: It is commonplace for a single physiological mechanism to seed
multiple phenomena, and for multiple mechanisms to contribute to a
single phenomenon. We propose that the flash-lag effect should not be
considered a phenomenon with a single cause. Instead, its various
aspects arise from the convergence of a number of different
mechanisms proposed in the literature. We further give an example of
how a neuron’s generic spatio-temporal response profile can form a
physiological basis not only of “prediction,” but also of many of the
other proposed flash-lag mechanisms, thus recapitulating a spectrum of
flash-lag phenomena. Finally, in agreeing that such basic predictive
mechanisms are present throughout the brain, we argue that motor
prediction contributes more to biological fitness than visual prediction.
It is likely that multiple mechanisms combine to create the flash-
lag phenomenon: persistence, priming, backward masking, tem-
poral dilation, and even attention have all been demonstrated in
one study or another (Bachmann & Poder 2001; Baldo & Namba
2002; Kanai et al. 2004; Krekelberg & Lappe 2001; Namba &
Baldo 2004; Sheth et al. 2000). It seems that cleverly designed
experiments can prove the importance of one’s favored model,
but in vanishingly small parameter regimes. For example, exper-
iments on the flash-terminated condition support extrapolation,
but the results are limited to degraded, uncertain stimuli (Fu
et al. 2004; Kanai et al. 2004). Other experiments support differ-
ential latency, but these use stimuli of much lower luminance
(Patel et al. 2000; Purushothaman et al. 1998).
We have previously argued that a very basic consideration of
neuronal response profiles can recapitulate a wide array of
flash-lag related mechanisms and effects (Kanai et al. 2004). As
a stimulus moves in physical space, it maps out a topographically
corresponding path in cortical space. At a given time instant,
there are the following components: (A) cells at the “current”
location of the stimulus are the most active; (B) cells in the
immediate past path of the motion contain residual activity; (C)
cells in the distant past path contain below-baseline activity
caused by adaptation and intracortical inhibition; and (D) cells
in the family of future motion paths have above-baseline sub-
threshold activity through intracortical excitation. This pattern
of activity arises from the basic temporal response profile of a
single neuron to input, and from the fact that lateral connections
between neighboring neurons tend to cause net excitation to
weakly firing neurons and net inhibition to strongly firing
neurons (Henry et al. 1978; Levitt & Lund 1997; Somers et al.
1998; Stemmler et al. 1995). These four components of the
spatiotemporal response profile have strengths that depend not
only on factors intrinsic to the neuronal network, but also on
stimulus parameters such as luminance, speed, and so on.
These components can implement various mechanisms related
to flash lag and motion processing. Component D could be
descriptively labeled as priming, and if the activity in D is high
enough to shift the centroid of the activity distribution forward,
it could partially underlie a motion extrapolation mechanism.
C could be a critical part of the neural basis for motion deblur-
ring. When component B is prominent, differential latency for
motion and flash arises: The spatiotemporal integral of the
activity of AþB will reach perceptual threshold faster than a tem-
poral integral of a stationary flash. Finally, stimulus conditions
such as uncertainty will determine whether the activity in A
alone suffices for awareness, or whether B needs to be added;
this is a plausible neural basis for two different Bayesian
estimators – conditional mean and maximum likelihood. Thus,
the tuning of a simple neural mechanism can give rise to
myriad psychophysical phenomena and high-level models.
When distilled down to the idea of lateral propagation of cor-
tical activity, we agree that prediction is intuitive and should be
neurally omnipresent. The above properties of neurons are
generic and found in almost all networks – sensory and motor.
One question that arises then is: What is the relative contribution
of sensory and motor prediction to successful behavior?
We argue that prediction in the motor realm seems to be more
effective and useful. First, visual prediction is applicable if a target
moves with uniform velocity, but motion is hardly ever uniform in
real life – physical (friction) and internal (attention, interest)
factors often disrupt the smooth flow of motion. Second, motor
prediction does not need to be as accurate as visual prediction.
The agent can often over-compensate for the movements of the
target, thus arriving at a common intersection point some time
before the target. This allows the agent some slop, and with it,
the flexibility to compensate for change in target speed, and for
relatively small synaptic delays within its own nervous system.
All delays – visual, synaptic, and of the muscle or tool-based effec-
tor – are available in a lump sum and are undifferentiated to the
motor system as motor error. Motor systems routinely compensate
for delays of the order of seconds, which arise from slow effectors.
Such a system should be well-equipped to accommodate 100 msec
of visual synaptic delay. Thus, the motor system seems to be the
workhorse. Although this is but an isolated example, we note
that prism adaptation begins in the motor system; one’s motor
system compensates for errors weeks before one begins to cor-
rectly perceive the world.
Visual prediction at the neural level is then just one of many
important mechanisms in two senses: it is only one of the
mechanisms which contribute to the flash-lag effect, and it is
only one of the types of “neural prediction” which contribute to
our biological fitness. In the case of flash-lag, variations in stimu-
lus conditions can dictate the relative importance of visual pre-
diction. In the case of biological fitness, it seems that visual
prediction is just a small jumpstart – a small, subthreshold
benefit to the organism in comparison to other predictive brain
mechanisms.
The mechanisms responsible for the flash-lag
effect cannot provide the motor prediction that
we need in daily life
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X08003993
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Abstract: The visual prediction that Nijhawan proposes cannot explain
why the flash-lag effect depends on what happens after the flash.
Moreover, using a visual prediction based on retinal image motion to
compensate for neuronal time delays will seldom be of any use for
motor control, because one normally pursues objects with which one
intends to interact with ones eyes.
In his target article, Nijhawan proposes that early visual proces-
sing provides the prediction that is needed to deal with sensory-
motor delays when we interact with moving objects, rather than
such prediction arising from complex motor strategies as is gen-
erally assumed. He argues that the flash-lag effect and related
phenomena illustrate the visual basis of such prediction. In his
discussion of the extensive literature on this topic, he ignores
several findings that show that the flash-lag effect cannot be
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caused by a visual prediction based on the preceding object
motion.
Several experiments have been performed in which a target
moves both before and after the flash, but changes its speed or
direction of motion at an unpredictable moment around the
time of the flash. According to Nijhawan’s account of visual pre-
diction, the target’s motion after the flash should be irrelevant for
its perceived position at the time of the flash. However, the per-
ceived position has been shown to depend on the target’s motion
up to 80 msec after the flash (Brenner & Smeets 2000; Eagleman
& Sejnowski 2000; Whitney & Murakami 1998). This result is
inconsistent with any kind of motion extrapolation. It is also unli-
kely that it is primarily caused by neuronal signals pertaining to
the flashed target taking longer to reach the brain than ones per-
taining to the moving target (Whitney & Murakami 1998),
because the flash-lag effect can be demonstrated with a very
bright flash and a dimly lit moving object.
The dependence of the flash-lag effect on what happens after
the flash can readily be explained if one regards perception as an
active process (O’Regan & Noe 2001). If so, the location of the
moving object is not evaluated continuously. It is only evaluated
when one needs to know it. The flash indicates that this is the
case. As determining the position in response to the flash takes
time, the result is a judged position that the object only
reaches some time after the flash. The fact that the moving
object is perceived ahead of its location at the time of the flash
is therefore not due to extrapolation, but to sampling its position
too late. This implies that the flash-lag effect should decrease if
one can convince subjects to start evaluating the location of the
moving object before the flash is registered. A way to achieve
this earlier sampling is by making the moment of interest more
predictable. Indeed, the flash-lag effect is reduced (and even
absent in some subjects) under such conditions (Brenner &
Smeets 2000).
Besides the doubts about the role of visual prediction in the
flash-lag phenomenon, there is also a more fundamental
problem with the main claim of the target article. Nijhawan’s
interesting claim is that visual prediction provides the prediction
needed to compensate for neuronal delays when interacting with
moving objects. However, when trying to intercept a moving
target, subjects tend to pursue the target with their eyes. This
is so not only in laboratory conditions (Mrotek & Soechting
2007) but also, for instance, during the final approach phase
when hitting a ball in cricket (Land & McLeod 2000). Moreover,
subjects are better at an interception task when they pursue the
target with their eyes than when they fixate somewhere near the
point of interception (Brenner & Smeets 2007). One reason for
pursuing the target is that pursuit eliminates the blur caused
by retinal motion, leading to more precise vision. However, the
lack of retinal motion means that the predictive mechanism pro-
posed in the target article will not be working. Therefore, in the
situations in which prediction is needed most in daily life, the
proposed mechanism cannot contribute to such prediction.
The way in which subjects pursue moving targets can give us
insight into how prediction works. It is known that pseudo-
random smooth target motion is pursued with delays of more
than 200 msec (Collewijn & Tamminga 1984; Koken & Erkelens
1992). Targets moving at a constant – and therefore predicta-
ble – speed are pursued with a negligible delay (Barnes & Assel-
man 1991). If this reduction in visuomotor delay were caused by
the kind of visual prediction proposed in the target article, it
would only work when the target motion is constant. This is
not the case: Negligible delays are also found when the target
motion is predictable, but not on the basis of the directly preced-
ing visual information (Thier & Ilg 2005). For instance, humans
can pursue sinusoidal motion with minimal delays. It only takes
about half a cycle of the sinusoidal target motion to achieve the
minimal tracking delay. If the target disappears, or changes its
motion, the sinusoidal eye movement continues for about half a
cycle (van den Berg 1988). Additional evidence against the
proposed visual prediction is that the prediction in pursuit is
task-specific.
When following a target with their eyes, subjects make errors
in the smooth pursuit that are corrected by catch-up saccades
that are predictive: They compensate for the errors that
develop during their programming and execution. These catch-
up saccades could be based on a visual prediction, or on a
motor prediction specific to the pursuit. In the former case, the
errors in pursuing a smoothly moving target should also be com-
pensated for when making a saccade in response to a sudden
jump of the target. However, in such an experiment, the
saccade amplitude is matched to the target jump (Smeets & Bek-
kering 2000). So the prediction that subjects make in order to be
able to track the moving target is specific to pursuit.
Our conclusion is that if the low-level predictive mechanisms
proposed by Nijhawan exist, they are responsible neither for
the flash lag effect nor for the motion extrapolation in our inter-
action with moving objects.
Anticipating synchronization as an alternative
to the internal model
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Abstract: The fundamental assumption of compensation for visual delays
states that, since delays are dealt with, there must be compensatory
mechanisms. These mechanisms are taken to be internal models.
Alternatives for delay compensation exist, suggesting that this
assumption may not be fundamental, and nor should the existence of
internal models be assumed. Delays may even be employed in their
own compensation.
A case is made for the ubiquity of anticipatory behavior by the
sensory-motor system, including visual perception. There is no
question that anticipation is ubiquitous; however, that ubiquity
tends to prompt assumptions about the world which may not
be warranted. For instance, “the fundamental assumption of com-
pensation for visual delays, [. . .] which states: ‘In the absence of
mechanisms compensating for visual delays, many behaviors in
otherwise healthy animals would be disrupted.’”(target article,
sect. 6.1, para. 2; italics in original).
The nature of these compensating mechanisms is of particular
importance. If a tacit assumption which goes along with “the fun-
damental assumption” is that those compensation mechanisms
are forward models, then the assumption may not be fundamen-
tal. The existence of alternative explanations for anticipatory
behavior strongly suggests that the assumption should not be
regarded as axiomatic. Moreover, the term compensation con-
notes both the presence of error and active correction. The
term anticipation will be used to avoid these implications.
Here, we present an alternative paradigm for anticipatory
systems, which may be useful when considering the anticipation
for visual delays. This alternative comes in the form of anticipat-
ing synchronization (Ciszak et al. 2004; Voss 2000). In one of its
simplest manifestations, anticipating synchronization is a coup-
ling of two dynamical systems such that the slave system is able
to synchronize with the future of the master system. The
general form of this coupling is shown in the following system
of equations:
_x ¼ f (x(t))
_y ¼ f (y(t))þ kx(t) y(t t))
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When two dynamical systems are coupled in this way, values of
y synchronize (after a transient) with the future of x. Put another
way, y becomes very close to a phase-shifted copy of x. This
method of anticipating synchronization is an instance of the
theoretical notion of strong anticipation (Dubois 2003; Stepp &
Turvey 2007). As opposed to weak anticipation, which involves
the use of models for explicit prediction, strong anticipation uti-
lizes law-based facts together with ordinary intrinsic dynamics. In
other words, the system above is anticipatory because it has no
opportunity not to be.
The delay term y(t2 t), representing delayed feedback in the
slave, should attract special attention. It is notable that without
this delayed feedback, the system above would not exhibit antici-
patory behavior. Typically, delays are taken to be a liability, for
which there must be explicit compensation. The alternative per-
spective suggests that delays are an asset, which can be the source
of anticipatory behavior. In the succeeding paragraphs, one may
see how delay-coupling addresses the features of behavior gener-
ally taken to imply a forward model.
Returning to the “fundamental assumption” itself, consider the
fact that increased delay induces a breakdown of anticipatory
ability, for example, demyelination in multiple sclerosis patients.
This fact is cited as the starting point for the assumption of com-
pensating mechanisms. Increasing the t parameter of a delay-
coupled system is known to show this same feature. Figure 1
shows the (k,t) parameter space associated with a delay-coupled
system such, where the function f is the Ro¨ssler system. There is
a sharp drop (shift from white to black) in anticipatory ability on
increasingt. Thus, anticipatory ability is lost after t is increased
past a critical value. The effect does not require an internal model.
Nijhawan makes the important point that mysterious self-
anticipation applies to the entire sensory-motor system. For a
delay-coupled system showing anticipating synchronization, this
behavior is expected by definition. Considering again the
system of equations above, the delay is inherent in the slave
system, y – the same system which is anticipating its master, x.
Therefore, y is indeed anticipating its own delay. Furthermore,
this anticipation is made possible not through an internal
model, but falls out of the normal functioning of the correctly
organized system.
Knowing something about delay-coupled systems and antici-
pating synchronization, we may turn to the flash-lag effect. The
pertinent aspect of this effect is that continuously moving
stimuli are led by the perceiver, whereas flashes are not. As
noted by Nijhawan, this effect shows itself in animal behavior
as a virtual lack of delay while tracking a moving object.
Viewing through the lens of anticipating synchronization, this
also comes as no surprise. In fact, one might be surprised if
this effect were not the case. Recall, anticipating synchronization,
like all dynamical synchronizations, goes through an initial tran-
sient. A flash, because of its short duration, does not allow this
transient to take place. Alternately, in the case of continuous
stimuli, we expect that the transient has taken place, allowing
for anticipation.
To reiterate, the evidence presented for the existence of antici-
pation of visual delays is sound. However, the existence of antici-
pating synchronization in particular, and strong anticipation in
general, restricts assumptions that can be made about the
nature of that anticipation. What is seen as “compensation” by
an internal forward model may simply fall out of the ordinary
dynamics of the components in question because of the way in
which they are organized with respect to their stimulus. The
above may be taken both as a counterexample to the necessity
of compensatory forward models and as an alternative framework
for investigating anticipatory behavior.
Empirically testable models are needed for
understanding visual prediction
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Abstract: Nijhawan argues convincingly that predictive mechanisms are
pervasive in the central nervous system (CNS). However, scientific
understanding of visual prediction requires one to formulate
empirically testable neurophysiological models. The author’s
suggestions in this direction are to be evaluated on the basis of more
realistic experimental methodologies and more plausible assumptions
on the hierarchical character of the human visual cortex.
The target article succeeds in convincing the reader that predic-
tion mechanisms are pervasive in the central nervous system
(CNS), and that prediction is involved even in the early stages
of sensory processing. Indeed, these results are not surprising
for informed readers, as discussions on this topic have been
prevalent for decades (Butz et al. 2007). Nonetheless, after the
neat survey by Nijhawan, it is likely – and indeed, highly desira-
ble – that most of the controversies about the predictive charac-
ter of visual processing will cease.
At the same time, we feel that the wealth of psychophysical
results discussed by the author – which may constitute a strong
basis for predicting behavioral performances in this kind of
tasks – fails to further significantly our understanding of the
phenomenon of “perception” in the brain: Without a suitable
proposal about how anticipation is implemented in the CNS,
we can hardly assume we have won one more point in this direc-
tion. One must acknowledge that the target article argues force-
fully for the existence of predictive capabilities in visual
processing. However, what we need now in order to explain
the behaviors observed in psychophysics experiments is to shift
from the level of psychophysical analysis to the level of neuros-
cientific modeling, and analyze the biological mechanisms
Figure 1 (Stepp & Turvey). For many (k,t) combinations, the
slave system (y) was incrementally shifted relative to the
master system (x), and maximum correlations recorded. White
corresponds to a maximum correlation of 1.0; black
corresponds to 0.0.
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responsible for these behaviors. “Understanding visual predic-
tion” (target article, Abstract) requires identifying parts of the
target nervous system, studying their behavior, their interconnec-
tions, and their functional role with respect to the visual proces-
sing capacity under investigation (Craver and Darden 2001;
Cummins 1983; Glennan 2005). In the lack of sufficiently
precise theoretical models, we can hardly evaluate the biological
plausibility of some of the author’s claims, especially the highly
speculative claim, discussed in the final sections of the article,
that “the goal of any type of compensation is to produce coordi-
nation between the time-varying neural representations that exist
in parts of the CNS separated by significant delays” (sect. 9.1,
para. 1). Similarly, in the lack of theoretical models, we can
hardly appreciate the relationship between the hypotheses pro-
posed by the author and other models available in the literature:
Notably, what is the distinctive character of the “internal model
for visual prediction (IMVP)” hypothesis discussed in the target
article (see sect. 7.2) with respect to the internal-model-based
hypothesis discussed by Wolpert et al. (1995; quoted in the
article) which involves sensory anticipation as well?
This is not to deny that conjectures on the involvement of some
neural structures in anticipation-based capacities may play
important roles in the discovery of anticipation mechanisms. As
has been pointed out (Machamer et al. 2000), the formulation
of mechanistic models of biological behaviors often involves the
formulation of mechanism sketches, which provide partial or
underspecified accounts of the target mechanism. Often one
starts with the isolation of some parts of the target system
which are supposed to play key functional roles with respect to
the capacity under investigation, and proceeds by identifying,
in a stepwise fashion, other functional components (and their
material instantiation) which are needed to obtain a “working”
mechanism. One must acknowledge that Nijhawan, albeit
being chiefly concerned with attesting the “existence” of visual
prediction, does occasionally formulate sketches of the neural
mechanisms that could produce the behaviors under
investigation.
However, we surmise that some of the author’s sketches are
based on too simplistic representations of the architecture of
the visual cortex, which undermines the possibility of extending
the proposed hypothesis to the study of other predictive phenom-
ena in the CNS. In fact, the article focuses on psychophysical
experiments in which only simple stimuli are involved. If we con-
sider more complex classes of stimuli, then the strictly retinotopic
organization of the visual cortex – which plays a key role in the
model – is no longer sustainable. Instead, according to a
wealth of physiological data reported in Serre et al. (2005, and
references therein), the main feature of the cortical architecture
is a hierarchical organization, which aims (in a series of stages) to
increase the invariance to object transformations and to tune to
more specific features. It is acknowledged that one of the main
functions of the ventral stream pathway is to achieve an exquisite
trade-off between selectivity and invariance, which results in an
improved capability to accomplish readily many recognition
tasks. As a possible side effect of such a trade-off, it is very
likely that strict information about the position of the objects
becomes less significant (in the higher levels of the cortical hier-
archy). If we assume that predictive phenomena also play a role
in this context – and we do – then it is not clear how extrapol-
ation can be of use. In our opinion, different phenomena
should be considered, such as, for example, the effect of the tem-
poral and spatial integration of the neural signal from the lower
layers of the hierarchy to the higher ones. That could have
induced a kind of “characteristic time” for each layer insofar as
different classes of objects would be affected by different
amounts of delays, and consequently, distinct anticipation
mechanisms.
In conclusion, we feel the author argues convincingly that pre-
dictive mechanisms must be implemented in the CNS at various
levels. This claim is consistent with a wealth of literature on
sensory processing and sensory-motor coordination. However,
as far as scientific understanding of these phenomena is con-
cerned, empirically testable theoretical models of visual predic-
tion, at a neurophysiological level, are needed. In our opinion,
the author’s suggestions in this direction are to be evaluated on
the basis of more realistic experimental methodologies and by
taking into account the hierarchical character of the human
visual cortex.
Motion as a reference for positions
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Abstract: Is the position of a moving target “predicted”? I argue that we
should regard moving targets as the natural (veridical) position
references. Motion is probably perceptually absolute, whereas position
and time are relative quantities, as in physics. According to this view,
processing delays are incorporated in the abstract local signs of motion
signals. The flash-lag effect is one case in point.
The usual way of looking at the flash-lag effect (FLE) is to
(implicitly) assume that the brain contains fixed position-maps
(e.g., retina-centric, head-centric, etc.) and that incoming
retinal signals need to be assigned a place on these maps.
Moving objects are in the habit of changing their position while
your brain is still trying to pinpoint them on a map. Therefore,
it would be a smart move if the brain were to place them on
the map at the position they will have reached at pinpointing
time. Nijhawan calls this visual prediction. It is relatively easy
to envision such a visual prediction for the whereabouts of
moving targets. Motion sensors report velocity vectors, and the
corresponding position shifts in the mapping process can be
(re-)calibrated during the visuomotor experience. It would be
smart to do this in the front end of the visual system, so that
both the action system and the perception system can profit
from the shifted mapping. Lankheet and I have developed a
simple implementation of this idea (van de Grind 2006, Fig. 1;
cf. Lankheet & van de Grind, in press) in which motion stop
signals can curtail the mapping shift. Motion prediction as well
as start and stop signals are already available at the retinal level
(Berry et al. 1999; Schwartz et al. 2007b). Further refinement
is possible in motion sensors in V1 and middle temporal area
(MT) and in the subsequent mapping on a head-centric position
map. Cantor and Schor (2007) presented arguments and evi-
dence that further support such low-level explanations. Echoes
of these ideas can be found in the target article, but in the end
Nijhawan prefers an exclusively high-level model, including feed-
back from the visuomotor action-system to the perceptual
system. Here I want to sketch a rather more grandiose low- to
middle-level alternative for the prediction hypothesis.
A neurophysiologist can see how a position in the environment
or on the retina is mapped onto a position in the brain of a
studied subject, but such a comparison is not possible for the
subject. Without a homunculus, we cannot read physical map
positions in our own brain, so external positions have to be
more abstractly coded in terms of processable neural activity. It
has been shown by Koenderink (1984a; 1984b) that it is possible
to neurally construct such an abstract “local sign” system from
scratch, by analyzing incoming information with simple oper-
ators. Receptive fields and brain maps set up correlation con-
straints because of overlap and inclusion relations, and local
signs are embedded in the correlation-structure of activity
patterns. This requires interaction with the environment to
(re-)calibrate local sign information in the brain. Similar
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remarks hold for the time sense (van de Grind 2002; 2006). Static
coordinates are not suitable as references for the construction
and maintenance of such a local sign system. In natural vision,
everything always flows (or jumps) on the retina. Therefore,
motion information is the best anchor for action control, setting
the momentary coordinates. Let us hypothesize that motion is
used to build up and continuously recalibrate the local sign
system. This makes motion an “absolute” quantity, and position
and time relative quantities, as in physics. For the FLE that
would mean that the position map is always tuned to motion,
so that moving objects are normally seen veridically at their
instantaneous physical position, regardless of their processing
time. Moving objects thus form the position reference for all
non-moving objects. The position of the flash in the FLE is there-
fore correctly seen to lag the position of the moving reference – a
shift that for logical reasons appears to equal the speed times
latency difference. The flash localization in the FLE is correct,
not an illusion, because at the time that we can report the flash
position, that position indeed lags the motion reference position,
in terms of momentary physical coordinates.
Interestingly, this was the implicit assumption in some of the
earliest papers on the flash-lag effect, by Hazelhoff and
Wiersma (1924; 1925), based on Hazelhoff’s Ph.D. thesis of
1923. Hazelhoff wanted to measure the perception time of a
flash; that is, how long after a brief flash do we consciously per-
ceive it? He invented a new method of measuring this latency.
His subjects had to pursue a black vertical bar moving along a
horizontal scale with a speed of 23 degrees per second. When
the bar passed point 0, a white line was flashed (10–20 msec),
centered on the slightly wider black bar, and the subject had to
report the bar’s scale-position at the moment the flash was
seen. Hazelhoff calculated the presumed perception times for a
range of flash luminances and for three subjects. The correspon-
dence to modern findings is striking. Hazelhoff reasoned that the
pursued object is always seen at the fovea and is “on” all the time.
The flash-signal, on the other hand, reaches some position com-
parator with a head-centric position label that was valid one per-
ception-time back for the moving eye. Metzger (1932) showed
that pursuit of the moving target is not essential in the Hazelhoff
effect. If you fixate and the scale moves continuously, a flash will
be shifted the same amount. Metzger criticized Hazelhoff’s
interpretation by pointing out that motion processing also has a
latency, and came up with the latency-difference explanation
that is still popular today. My aforementioned hypothesis, that
motion provides the reference signal for position and time,
means that I think that Metzger was wrong. Of course motion
has a processing time, but that can simply be incorporated in
the corresponding local sign. Now that study of the FLE has
grown into a field with many stake-holders, subtle experimental
paradigms, grossly incompatible explanations, and dozens of
papers, it may be time to turn to the underlying question:
What is the reference for positions in visual processing? My
guess is: motion.
Perception-action as reciprocal, continuous,
and prospective
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Abstract: From the perspective of ecological psychology, perception and
action are not separate, linear, and mechanistic processes that refer to the
immediate present. Rather, they are reciprocal and continuous and refer
to the impending future. Therefore, from the perspective of ecological
psychology, delays in perception and action are impossible, and delay
compensation mechanisms are unnecessary.
Nijhawan argues that delays inherent in the transmission of infor-
mation introduce error into perceptual and motor processes.
Such delays are primarily a consequence of the time required
to transmit information from the world to the central nervous
system (perception) and from the central nervous system to the
world (action). These delays create error between the actual
state of the world and the state of the world perceived (and
acted on) by the nervous system. As a result, delay compensation
mechanisms are required to correct this error, and such mechan-
isms are a pervasive feature of the nervous system (particularly
the visual and motor planning systems). I propose that delay com-
pensation mechanisms are necessary only if perception and
action are (mis)characterized (a) as fundamentally separate
linear and mechanistic processes, and (b) as processes that (pri-
marily) occur with reference to the immediate present. From the
perspective of ecological psychology (J. Gibson 1979; Reed
1996), both (a) and (b) characterizations are rejected. Thus,
from this perspective, the proposed delays do not exist, and
delay compensation mechanisms are unnecessary.
Perception-action as reciprocal and continuous. The delays
described by Nijhawan reflect those that are inherent in the
receiving and sending of information. As a result, such delays
(and the need for delay compensation mechanisms) are depen-
dent upon characterizations of perception and action as pro-
cesses in which information is received and sent, respectively.
That is, they are dependent upon a characterization of perception
and action as information processing. From such a perspective,
perception and action are inherently separate processes in
which information is transmitted in a sequence of linear and
mechanistic steps. Therefore, perception and action are subject
to the time delays inherent to such processes.
From the perspective of ecological psychology, far from being
separate, linear, and mechanistic, perception and action are reci-
procal and continuous. Perception and action are circularly
causal in that perceiving refers to acting, and acting refers to per-
ceiving (Shaw & Wagman 2001). It is inappropriate to label per-
ception as “input” and action as “output,” because perception and
action are multidirectional and mutually constraining. Perception
is action, in that exploratory behaviors (e.g., head movements or
manipulation of a handheld object) reveal properties of the world
that would otherwise remain hidden. To paraphrase James
Gibson (1979, p. 223), “As much as we must perceive in order
to move, we must also move in order to perceive.
To ecological psychologists, perception-action is a continuous
event with no clear beginning or end. The relationship
between perception and action is more like the continuum that
exists between the sides of a Mo¨bius band than like the relation-
ships among the parts of a clock (Turvey 2004). For this reason,
ecological psychologists refer to the relationship between per-
ceiving and acting as “perception-action” much as physicists
refer to the relationship between space and time as “space-
time.” If perception-action is characterized in this way, then
delays between perception and action are impossible because
perception-action is a continuous event (Turvey 2004). No trans-
mission of information is necessary (or even possible), and delays
between perception and action do not (and cannot) occur. There-
fore, delay compensation mechanisms are unnecessary.
Perception-action as a prospective act. According to Nijha-
wan, the delays created by the transmission of information in
the nervous system are problematic because they produce an
error between the “instantaneous registered state” of the world
and the actual state of the world. As a result, perception necess-
arily “lags behind” the world and must be “brought up to speed”
by the pervasive delay compensation mechanisms in the nervous
system. Such delays seem particularly problematic in situations in
which a behavior requires prediction of a future event (such as a
batsman attempting to hit a ball thrown by a bowler). However,
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in addition to being dependent on a characterization of percep-
tion as information processing, such delays (and the need for
delay compensation mechanisms) are also dependent upon a
characterization of perception and action as processes that (pri-
marily) occur with reference to the immediate (i.e., instan-
taneous) present.
From the perspective of ecological psychology, perception-
action primarily occurs with reference to the (impending)
future (Wagman & Malek, in press). In order to successfully
achieve a behavioral goal (e.g., reaching for a cup of coffee or
hitting a thrown ball), perceiver-actors must be able to perceive
whether that (future) behavior is possible, and (if so) they must
be able to perceive how to control their (future) movements
such that this possibility is realized (Shaw & Turvey 1999).
Thus, perception-action is inherently a prospective act (Turvey
1992). If perception-action is inherently prospective, there is
no need for the nervous system to bring the perceiver-actor
“up to speed” because perception-action places awareness
“ahead of the world.”
The prospectivity of perception-action is considered by some
to be one of the fundamental hallmarks of a psychological
being (E. Gibson 1994). From the perspective of ecological psy-
chology, the stimulation variables that support such prospectivity
are not the static and isolated variables of standard physics
(so-called “lower-order” stimulation variables) but, rather, are
the dynamic and relational variables of an ecological physics
(so-called “higher order” stimulation variables) (Turvey & Shaw
1999). For example, a handheld object’s resistance to rotational
acceleration in different directions not only informs a perceiver
about whether that object can be used to achieve a particular
goal (e.g., striking another object) but also about how that
object should be used to do so (Wagman & Carello 2001;
2003). If perception-action is characterized as a prospective
act, then there is no need for delay compensation mechanisms
in perception-action because higher-order relational variables
are sufficient to specify impending states of affairs without the
need for mediating processes.
Delays that are inherent in the sending and receiving of infor-
mation create an explanatory gap in a scientific understanding of
perception and action. However, rather than fill that gap with
specialized delay compensation mechanisms, I propose that per-
ception and action be (re)characterized in a way in which such
delays are an impossibility and the explanatory gap dissolves.
The ecological approach to perception-action provides such a
(re)characterization.
Visuomotor extrapolation
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Abstract: Accurate perception of moving objects would be useful;
accurate visually guided action is crucial. Visual motion across the
scene influences perceived object location and the trajectory of
reaching movements to objects. In this commentary, I propose that the
visual system assigns the position of any object based on the
predominant motion present in the scene, and that this is used to guide
reaching movements to compensate for delays in visuomotor processing.
Nijhawan’s article provides evidence for compensation mechan-
isms in visual perception and visually guided action. Most of this
evidence is drawn from the flash-lag effect, where a single object
moves across the retina. There are several other illusions, some of
which are briefly mentioned in the target article, which might
also support Nijhawan’s position (De Valois & De Valois 1991;
Hess 1904; Matin et al. 1976; Nishida & Johnston 1999; Rama-
chandran & Anstis 1990; Regan & Beverley 1984; Snowden
1998; Whitaker et al. 1999; Whitney & Cavanagh 2000). For a
review of these illusions, see Whitney (2002). The strongest
support for compensation in the perceptual system (e.g., extrapol-
ation) comes from the displacement of stationary edges by motion.
For example, visual motion viewed through a static aperture causes
the aperture to appear shifted in the direction of the motion (De
Valois & De Valois 1991; Ramachandran & Anstis 1990; Regan
& Beverley 1984); the motion aftereffect is accompanied by a con-
current shift in the apparent position of a static test stimulus
(Nishida & Johnston 1999; Snowden 1998; Whitaker et al. 1999);
and, static flashed objects appear shifted in the direction of
nearby motion (Whitney & Cavanagh 2000). Whereas the flash-
lag effect may be due to differential latencies for moving and
flashed objects (Ogmen et al. 2004; Purushothaman et al. 1998;
Whitney & Murakami 1998), these other mislocalizations of static
edges by visual motion cannot be caused by temporal mechanisms
such as differential latencies (Whitney 2002).
Although these mislocalizations of static edges by visual
motion provide the strongest support for perceptual extrapol-
ation (i.e., compensation for neural delays in the perceptual
system), some of these illusions greatly complicate things:
Several papers have shown that flashed objects appear shifted
forward, in a direction consistent with any nearby visual
motion, even when that motion is several degrees away from
the flash. This has been called the “flash-drag” effect or the
“flash-shift” effect (Durant & Johnston 2004; Eagleman & Sej-
nowski 2007; Watanabe et al. 2002; 2003; Whitney 2006;
Whitney & Cavanagh 2000; 2003). Because the flash is not
moving, and it is distantly separated from the moving object, it
does not immediately make sense why the flash should appear
shifted (or extrapolated) in the direction of nearby motion.
This result is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the notion
of compensation for moving object positions, but it is not
entirely incompatible. In fact, this flash-drag effect suggests
that the sort of compensation that Nijhawan describes for a
single moving object extends to all objects, and may be a far
more pervasive and important mechanism than simply allowing
us to perceptually extrapolate a baseball or other moving
object’s position.
In Nijhawan’s article, the primary case that is considered is one
in which a single moving object needs to be perceived or grasped.
This is a relatively rare situation compared to what normally
happens: usually, there is image motion across the entire
retina, not just a single moving object. Normally the world is
physically stationary, and it is we (our eyes, heads, or bodies)
that move around; and it is our movement which generates
retinal image motion. For example, when we reach to any
object, we usually make an eye or head movement during or
just before the reach. In this case, there is retinal motion of the
scene and the target object. On account of delays in visual pro-
cessing, delays in coordinate transformations, and other factors
such as imperfect efference copy signals (Bridgeman
1995) – along with the fact that targets of reaching movements
are coded in eye-centered coordinates (Buneo et al. 2002;
Crawford et al. 2004; Henriques et al. 1998) – our visuomotor
system faces a somewhat similar challenge to the one outlined
by Nijhawan, but on a much grander scale. Because of these
visuomotor delays, we should miss-direct nearly every reaching
movement we make to virtually any object. Every time we
reach toward our coffee cup, we should either hit the cup, knock-
ing it over, or fall short of the cup – all because of sluggish visual
and motor processing.
How does the visuomotor system avoid these errors? In a
recent series of studies, we found that the visuomotor system
samples motion across the visual field and then shifts the trajec-
tory of the hand in the direction of that motion when reaching to
any object in the scene (Whitney & Goodale 2005; Whitney et al.
Commentary/Nijhawan: Visual prediction
220 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:2
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X08003907
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:09:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
2003; 2007). This effect was recently called the manual following
response (Gomi et al. 2006; Saijo et al. 2005) and reveals an adap-
tive mechanism: The visuomotor system uses retinal motion to
gauge movements of the eye and body (probably because it is
as fast or faster than using vestibular or proprioceptive cues),
and then adjusts the trajectory of the reach based on this infor-
mation to improve the accuracy of goal-directed action. In
support of this, when subjects were passively rotated, the pre-
sence of background retinal image motion improved the accuracy
of reaching movements compared to cases in which only static
information, or nothing, was visible (Whitney et al. 2003). The
manual following response is conceptually similar to the “flash-
drag effect” described above, and it suggests that the visual and
visuomotor systems use retinal image motion (the kind generated
every time we move our eyes) to update/extrapolate/shift the
representations of object position (causing objects to appear
shifted in position) – and this allows us to guide our hand
more accurately than would otherwise be possible.
This visuomotor extrapolation model has the advantage that it
accounts for several psychophysical findings that are discrepant
with the perceptual extrapolation model; and it also has the
advantage that it explains accurate visuomotor behavior under
the most common circumstances – where the world is stationary
and we are moving.
Compensation for time delays is better
achieved in time than in space
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Abstract: Mechanisms of visual prediction based on spatial extrapolation
work only for targets moving at constant speed, but do not easily
accommodate accelerating or decelerating motion. We argue that
mechanisms based on temporal extrapolation deal with both uniform
and non-uniform motion. We provide behavioural examples from
interception of falling objects and suggest possible neurophysiological
substrates of time extrapolation.
Nijhawan makes a clear case for the need to compensate for
delays arising from processing and transmission times. The evi-
dence for compensation in perceptual decision and visual aware-
ness appears somewhat controversial (Eagleman & Sejnowski
2000; Krekelberg & Lappe 2001), but the evidence for compen-
sation for motor reactions to a rapidly changing sensory stimulus
is uncontroversial. Typical visuomotor delays in ballistic intercep-
tion of fast targets (such as in catching or hitting in ball games)
are about 200 msec – at least an order of magnitude longer
than the temporal accuracy required for interception (about
+10 msec). Unless the nervous system has built-in mechanisms
to compensate for such delays, the interception program would
be based on obsolete visual information about target motion,
and, as a consequence, the target would be badly missed.
Nijhawan proposes a mechanism for neural compensation of
delays that is based on a spatial extrapolation linearly related to
the time delay. According to his hypothesis, visual prediction
would be concerned primarily with horizontal processes, which
transmit neural information between two neighbouring retinoto-
pic sites. The speed of neural transmission and the distance
between neighbouring neurons along the horizontal direction
would jointly determine the amount of spatial and temporal
extrapolation. Another mechanism could consist in a shift of
the receptive field in response to moving stimuli. Sundberg
et al. (2006) found that neurons in monkey area V4 exhibit
such a shift in response to a particular type of moving stimuli.
The direction of the receptive field shift was opposite to the
direction of target motion, as if the cell had been recruited by
a wave of activity preceding the target. Ferrera and Barborica
(2006) argued that a moving target would leave a trail of refrac-
tory neurons in its wake so that spiking activity would be shifted
toward the leading edge.
Interestingly, mechanisms of visual prediction based on
spatial extrapolation, such as those mentioned above, work
only for targets moving at constant speed (uniform motion),
because the spatial shifts co-vary with the time samples in a
fixed manner. Most targets, however, accelerate or decelerate
to a variable extent. Let us consider a very common situa-
tion – that of motion affected by Earth’s gravity, such as free-
fall, ballistic, pendulum, or wave motion. Although all objects
are accelerated downward by gravity at the same rate, the
corresponding acceleration of the retinal image is not at all
constant, being inversely related to the apparent viewing dis-
tance of the object. The question then is how the central
nervous system (CNS) compensates for delays in the case of
accelerating or decelerating motion. Here we show that tem-
poral extrapolation rather than spatial extrapolation can more
easily do the job.
Figure 1A depicts space–time plots similar to those of
Figures 3 and 4 of Nijhawan, but for an object moving at con-
stant acceleration (when the spatial variable decreases from
right to left) or deceleration (when the spatial variable increases
from left to right). The dashed curve depicts the physical trajec-
tory, and the dotted curve depicts the corresponding trajectory
“seen” by a neuron with a fixed visual delay. Clearly, the spatial
shifts required to compensate for the visual delay (solid line
segments connecting the two curves) are not constant
anymore, as they were in the spatial extrapolation scheme pro-
posed by Nijhawan.
In theory, a first-order model might be used to approximate a
second-order motion. One such model is provided by the tau
function, tau ¼ x(t)/v(t), where x(t) is the spatial position of the
target and v(t) is the corresponding velocity (Lee 1976).
However, it can be shown that, in case of free-fall motion from
relatively short drop heights, such an approximation would
imply significant temporal errors in interception (.50 msec),
corresponding to the difference between the time-to-contact pre-
dicted by tau and the actual time-to-contact of the ball acceler-
ated by gravity (Zago & Lacquaniti 2005). In fact, we know
that unless taken by surprise, people can easily intercept
targets descending along the vertical accelerated by gravity (Lac-
quaniti & Maioli 1989; Zago et al. 2004); they generally intercept
Figure 1 (Zago & Lacquaniti). Figure depicts space-time plots
similar to those of Figures 3 and 4 in the target article, but for an
object moving at constant acceleration (when the spatial variable
decreases from right to left) or deceleration (when the spatial
variable increases from left to right). The dashed curve depicts
the physical trajectory and the dotted curve depicts the
corresponding trajectory “seen” by a neuron with a fixed visual
delay.
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such targets much better than similar targets descending at con-
stant speed (McIntyre et al. 2001; Zago et al. 2004). The inescap-
able conclusion, therefore, is that neural compensation uses
second-order information. However, direction, velocity, and
acceleration are probably encoded together at the level of
single neurons both in retinal ganglion cells (Thiel et al. 2007)
and in visual motion area MT (Lisberger & Movshon 1999;
Price et al. 2005; Schlack et al. 2007). It may not be an easy
task for neural populations to disentangle acceleration estimates
independently of velocity and to extrapolate target trajectory in a
time-varying fashion, as required by the schematic graph of
Figure 1A.
An alternative solution, however, is to extrapolate trajectories
in time, rather than in space. This is shown in Figure 1B,
where the same spatio-temporal trajectories of an accelerating
or decelerating object as those of Figure 1A are plotted. Here,
however, the compensation for the visual delay is implemented
by means of a temporal shift (black segments connecting
the two curves). The resulting correction at each sampled
position of the target is constant throughout the trajectory. Need-
less to say, time extrapolation works equally well for uniform
motion.
Behaviourally, it has been shown that when subjects must
intercept novel types of vertical target motion, they learn to
improve their performance by shortening or lengthening
central processing time, with the direction of change depending
on the task (Senot et al. 2005; Zago & Lacquaniti 2005; Zago
et al. 2004; 2005). This is equivalent to modulating the time
shifts in Figure 1B. We do not know where in the brain a
time extrapolation mechanism might be implemented, though
it could occur at the interface between sensory and motor
systems. There is some evidence that neurons in posterior par-
ietal cortex (area 7a and LIP) may encode elapsed time by
means of ramping activity (Leon & Shadlen 2003; Maimon &
Assad 2006; Merchant et al. 2004).
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Abstract: Challenges to visual prediction as an organizing concept
come from three main sources: (1) from observations arising from
the results of experiments employing unpredictable motion, (2)
from the assertions that motor processes compensate for all
neural delays, and (3) from multiple interpretations specific to
the flash-lag effect. One clarification that has emerged is that
visual prediction is a process that either complements or reflects
non-visual (e.g., motor) prediction.
The hypothesis that visual prediction (VP) is a central
component of visual perception attracts its fair share of
nay-sayers. It has been over 15 years since I first set up a
mechanical display in a basement at the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, using a 7-up soda can, and observed the
phenomenon. Although I was intrigued at the time, I never
anticipated that the next decade and a half would be spent
sorting it out. The attraction for me, as I suspect it is for
many of the commentators, lies in the way this simple
phenomenon forces consideration of the relationship
between time and space, the physical and the perceived,
perception and action, and brain and mind. A more
implicit theme emerging is consistent with Mach’s
notion of the “elements” (cf. Ratliff 1965) and “neutral
monism” that reality is ultimately one, and it is neutral
between the physical and the perceived.
My response is divided into six sections. The first two
sections, R1 and R2, are on general philosophical, psycho-
physical, and neurophysiological issues concerning
phenomenal consciousness (sect. R1) and the role of
motion in defining perceptual space (sect. R2). Several
commentators have suggested that motor prediction,
which could take into account visual delays in addition to
non-visual delays, renders visual prediction unnecessary.
In the third section (R3), I address this alternative point
of view, consider alternative accounts of flash-lag, clarify
misinterpretations, and consider not just predictions but
also the other side of the coin, violations of prediction.
The next section (R4) addresses the points raised by com-
mentators, ranging from suggestions that delays do not
exist, to the proposal that delays exist but frequently do
not require compensation, to the point that delays are
optimal and may, in fact, be beneficial. The next section
(R5) answers to several commentators who have ques-
tioned the applicability of the VP framework beyond
single objects moving at constant velocity. The final
section (R6) discusses commentaries that suggest mechan-
isms (e.g., adaptation) responsible for VP, or, instead, for
alternative favored mechanisms for compensation of
neural delays. It focuses on the role of feedback during
interactions with objects in specifying retinal “local sign,”
and on temporal (as opposed to spatial) extrapolation.
R1. Visual prediction (VP) is unaffected by the
outcome of the functionalism versus
epiphenomenalism debate
As Khurana points out, renaming “extrapolation” as visual
prediction draws attention to its function. What is the
function of phenomenal consciousness? Some scientists
and philosophers ascribe functionality to consciousness,
and some believe consciousness to be an epiphenome-
non – that all mental states are causally inert and cannot
impact physical (brain) states. The flash-lag effect is part
of phenomenal experience and the visual prediction (VP)
hypothesis arises from a claim about the phenomenal
experience of moving objects. So, does the truth of VP
depend on a functional account of phenomenal conscious-
ness? The answer to this is, no. As Khurana suggests, in the
newer rendition, VP is unaffected by the outcome of the
debate. If one believes that mental things have a function,
then a veridical perceived position of moving objects (with
lag removed) would be useful for whatever phenomenal
consciousness is useful for. If mental things do not have
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a function, then a veridical perceived position of moving
objects could simply be a byproduct of predictive visual
neurons that supply other brain structures (e.g., motor
planning centers) with compensated visual input.
R2. Dynamic calibration of visual space: The
fundamental role of motion in perception of space
McFarland points out a potential difficulty for compen-
sation for neural delays in the processing of physical
events, as the absolute reference for calibration is not
known. Van de Grind offers a possible solution, arguing
that moving objects do not require a reference, as
moving objects are the reference. He proposes that pos-
ition and time are relative quantities and motion is the
absolute quantity. Van de Grind states: “For the FLE
[flash-lag effect] that would mean that the position map
is always tuned to motion, so that moving objects are nor-
mally seen veridically at their instantaneous physical pos-
ition, regardless of their processing time.”
This is a fascinating proposal. Arguments from develop-
mental neurobiology and evolution bear on this. Move-
ment has been identified as a fundamental sensory
dimension (Nakayama 1985) because of its association
with survival of the individual and the species. Many
primitive visual systems do not respond to stimulation
unless the stimulus is moving, and the ability of eyes to
signal to the brain in the absence of movement, it seems,
is present only in higher animals (Gregory 1979).
Indeed, the more primitive extreme periphery of the
human retina is only capable of signaling movement.
Thus, there are visual systems that do not respond to
stationary stimuli, but none that do not respond to
movement.
Movement is also necessary for visual perception.
Stationary stimuli disappear rapidly when their images
are stabilized on the retina (Coppola & Purves, 1996).
Although micro eye-movements allow for sustained
vision in adults, these movements are not sufficient for
strongly activating the cortical cells of a developing
visual system. Many cortical cells in newborn mammals
do not give a sustained response even to high-contrast pat-
terned stimuli, unless the stimuli move (Wiesel & Hubel
1963). Consistent with this is the finding that newborn
humans respond much more strongly to moving than to
stationary stimuli (Wickelgren 1969). These findings
suggest that visual motion must be the primary source of
stimulation for neonatal visual systems, particularly the
visual cortex (Hubel & Wiesel 1959). Because neural
activity is essential in the normal development of the
visual system (Blakemore & Cooper 1970), and cortical
activity is essential for perception, this suggests that
motion plays a primary role in first establishing the
normal mapping between points on the retina and the cor-
responding perceptual positions in space (Fawcett &
O’Leary 1985).
Movement plays a role in early development even
before the onset of visual experience. Spontaneous
ganglion-cell action potentials, seen as patterns of
activity sweeping across the retina at different speeds,
are essential to the normal development of the visual
system (Butts et al. 1999). These sweeping patterns are
similar to waves of spikes produced by moving optical
images in ganglion cells of the mature retina (Berry
et al. 1999; Meister, Wong, Baylor, & Shatz 1991).
Thus, a significant proportion of pre- and postnatal
neural activity of the immature visual system results
from movement.
Van de Grind states that “the usual way of looking at
the flash-lag effect (FLE) is to (implicitly) assume that
the brain contains fixed position-maps (e.g. retina-
centric, head-centric, etc.) and that incoming retinal
signals need to be assigned a place on these maps,” and
he asks whether this is a correct description. Indeed, it
may be incorrect to view such maps as fixed position-
maps if motion-dominated early experience contributes
in an essential manner to the mapping between retinal
points and perceived positions. We have suggested else-
where (Nijhawan & Khurana 2002) that in a developing
visual system lacking neural specificity (Barlow & Petti-
grew 1971), when a retinal point (m, n) is stimulated by
motion, the corresponding perceived object is localized
at point (m0, n0) in visual space. Once motion-based topo-
graphic maps are set up, these maps are further refined
and are eventually used by the mature visual system to
represent stationary stimuli. Thus, in the mature system,
when retinal point (m, n) is stimulated by a stationary
object, it is also localized at position (m0, n0). This proposal
(Nijhawan & Khurana 2002), which we call the “dynamic
calibration of visual space,” reinforces van de Grind’s sug-
gestion that motion is primary, and that the position of
stationary stimuli is determined by the principles estab-
lished by moving objects – not the other way round, as
is more commonly assumed.
Whitney also ascribes a fundamental role to motion, as
motion in the scene can influence the position of not just
moving objects, but also that of other static objects
(Whitney 2002). What determines the direction of influ-
ence? Because visual delays should cause a backward
shift in the perceived position of moving objects, a
forward shift in the presence of motion immediately
suggests processes geared to undoing the backward shift.
The observation that moving objects cause nearby
flashes to shift in the direction of motion is not well under-
stood, but it seems likely that whatever causes moving
objects to appear shifted forward also causes the flashes
to appear shifted. Contrary to frequent assumptions that
a flash is a static object (e.g., Whitney & Cavanagh
2000), a brief flash neither moves nor remains stationary;
neither does it move relative to the retina when the eye
is stationary, nor when the eye is moving. Thus, in the
realm of moving/nonmoving stimuli, a brief flash may be
characterized as an ambiguous object. Similar to all
ambiguous stimuli, then, flashes should be susceptible to
contextual effects. To the extent that moving objects are
forward-shifted, and flashes are influenced by motion
signals, flashes will also appear forward-shifted (but see
Shi & Nijhawan, under review). Truly static objects,
such as motion-defined stationary Gabor patches (De
Valois & De Valois 1991) and longer duration flashes,
are seen as shifted forward because these objects do not
contain strong cues as to their position. I would argue,
however, that flashes and motion-defined patches are typi-
cally not shifted forward to the same extent as moving
objects because stationary reference objects (e.g., the
computer monitor) reduce the forward shift.
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R3. Predictive perception, alternative
interpretations, misinterpretations, and the
flash-lag effect
R3.1. Motor compensation and accounts of ﬂash-lag
There are many types of prediction – motor, visual, and
cognitive – and Kerzel & Mu¨sseler underscore this gen-
erality. However, phenomena of such generality would
require mechanisms of comparable diversity. Conse-
quently, predictive mechanisms may be widespread
within the nervous system. This also stands to reason, as
the brain is a massively interacting computational device.
Any significant neural function in one part of the brain
(e.g., motor) can influence another part of the brain,
such that both parts will show that function. But Kerzel
& Mu¨sseler suggest that visual mechanisms do not con-
tribute to prediction. This is unparsimonious, as more
that 50% of the cortex serves a visual function.
Sheth & Wu suggest that, “The agent can often over-
compensate for the movements of the target, thus arriving
at a common intersection point some time before the
target,” in claiming that motor prediction is more flexible
in compensating for delays in some situations, as it can tol-
erate slop. A clear example where compensation for delays
may not be necessary is where a stationary animal hunting
for fish is positioned in a narrow, fast-flowing stream.
However, some tasks, such as a frog striking a flying
insect with its tongue, would be impossible without extra-
polation in visual neurons (possibly in the tectum). Fur-
thermore, in the given fishing example, and myriad other
similar examples, even skill (which Cutting favors) and
motor compensation (which Sheth & Wu favor) are not
required. Just as this example does not diminish the
importance of skill and motor compensation generally,
examples in which visual compensation may seem
unnecessary do not diminish the importance of visual com-
pensation generally. The animal needs to localize not only
objects, but also its end-effectors. Prediction in the motor
domain but not in the visual domain would result in a
spatial mismatch between visual objects and end-effectors,
which would in turn interfere with the formation of a
unified spatial map. A mechanism for “motor-sensory uni-
fication” is considered in section R6.5.
Purushothaman, Bedell, O¨g˘men, & Patel [Purush-
othaman et al.] argue the point that compensation for
delays is carried out by motor processes. It must be
noted, however, that there is debate neither in the litera-
ture nor in the target article challenging the extremely
important role of motor processes. The examples these
commentators give are useful; however, these do not
rule out the possibility of predictive visual processes.
Although Purushothaman et al. are correct in saying that
most of the evidence supporting prediction involves beha-
vior (e.g., saccades), they fail to note that “purely” visual
processes are not as divorced from motor processes as
was once believed (Wilson & Knoblich 2005).
Smeets & Brenner misattribute the following claim to
the target article: “In his target article, Nijhawan proposes
that early visual processing provides the prediction that is
needed to deal with sensory-motor delays when we inter-
act with moving objects, rather than such prediction
arising from complex motor strategies as is generally
assumed.” Visual prediction does not replace motor
strategies, but rather, suggests that prediction in vision
either complements or reflects prediction in other (non-
visual) processes. In addition, VP could provide crucial
data not just for interactions but also for decision processes
such as when to act, and whether to act or withhold action.
Sheth & Wu suggest that VP makes only a minor con-
tribution to the flash-lag effect, invoking multiple other
factors. In some cases, large magnitude effects, for
example, some geometrical illusions, have been difficult
to account for with a single mechanism, so multiple mech-
anisms have been invoked (Coren & Girgus 1973).
However, there are still unresolved issues of basic causes
versus modulatory influences for the flash-lag effect.
Baldo & Klein have championed an attentional frame-
work for understanding the flash-lag effect. There is no
doubt that attention has a role to play in the flash-lag
effect, however, what this role is remains unclear, as
there are discordant findings (Baldo & Klein 1995;
Khurana et al. 2000; Khurana & Nijhawan 1995).
Another difficulty for the attentional framework is that
there are many forward-shift effects that do not involve
flashes (e.g., see Maus & Nijhawan 2006), so movement
of attention is not present, while forward-shift effects are.
R3.2. Additional delays in the localization of moving
objects would be dangerous
Smeets & Brenner claim that the visual system deter-
mines the precise location of a moving object only when
there is a need to know the object’s location, not through-
out the object’s motion trajectory. They suggest that the
flash-lag effect occurs because the observer needs to
determine the position of the object after the flash is
presented.
I claim that the visual system acquires and has continu-
ous position information of a smoothly moving object. This
is because precise position of a moving object could be
required to guide action at an unpredictable instant.
Localization is a fundamental task, and the mechanisms
serving localization are frequently tested (and selected)
in trying situations, such as predator–prey interactions.
On account of survival pressure, animal nervous systems
cannot tolerate any added delays in localization of
moving objects. Continuous location information concern-
ing a moving object has a survival advantage, as the rel-
evance of a moving object can change drastically from
one moment to the next.
Imagine a monkey being hunted by a tiger, which is
slowly approaching from the right. The monkey is not
unduly concerned, as there is a sure getaway – there is a
large tree near the monkey to the left that it can quickly
climb. Now imagine that there is second tiger hiding
behind the tree, whose presence is given away by the
sound of a twig breaking under the tiger’s paw. Under
this scenario, and innumerable similar scenarios in
nature, the animal that already has location information
regarding an important moving object (in this example,
the approaching tiger from the right) will be able to plan
its next escape strategy more quickly, and thus have a sur-
vival advantage over an animal that must first establish the
location of the moving object following an unpredictable
event (in this example, the sound of the twig).
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R3.3. The ﬂashf/ﬂashc muddle
The non-controversial aspect of the various accounts of the
flash-lag effect is the assumption of a significant delay
between the presentation of a flash and its perception.
However, keeping the two events, flash presentation and
perception, separate is as difficult as it is important to be
explicit as to which of the two meanings one intends
when using the term flash. In order to be more precise,
I will denote the event physical-flash by flashf and the
event psychophysical-flash by flashc. Note that the event
flashc is short for the perception of the flash.
Now let us turn to the moving object. Visual input delay
(Dti) should cause an observer to perceive a continuously
moving object in a position that it occupied Dti seconds
ago. The initial impetus for the suggestion that this state-
ment is incorrect came from the flash-lag effect (Nijhawan
1994), and motion extrapolation was suggested as a
process that undoes this lag. Happily, Eagleman suggests
that postdiction, which until now has been considered to
be the antithesis of prediction, can also achieve this at
least partially.
The initial basis for the postdiction account was the
observation that the flash-terminated condition does not
lead to the flash-lag effect (Eagleman & Sejnowski 2000).
Postdiction suggested that the visual system integrates
information after an event, and this integrated information
can impact perceptual decisions about an event in the
immediate past. A semantic analogy would be a word
appearing later in a sentence giving added precision to
(or disambiguating) the meaning of a word appearing
earlier in the sentence. Eagleman suggests that continu-
ous input from future events could update past delayed
information to align the perceived position of a moving
object with its actual position. But what happens when a
flash is presented? On the current rendition of postdiction,
when the moving object is physically aligned with flashf, it
is also perceptually alignedwith it (as the delay between the
perceived and physical position of the moving object has
been removed by the postdictive process). Thus, when
event flashc occurs, the perceived position of the moving
object is ahead, which explains the flash-lag effect.
However, on this view, a flash-lag effect should also occur
in the flash-terminated condition. The lack of effect in
the flash-terminated condition now poses a problem for
postdiction, even though it was the initial impetus for it.
Now let us consider the flash-initiated condition.
Although it is correct that motion information after
event flashf (which is what is commonly meant by the
term “flash”) drives the flash-lag effect, it is equally
correct to say that motion input before event flashc
drives the flash-lag effect. The suggestion by Smeets &
Brenner that the dependence of the flash-lag effect on
what happens after the “flash” (more precisely, flashf)
opposes VP, is incorrect. By definition, in the flash-lag
effect, the observers report that flashc lags behind the
moving object, so flashc is the all-important event. There-
fore, this event should play the central role in all analyses.
According to the analysis presented in section 5.2.1 of the
target article (also see Figure 7 there), more than 98% of
the time period immediately before flashc, during which
the moving object is in view, is available for motion extra-
polation. So, it is the past, not the future, motion that con-
tributes to the flash-lag effect.
Eagleman believes apparent motion to be a quintes-
sential postdictive phenomenon. In apparent motion,
two dots, dot 1 and dot 2, are flashed in two positions in
quick succession. The perception is that dot 1 appears to
move to dot 2. Movement of the dot could have started
only after dot 2 appears, and yet the movement of the
dot implies that it occupies positions between dot 1 and
dot 2, which are past positions. This phenomenon has
puzzled many researchers, and Eagleman has identified
a possible postdictive account of this. I believe this
phenomenon seems puzzling due to acquiescence. Influ-
ential scientists have continually reminded us that we
have no direct immediate access to the world (Neisser
1976) and that visual perception is a generative process
that “creates” the visual image (Kandel & Wurtz 2000).
In the absence of such reminders, we acquiesce into
believing that our visual percepts directly reflect the
state of the world.
There is a temporal version of this acquiescence, which
results in the flashf/flashc muddle and engenders a post-
dictive account of apparent motion. It is well known that
motion can be perceived even when there is no object
appearing to move. Sitting in a quiet room, we can some-
times have the experience that something moved, without
perceiving what moved. In the far periphery of our retina,
a stimulus is perceived only when it is moving; as soon as
movement stops, the object vanishes. This is what happens
in apparent motion: say event flash1f occurs at time 1 and
flash2f quickly follows at time 2. This leads to neural sig-
naling of motion. These motion signals occur before event
flash2c (because flash2c is subject to conduction delays).
Thus, at the time of flash2c, the motion computation has
already occurred (on the basis of flash2f), so the motion
percept is interjected before the percept of the second
flash. The seemingly postdictive nature of apparent
motion comes about because we forget that flash2f and
flash2c are distinct events.
In conclusion, postdiction does not cause the flash-lag
effect, but it does contribute to its elimination it in the
flash-terminated condition. Backward masking in which a
later stimulus renders an earlier stimulus invisible is
another excellent example of a postdictive phenomenon. By
letting later information have an impact, postdiction has the
advantage of obtaining more reliable data about the world,
and disambiguating information when the data are noisy.
R3.4. Going nowhere bymisinterpreting andmislabeling
visual prediction
O¨g˘men, Patel, Purushothaman, & Bedell [O¨g˘men
et al.] and Purushothaman et al. appear to have misin-
terpreted the basics of VP. They even mislabel it as “per-
ceptual compensation model” (PCM), and then proceed
with criticisms that are directed at PCM and not VP. At
first, it might seem that the authors may have simply
switched the word “perceptual” for “visual,” as one may
interchangeably use the terms in describing the perceptual
system or the visual system. This would not be a serious
problem. However, there is a deeper issue, as revealed
in several statements by O¨g˘men et al. and Purushothaman
et al. Consider the following statement by Purushothaman
et al.: “Perceptual compensation in early visual areas, as
suggested by the target article, need not occur.”
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In the target article I suggested that perception is the
outcome of visually sensitive neurons that are capable of
compensating for visual delays, or that compensatory
motor processes can influence perception (e.g., via feed-
back from motor areas to visual areas). The percepts
reveal this compensation (e.g., in the flash-lag effect)
because of compensation mechanisms in the feedforward
vision pathway and/or motor pathways. Thus, perception
is not a process that produces compensation, as the
authors seem to suggest. Rather perception is the
outcome of compensation mechanisms.
O¨g˘men et al.’s misinterpretation of VP is underscored
when they draw a contrast between perceptual compen-
sation (their term) and sensory compensation. They say:
“That sensory processes may be predictive is neither
new nor controversial. . . . What is controversial is the
specific hypothesis proposed by Nijhawan, namely, com-
pensation of neural delays at the perceptual level.” It is,
however, highly unlikely that sensory processes can be
predictive while the perceptions that these sensory pro-
cesses contribute to are not.
Contrary to what Purushothaman et al. report, not only
does pursuit eye-movement yield a flash-lag, but the magni-
tude of the effect with pursuit is about the same as in the
standard object motion case (Nijhawan 2001; also see van
de Grind’s commentary). Purushothaman et al.’s sugges-
tion that other motion-bias phenomena (De Valois & De
Valois 1991; Ramachandran & Anstis 1990) do not support
the notion of compensation for delays, is not widely shared
(see, e.g., commentary by Whitney). Finally, O¨g˘men
et al.’s favored explanation of our fading motion data in
terms of lowered detection threshold resulting from inte-
gration along the motion path, is incorrect; we explicitly
tested this hypothesis by doubling the trajectory length of
the motion stimulus and found the detection threshold to
not change significantly (Maus & Nijhawan 2006, p. 4379).
O¨g˘men et al. claim that the target article is selective, as
it does not address the luminance-dependent modulation
of the flash-lag effect. This is surprising, as section 6.1. of
the target article is devoted to this very issue. I would like
to add that many everyday objects consist of parts of differ-
ent luminance (e.g., a fair-skinned person with black hair),
and movement of such objects does not lead to spatial dis-
tortions. This supports the view that the visual system takes
differential latency (due to variations in luminance) into
account. This brings me to a related point concerning the
“flash-lead” effect (Purushothaman et al. 1998), which
the commentators mention. The authors have claimed
that a flash-lead effect occurs when the display combines
a moving object of low luminance contrast with a bright
flash. Let me say that in all my experience of working
with the flash-lag effect since 1990, I have never observed
a flash-lead effect based on luminance differences. This is
also true of displays that combine a moving object that is
close to absolute detection threshold and a stroboscopically
generated flash that is a million times brighter! This has
also been noted by others (see, e.g., Brenner & Smeets
2000, and Smeets & Brenner’s commentary).
R3.5. Neural response to the instantaneous value of
continuous input
In the interaction between a monkey and a tiger that
Krekelberg considers, the smooth changes in direction
that the tiger produces are more to test the monkey’s
endurance than to challenge its visual system. What is
demanding for the visual system in predator–prey inter-
actions is the sudden changes in movement direction
that the animals often produce. Such energetically costly
movements are selected precisely because smooth
changes in movement are predictable.
There have been several studies on motion per se,
showing predictive responses of neurons (e.g., Fukushima
et al. 2002). Krekelberg’s interpretation that a change in
the response maximum of a middle temporal area (MT)
neuron to different motions shows that this neuron is
unable to compensate for the delay, is incorrect. The
possibility of relating the neural response of a cell to the
“wrong” instantaneous value of a continuously changing
input was discussed in the target article for orientation
tuning in primary visual cortex (V1) (see sect. 1.3). There
is a relatively straightforward interpretation of the interest-
ing results shown by Krekelberg. The so-called directional
label of a MT neuron depends not just on the intrinsic
properties of the neuron, but also on the context of the
stimulus. In the present case, the directional tuning
curve of an MT neuron depends on the history of the
stimulus. In general, if the movement direction of the
stimulus changes continuously, it will produce a different
tuning curve than if the stimulus moves in a fixed direction
within the MT cell’s receptive field (in the vast majority of
studies, fixed direction stimulus is used). Furthermore, the
tuning for clockwise motion versus counterclockwise
motion would be different, as the history of the stimuli is
different for the two motions. Continuous input to a cell
leads to adaptation in the cell’s response, and clockwise
(CW) and counterclockwise (CCW) motions will cause
differential adaptations. In addition, a single neuron does
not receive input only from the retina, but also from
other neighboring cells, which are differently tuned.
These factors, and not differential delay in the cell’s
peak response to CW and CCW motions, are the likely
cause of the observed difference in the peak response of
the cell described in the commentary.
R3.6. Prediction and violation of prediction in the ﬂash-
lag phenomenon
Baldo & Klein suggest that the original motion extrapol-
ation account (Nijhawan 1994) nicely explains the flash-lag
effect in its purest form. They state, however, that:
in order to accommodate that explanation with discordant
empirical findings, Nijhawan, [. . .] now resorts to at least
three different putative mechanisms: (1) the role of lateral
communications between neighboring retinotopic locations,
(2) the impact of visual transients generated by offsets, and
(3) a dynamical interplay between motor and visual processes.
Baldo & Klein are correct in saying that the target article
focuses more on new physiological mechanisms, but
neither have these mechanisms been mentioned here for
the first time, nor are they introduced to explain discor-
dant findings.
Take the role of transients in the localization of moving
objects, which was first introduced by Nijhawan (2002). In
nature, predictable events and events that violate predic-
tions go hand in hand, so one goal of the target article
was to look at both sides of the coin. Prey animals often
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produce abrupt trajectory changes in an attempt to throw
off a following predator. There is recent neurophysiologi-
cal evidence that the retina not only predicts moving
objects but also strongly signals violations of prediction
(Holy 2007; Schwartz et al. 2007b) resulting from
sudden changes in the trajectory of moving objects. It is
natural to think of an abruptly disappearing moving
object in the flash-terminated condition, or sudden
change in object trajectory in the motion-reversal con-
dition, as violating prediction. I suggest that the strong
transient signals generated by violations of prediction
interact postdictively (Eagleman & Sejnowski 2007) with
predictive signals and overwrite them. We tested this
claim by making the stimulus disappear without this
violation and found the predictive-overshoot (Maus &
Nijhawan 2006) that is typically missing in the flash-
terminated condition. Furthermore, when the strength
of the transients is manipulated, transients of intermediate
levels result in intermediate forward displacements
(Maus & Nijhawan, in press).
Howe, Horowitz, & Wolfe [Howe et al.] tested our
account by doing the opposite experiment: they attempted
to eliminate the flash-lag effect by introducing a transient.
In their experiment, as an object moved on a gray back-
ground, it abruptly reversed contrast at the time of the
flash from black to white. The observers reported a
flash-lag effect. The commentators claim that this contra-
dicts the proposal by Nijhawan (2002) and Maus and Nij-
hawan (2006) that the transient in the flash-terminated
condition eliminates the predictive-overshoot. Before ana-
lyzing Howe et al.’s interesting experiment, it is important
to note that there is a transient at the beginning of motion
in the flash-initiated condition, which fails to eliminate the
flash-lag effect (Khurana & Nijhawan 1995). So, clearly,
the timing of the transient is crucial.
One can think of the contrast reversal experiment as
consisting of two phases. The first phase, with a black
moving object, comprises the flash-terminated condition,
and the second phase, with a white moving object, com-
prises the flash-initiated condition. We know that the
latter condition does and the former condition does not
produce a flash-lag. For a black-to-white transition, the
important question to ask, however, is: Did the flash
appear to lag the black or the white moving object? (It is
not sufficient simply to report a flash-lag effect here). If
the white object appeared ahead of the flash (which
would be my guess), then this is not surprising, as this is
just the flash-initiated condition producing the effect. In
the biased competition model presented in the target
article (see sect. 5.2.2.) the visual system gives higher
weighting to newer retinal input. In the case of the flash-
initiated condition, the initial transient resulting from
motion onset does not fix the position of the moving
object because there is newer (motion) input after the
transient.
It would be of great interest if the black object appeared
ahead of the flash. This would be the flash-terminated con-
dition producing a predictive-overshoot (which is normally
not seen). Such a finding would mean that the motion
input resulting from the white object following contrast
reversal weakens the black-to-white transient. A weakened
transient, in turn, is less able to suppress the prediction-
based representation of the black object. In conclusion,
a transient will fix the location of a moving object only if
(1) it comes at the end of an event (as a final event), so
that it has the opportunity to compete strongly with, and
mask, the previously setup prediction-based represen-
tation, and (2) no new input is there to suppress the
transient.
R3.7. TTC models and VP
Benguigui, Baure`s, & Le Runigo [Benguigui et al.]
suggest that the visual system is not an accurate predictor
of moving objects if the last part of their trajectory is
occluded for more than 200 msec, contrary to the claim
made in the target article, which suggests that the time
period is much longer. However, the 200 msec limit
does not significantly change my conclusion. Time-to-
collision (TTC) theorists suggest that the nervous system
uses information contained in the changing retinal image
to compute TTC. In the target article, I claim (and make
a case) that a corollary of the TTC approach is that
visual mechanisms compensate for the delays that would
be incurred in the transmission of the changing retinal
image to the central nervous system (CNS). This claim
will only be affected if accuracy in prediction is compro-
mised for an occlusion duration that is close to the dur-
ation of visual processing delay. Since, according to
Benguigui et al. prediction ability is compromised for
occlusion durations of 200 msec and beyond, which is
longer than visual processing latency, my claim is unaf-
fected. So the restated claim would read: Because TTC
can be predicted accurately 200 msec into the future on
the basis of retinal information, the position of the
moving object can certainly be predicted ~80 msec into
the future, as required by the motion extrapolation
account of the flash-lag effect.
R4. Are neural delays optimal, and therefore
compensation unnecessary?
R4.1. Are tolerance for delays and skill enough to
account for human performance?
McFarland points out that the absolute reference
location of a moving object is unavailable. Adding to the
suggestions of van de Grind, I argue that the need for a
reference for locating moving objects may not arise, as
motion is absolute (see sect. R2). Alternatively, I suggest
that a position assigned to moving objects by the visual
system is determined by the success or failure of the
animal that uses that information during action; if the
behavior produced by the animal on the basis of position
information is successful, contributing to the animal’s sur-
vival, then the position is correct (and it is the same as that
of the end-effector engaged in the production of action;
see sect. R6.5). Otherwise, it is incorrect. McFarland
claims that compensation may be unnecessary, and
phase-alignment between different signals may be suffi-
cient. Phase-alignment may solve one problem, but it
raises another. Even if phase-alignment causes fusion of
the to-be-aligned signals (say, vision and touch) the ques-
tion still remains: How is the animal able to successfully
interact with a visuo-tactile object, for example, an insect
moving rapidly on the skin, given that both vision and
touch give delayed position information?
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Both McFarland and Cutting describe an exper-
iment on audiovisual speech where the auditory and
visual (lip movements) signals are asynchronous. The
findings are that observers fail to detect moderately
large asynchronies. Cutting suggests that the examples
of large tolerances show that compensation is not
necessary. I have an alternative interpretation of these
interesting findings: The nervous system reduces discre-
pancies between two (or more) neural representations
that belong to the same world event. This function of
VP is outlined in the target article (see section 9.1.
“Coordination of neural representations”). A previous
study has shown that the brain can use visual distance
to calibrate the simultaneity of auditory and visual
signals of audio-visual objects (Sugita & Suzuki 2003).
Thus, the asynchrony between auditory speech and its
visual signal is undetected not because there is a wide
range of tolerance, but because the brain actively coor-
dinates the auditory and visual signals that likely
belong to the same physical event.
There is a more fundamental aspect of this coordinating
influence. There are many neurons in the CNS that
receive convergent input from more than one modality,
for example, audition and vision. Consider the conse-
quences of unchecked lags between auditory and visual
channels from a neurophysiological perspective. As
vision is slower than audition, differential processing
delays would mean that the input to bimodal neurons
will be asynchronous, and for moving audiovisual
objects, the two signals will be spatially offset in location
maps. But, most importantly, an asynchrony would mean
that the convergent inputs from moving objects would
repeatedly fail to activate such bimodal neurons. This
has implications not just for perception but also for the
survival of such neurons. One possible solution could be
a delay introduced in the faster modality; however, this
would mean that early warning from an audiovisual
object would cause the animal to respond with the
latency of the slower modality. A much more adaptive sol-
ution would be for the nervous system to extrapolate the
slower modality.
Cutting argues that compensation for delays is not
necessary for fine-timed interceptions and claims that
behaviors in sports are better understood in terms of
skill acquisition over many years (combined with a
genetic predisposition). There is no doubt that skill and
genetics are important in everyday interactions and
crucial in modern-day sports. However, the suggestion
that skill can render compensation for sensory delays
unnecessary is probably wrong. Highly skilled actions
have features in common with ballistic actions (such as
saccades); in both cases, the role of sensory data is
reduced/altered. Hence, one may argue that compen-
sation for sensory input delays during such open-loop
actions becomes less relevant. However, in extreme
cases of skilled performance, one may conjecture that no
sensory input, let alone compensated sensory input, is
required. Consider the performance of a knife-throwing
artist. With enough skill, the artist can throw knives blind-
folded. However, it is known from research on deaffer-
ented patients, for example, that there are limitations to
open-loop actions; while some aspects of open-loop
actions seem unaffected others aspects are compromised
(Sarlegna et al. 2006). So sensory data are required even
in highly skilled acts, and compensation for sensory
delays is important.
Wagman, however, denies the very existence of neural
delays. He challenges the view that perception and action
are information-processing tasks, and so transmission of
information between perception-to-action is not even
possible. I am happy to treat perception-action as a hyphe-
nated quantity, and I agree that the wide conceptual gap
between perception and action that is sometimes
assumed to exist is unjustified. Furthermore, I agree that
the relational variables (e.g., in the expanding retinal
image) are the most relevant in guiding actions.
However, I do not see how these positions lead to the con-
clusion that delays in perception and action do not exist. In
any event, the issue of delays discussed at length in the
target article is not one of delays between perception
and action but, rather, between a physical event and its
perception, and a physical event and an action directed
at it. So it is not clear whether commentator Wagman is
addressing the main issues raised there.
R4.2. The faster the better, but not too fast please!
Lin suggests that the target article overestimates the visual
processing delays. He further claims that the need for
compensation depends on the assumption that perception
occurs beyond V1. I disagree. The requirement for com-
pensation is virtually independent of which segment of
the vision pathway is considered necessary and sufficient
for visual perception. This is so because it is well estab-
lished that visual delays are nontrivial, even at the first pro-
cessing level; photoreceptor hyperpolarization peak to a
bright flash occurs with a latency of about 50 msec.
Many actions in high-speed ballgames require a temporal
window that is narrower than photoreceptor delays (Tresi-
lian 1993). Delays quickly become large as they accrue
along the vision pathway. Hence, there is no question of
compensation being unnecessary for delays before V1.
Lin’s suggestion that neural delays are optimal – they
are long enough to allow sufficient computation time,
but not so large so as to make the responses too
slow – is interesting. Similarly, Changizi points out that
contrary to the assumption that faster neural processes
would always confer an advantage to the animal, there
may be a trade-off between computation speed and com-
plexity. Changizi makes the point with an insightful
analogy between nervous systems and computers. Compu-
tation speeds have increased by several orders of magni-
tude in the past two decades, and yet we still have to
wait for software to load. Clearly, modern programs are
doing a lot more. This behavior (rather than instantaneous
loading of programs that do a lot less) is selected for in the
computer world. In the real world, some behaviors can be
produced with little computation – and relatively
quickly – whereas others require elaborate computations.
The knee-jerk reflex, for example, requires a single
synapse and can be produced within 40 msec. However,
such responses are stereotyped and have a limited
(though important) function. The plasticity, flexibility,
and complexity characteristic of many primate behaviors
requires significant processing and elaborate networks.
At the level of perception, the issue of compensation for
delays may arise precisely because complex and time-
consuming computations (e.g., integration of retinal
Response/Nijhawan: Visual prediction
228 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:2
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X08003907
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:09:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
image size and retinal disparity carried out by cortical cells
in the computation of size constancy) are required for
accurate localization of moving objects in three-dimen-
sional space.
However, there are two things to note here. First, there
is no doubt that increased speed of transmission of unmo-
dified information over long distances, for example by per-
ipheral sensory-motor nerves, can only be beneficial.
Second, there are several other types of trade-off that
are relevant. One is speed and size of the nervous
system. Although certain invertebrate nervous systems
are capable of producing fast reactions (e.g., the escape
reaction in the squid), these reactions are possible only
by the virtue of large-diameter nerve fibers. Myelination
of neurons in vertebrates results in signal transmission
that is more than an order of magnitude faster without
the need to support much larger fibers (and brains).
Therefore, although all this speed may not translate into
faster behavior of vertebrates, generally speaking there is
certainly some speeding up. Thus, it may be correct that
software-loading times have not gone down linearly with
the increase in computation speed but there is some
general speeding up of computers.
Perhaps the most significant type of trade-off is revealed
by comparison of processing speeds for predictable versus
unpredictable events. In animal behavior, unpredictable
events are of great importance. For example, in preda-
tor–prey interactions, each animal attempts to make gains
over the opponent by producing sudden changes in trajec-
tory. Such behaviors involving high accelerations are ener-
getically expensive, so the fact that they are common in
nature underscores their importance; these behaviors exist
because the opponent’s nervous system takes time to
process them. It is likely that the upper limit of how
much delay the animal’s visual system will tolerate
depends on how quickly the animal can respond to unpre-
dictable visual events. A brain that is slower because of its
fancier computations would take a long time in communi-
cating an important, unpredictable, event (such as the pre-
dator adopting an attack posture). Thus, slowness due to
fancier computations that may allow for extrapolation
farther into the future, as suggested by Changizi, may
indeed have no cost for highly predictable events, but the
resulting slowness in the registration of unpredictable
events (that are presumably processed by the same brain
structures) will confer a huge disadvantage.
R5. How does the VP framework fare with multiple
objects, observer motion, and accelerating
motion?
Movement velocity is hardly ever constant in nature, and
there are always multiple objects present. Does VP come
into play in such real-world scenarios?
Smeets & Brenner claim that in typical interactions
with moving objects, the subject attempts to smoothly
pursue the object. This eliminates retinal image motion,
and obviates the need for VP in typical interaction scen-
arios. Animals, however, rarely have the luxury of tracking
a single moving object with their eyes. There are usually
many relevant objects in the scene, both stationary and
those moving at various velocities. Smooth pursuit of one
object will cause other stationary objects to move on the
retina. So, invariably, there will be retinal image motion,
and the issue of neural delays and compensation become
relevant. Imagine a monkey being hunted by two tigers,
one near by to the left and stationary, and the other
farther away to the right, advancing toward the monkey.
The monkey needs to maintain fixation on the nearby
tiger to monitor its fine movements. The movement of
the advancing tiger’s retinal image, and the transmission
delay of this image to the cortex, if uncompensated,
would lead to an error in the visual position of the tiger.
VP would provide compensated data relevant for the
monkey in planning its escape manoeuvre.
Sheth & Wu and Zago & Lacquaniti suggest that the
fact that common objects do not travel at constant speed is
problematic for visual (spatial) prediction. However, when
considering movement at the time scale of neural delays
(100 msec), velocity is approximately constant in most
situations. Furthermore, for objects that produce a large
change in velocity in 100 msec (e.g., when an animal
jumps to escape a predator), even the predictive motor
mechanisms, which Sheth & Wu favor, will fail. Failure
of predictive motor mechanisms in such situations does
not reduce the importance of motor mechanisms in
other situations, in which acceleration is smaller or zero.
Likewise, scenarios in which VP does not apply do not
rule out the role of VP generally.
Whitney notes that single moving objects in the
environment are rare, and furthermore, typically it is the
observer that is moving. Therefore, VP may not apply in
most real-world scenarios. In the target article, I briefly
discuss the situations in which the observer’s eyes, limbs,
or the whole body are moving (see the beginning of
sect. 7). The issues that arise for observer movements
are very similar to those arising for object motion. When
an animal moves its arm, or its whole body forward,
what is its instantaneous position as represented by the
continuously changing neural representation of the
moving item? Cells in the hippocampus known as place
cells, and entorhinal cortex, are responsible for coding
the animal’s location. Delays in neural transmission will
cause the registered location to be delayed relative to
the animal’s physical location. A similar localization issue
arises when the animal moves its sensors or end-effectors.
For example, cells coding for head-direction in the hori-
zontal plane (Taube et al. 1990) should respond with a
lag in relation to the physical direction of the head.
However, it is known that some head-direction neurons
lead physical head direction of the animal (Blair and
Sharp 1995). The target article focuses more on moving
objects than on moving end-effectors because localizing
moving limbs and eyes is considered more complex.
However, I had an even more important reason for
addressing the simpler object motion case first. Many
articles (e.g., see Krekelberg & Lappe 2001, p 335) begin
by posing a puzzle: “Do we perceive the position of a
moving object with a delay because of neuronal latencies?”
The goal of the target article is not just to address accurate
perception of baseballs and the like, but also to address the
puzzle of visual awareness and its neural underpinnings. Yet
another goal is to draw focused attention to the issues of
perception and reality in the spirit of Ernst Mach, whose
lifetime research goal was “to distinguish in any phenom-
enon, the properties of the observer from the properties
of the thing observed” (Ratliff 1965, p 1).
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R6. Mechanisms for compensation
R6.1. Implementation of Visual Prediction
I agree with Trautteur, Datteri, & Santoro [Trautteur
et al.] that the first goal of the target article is to make a con-
vincing case that prediction is a widespread function of the
nervous system. This goal would be impossible to achieve
without inclusion of visual processes – hence my focus on
VP. Indeed, my hope is to reduce the opposition to VP
that has existed in raging controversies over the past
decade or so. How VP is implemented is the next exciting
question, and I am happy that the authors think that there
are some useful rough sketches in the target article.
Toward this goal, I would like to ask: Might there be as
much variety in mechanisms as there are time scales for per-
forming different actions, as suggested by Balkenius &
Ga¨rdenfors? Stepp & Turvey outline a novel approach
in their commentary that may show well-known phenom-
enon of neural synchronization (Sillito et al. 1994;
Neuenschwander et al. 2002) in the new light of visual pre-
dictive phenomena. I think there is likely to be a great
variety in mechanisms for prediction, only a few of which
we have any details on.
R6.2. Early versus late compensation: Are internal
models indispensable?
Stepp & Turvey help to not only broaden the basis of
anticipation (to use their term) but also bring clarity to
the issues. First, I agree with these commentators (and
with Benguigui et al.) that it is wrong to assume that
internal models are the basis of all anticipation; it was
not my intention to confer this exclusivity to anticipatory
mechanisms. Indeed, there are anticipatory neural mech-
anisms that do not fit the description of internal models
(Barlow 1953), and Stepp & Turvey mention an interesting
example from physics, termed anticipating synchroniza-
tion. Indeed, anticipatory phenomena may lie in realms
beyond animal behavior, cellular networks, or single
cells, and may be present in physical systems (e.g., in semi-
conductor lasers with optical feedback). This suggests an
approach that may be termed anticipatory behavior
without internal models, which is reminiscent of a previous
approach to intelligent behavior without internal represen-
tations (Brooks 1991).
Stepp & Turvey further point out that anticipating syn-
chronization shares features (e.g., delayed feedback) with
the behavior of animals and nervous systems. In anticipat-
ory synchronization there is a driver and a slave. The
observation is that the slave can synchronize with the
future state of the driver. Is such a system neurophysiolo-
gically plausible? The answer is clearly, yes. There are
many examples of synchronization of neural responses in
the retina, lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) and cortex
(Neuenschwander et al. 2002). Consider the LGN-V1
driver–slave pair, with LGN as the driver and V1 as the
slave. In this system, V1 sends delayed feedback to
LGN. It is not difficult to imagine V1 activity synchroniz-
ing with the future state of LGN activity (Sillito et al.
1994). It is noteworthy, however, that the basis of predic-
tion may be triplets of neural locations (instead of pairs)
that are capable of producing zero time-lag synchroniza-
tion (Chawla et al. 2001).
Stepp & Turvey (and van de Grind) have suggested
that I have portrayed VP as an exclusively high-level
model. I disagree. In the target article, I argue that predic-
tion is ubiquitous in the CNS, with both early and late
mechanisms devoted to it; findings such as the flash-lag
effect in the flash-initiated condition (Khurana & Nijha-
wan 1995) and the color decomposition effect (Nijhawan
1997) would be difficult to explain in terms of high-level
mechanisms. Furthermore, there are neurophysiological
considerations that support early mechanisms for predic-
tion (see sect. R4.1). Nonetheless, anticipation can mani-
fest itself at “high” levels where one cannot escape
internal models (Erlhagen 2003; Snyder 1999), and syn-
chronization and phase alignment become inappropriate
metaphors. I would like to reiterate the proposal in the
target article: For a function as fundamental as prediction,
the nervous systems uses as many tricks as possible, and
the phenomena revealing this function may show up in
many guises.
R6.3. Time from adaptation
Every time we make a saccadic eye-movement there is a
discrete, but predictable, change in visual input. Mayo &
Sommer describe a process in which adaptation from
one input to the next could be used for the timing of the
sequence of discrete stimuli. A modified version of such
a timing mechanism could play a role in compensation
for neural delays. The mechanism is revealed when two
sequential stimuli are presented to neurons in the superior
colliculus and the frontal eye field. For inter-stimulus
intervals of less than 400 msec, the neural response mag-
nitude to the second stimulus varies precisely with the
delay between the first and the second stimulus.
Mayo & Sommer have wondered how such a mechan-
ism could be adapted to compensate for delays. I speculate
on one possibility for estimating delays involving three
visually responsive neural sites (A, B, and C). Sites A
and B are hierarchically organized, with site B farther
away from the retina than site A. Site C receives input
from both A and B. If a single stimulus is presented,
neurons in site A will respond before those in site B.
Thus, a single world event will lead to two successive
neural events that are temporally separated by the delay
between site A and site B. The delay between the
responses of site A and site B can be estimated from the
adaptation level (reduced response) of neurons in site C
to the input from site B (second input). This would be
one way in which the visual system could monitor its
own delays, and not just delays between two external
events.
Sheth & Wu describe a neural activity profile in a topo-
graphical (cortical) map generated by the movement of an
object. This profile includes the neural activity correlated
with the object’s distant past, immediate past, current, and
immediate future positions; the locus of maximum cortical
activity in the map represents the “current” location of the
object. These commentators point out that the neural
mechanisms leading to this profile are basic to all
neurons. However, there is another basic neural mechan-
ism that the commentators have missed, and that is spatio-
temporal filtering, which has been invoked as one of the
mechanisms leading to spatial extrapolation. One mechan-
ism that Sheth & Wu do mention is neural adaptation.
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Mayo & Sommer make a clever proposal that adaptation
could be used by neural networks in the timing of sequen-
tial stimuli, and perhaps in compensation of neural delays.
Consider again Sheth & Wu’s statement that the
maximum of neural activity in a topographic map rep-
resents the object’s current location. There are multiple
topographic maps in the brain, so the described profile
of neural responses will be present in all of the maps
stimulated by a moving object. However, as these maps
are located at various distances from the receptor sheet
(e.g., in the superior colliculus, cortex, etc.), the neural
activity maxima representing the object’s current position
will correspond not to one but to many positions in space.
Some of these maps (e.g., superior colliculus) serve mainly
a motor function (e.g., eye-movements), but others might
mainly serve perception. Input from two or more such
maps to a target site that produces an average would be
required to eliminate the multiplicity in perceived pos-
itions. With little modification, an extrapolation process
could achieve the same goal.
R6.4. Modeling forward-shift effects
Berzhanskaya presents a detailed computational model
that might produce not only the flash-lag effect, but also
several other well-known forward-shift effects. One may,
however, ask why these computational models behave the
way they do. Is there any functional significance to this
behavior of the models, assuming that natural visual
systems behave like this? Towards this, then, one may
wonder whether prediction versus emergent property of
directional selective mechanisms, as the commentary title
suggests, is the correct contrast to draw. Consider an
analogy: human photoreceptors are most sensitive to light
around the yellow-green part of the spectrum, despite the
fact that blue photons are more energetic. One might
explain this in terms of the photochemical interactions
and the neural networks tuned to produce a maximum
response to yellow-green light. This answer is correct and
suffices for certain purposes. However, the fact becomes
more meaningful when one looks deeper into the cause.
The facts that maximum energy in the solar spectrum is
in the yellow-green region, and that the absorption coeffi-
cient of water, which the human eye contains, is smallest
precisely over the range for which human vision is most sen-
sitive, give a better understanding of the peak sensitivity in
the yellow-green part of the spectrum (Nunes 2003). Like-
wise, the psychophysical phenomena or networks that
produce forward shifts would be understood better in the
context of neural delays and prediction.
Berzhanskaya has focused on direction selectivity. It is
worth mentioning that the flash-lag effect has been
observed in retinal ganglion cells of the rabbit and sala-
mander that are directionally insensitive. Another point
to note is related to the commentators’s explanation of
the flash-lag effect in terms of shift in position of the
flash due to trailing inhibition left behind by the moving
object. This predicts that the flash should be mislocalized
relative to stationary objects in the direction opposite to
object motion. We have found that flash mislocalization
in the direction opposite to motion may contribute,
however, it is not sufficient to explain the full flash-lag
effect (Shi & Nijhawan, under review).
R6.5. Modifying perceptions
Balkenius & Ga¨rdenfors note that the task for predictive
sensory-motor processes is more complex than is por-
trayed by the target article, and, in particular, that the
target article underestimates the contribution of feedback
from past interactions in creating a compensated percept
of the moving object. I agree with the commentators.
This is indeed an omission, which I will attempt to
rectify here.
Balkenius & Ga¨rdenfors propose that predictions
concerning a moving object’s visual position result in an
anticipated now, but it is not known until later whether
the prediction was correct or incorrect. In the target
article, I say that: “during a catch, the visual system mod-
ifies the perceived position of the ball so that it matches
the position of the moving hand.” I now elaborate on
this with the example of interceptive action directed at a
moving object. A successful catch implies that the
animal’s CNS was able to issue motor commands to send
the hand to the correct location. Now the question is: To
which physical position in space did the visual neural rep-
resentation of the moving object correspond at the time of
interaction? Feedback (vision, touch, and sound) from the
results of the action helps in answering this question for
the CNS. The CNS uses the motor-sensory representation
(motor command and proprioception) of the hand as a
reference to which the visual representation is compared.
Successful interactions lead to integration of hand and
visual positions, and the moving object is assigned the
same visual position as the hand. Helmholtz first suggested
that the visual position code (local sign) for an object could
be trained by the motor position code when an end-effec-
tor, for example, the subject’s moving hand, stimulates the
subject’s own retina. There is evidence that cells in the
posterior parietal cortex respond to visual stimulation
resulting from the movement of limbs during action
(Mountcastle et al. 1984). Because the feedback inter-
actions occur in a plastic neural environment, the error
between spatial position of the visual object and the
hand is removed over multiple successful interactions.
R6.6. Extrapolation in time or space?
Zago & Lacquaniti propose that extrapolation in the
domain of time rather than space would be more useful
for the visual system. They argue that time-extrapolation
would be better adapted to handling moving objects in
nature, as these objects rarely travel at constant velocities.
However, a question immediately arises: Is a time-extrapo-
lated input the same as a reduced latency one? (This of
course raises the question of how this is different from
the differential latency accounts by Whitney & Murakami
[1998] and Purushothaman et al. [1998]). The main
problem with time-extrapolation, as Zago & Lacquaniti
recognize, is one of finding a mechanism. Again, if the sug-
gestion is analogous to latency reduction, then this can be
achieved by neural facilitation along the motion path
(Grzywacz & Amthor 1993). However, this can only be
achieved on the basis of lateral interaction, which is
again a spatial process. Mayo & Sommer discuss a
purely temporal mechanism based on neural adaptation,
which is reliable and unaffected by trial-to-trial variations
in response delays. It remains to be seen whether such
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a mechanism would have the necessary speed to produce
the interception of accelerating objects, as has been
demonstrated by Lacquaniti and colleagues. A time-extra-
polation could supplement the task of prediction, and
work cooperatively with space-extrapolation to yield a
more robust system than each type of extrapolation
alone would.
Cunningham suggests that in addition to spatial com-
pensation for delays, there should also be temporal com-
pensation; and in addition to compensation for delays for
continuous events, there should also be compensation for
discrete events. There are perhaps two ways of describing
temporal compensation. One is similar to whatz Zago &
Lacquaniti might call time-extrapolation. This may be
called absolute temporal compensation, as it affects delays
between a physical event and its registration. The other is
relative temporal compensation, where the nervous system
actively coordinates sensory signals to compensate for tem-
poral asynchronies between modalities (see commentary by
Cutting).
Relative temporal compensation is what Cunningham
and colleagues have shown in their interesting exper-
iments. Let us consider absolute temporal compensation
further. First, there is a form of absolute temporal com-
pensation, as demonstrated by experiments on finger
tapping to auditory tones. Within limits, human subjects
can predict repetitive discrete tones and put their finger
taps just in advance of the tones (Mates et al. 1994).
This is a good example of where the sensorimotor system
must have information about the actual time of an external
event. But can absolute temporal compensation occur for
perception (as opposed to behavior such as finger taps)?
Can the visual system generate the percepts of repetitive
flashes, for example, simultaneously with the actual
flashes? The answer would appear to be no, and this is
where spatial and temporal compensations differ. The
claim of spatial compensation is that it can put the
percept of the moving object closer to (or even ahead of)
the actual position of the moving object. In contrast, tem-
poral compensation cannot, it seems, put the perceptual
event close to the time of the actual event.
I fully endorse the amendment suggested by Cunning-
ham that: “The goal of visual prediction is to use priors
acquired from both previous experience and the currently
unfolding visual stimulus to create a perceived state of the
world that matches, as far as possible, the actual state of
the world.”
R6.7. Mental extrapolation and (not “or”) visual
extrapolation
Kerzel & Mu¨sseler suggest that sensorimotor prediction
and mental extrapolation, as opposed to visual extrapol-
ation, can overcome perceptual latencies. There is no
doubt that sensorimotor prediction is an important, and
highly flexible, contributor to successful behavioral acts.
The role of mental extrapolation in the context of flash-
lag effect is, however, not as clear as these commentators
propose. Kerzel & Mu¨sseler claim that the missing predic-
tive-overshoot in the flash-terminated condition opposes
the visual extrapolation account, and they invoke mental
extrapolation in explaining the forward-shift of fading
moving objects (Maus & Nijhawan 2006). However, it is
not clear how mental extrapolation escapes this very
criticism. Why does mental extrapolation not lead to an
overshoot in the flash-terminated condition?
Mental extrapolation falls in the general category of
phenomena such as mental imagery and mental rotation.
Researchers have investigated the neural basis of mental
imagery. One of the key findings is that mental imagery
tasks engage the primary visual cortex (Kosslyn &
Sussman 1994). In addition, Kosslyn and colleagues have
found a number of similarities between mental imagery
and visual perception, such as the topographic nature of
both representations (Kosslyn et al. 1995). Thus, the exist-
ence of mental extrapolation would predict the existence
of visual extrapolation. Kerzel & Mu¨sseler’s proposal
that mental extrapolation exists but visual extrapolation
does not is unparsimonious.
I claim that the task of mental extrapolation is not to
solve the problem of neural conduction delays, but
rather, it is to determine when a moving object, occluded
by another object, will reappear (Wexler & Klam 2001). In
the case of continuous sensory input from a moving object,
the task of mental extrapolation is to determine the
object’s future position. The task of visual extrapolation
is to use sensory input to determine the object’s current
position (after compensating for visual conduction
delays). In past studies, Kerzel and colleagues have used
either probe stimuli presented after a retention interval,
or pointing movements, and so in effect asked for the
remembered final position of the moving target. In flash-
lag experiments, or in the task used by Maus and Nijhawan
(2006), participants make an online perceptual judgment
comparing the position of the moving target to a flash or
to a static probe. Although obviously the observer’s
response is given after the visual offset, the judgment is
based on simultaneously visible stimuli. It is likely that
the two experimental methods differentially engage
mental and perceptual extrapolation. In this context, it is
interesting to note that the forward-shift effect of the
fading moving object observed by Maus and Nijhawan
(2006) is 175 msec, which is a much larger shift than the
typical flash-lag effect of 80 msec. It is possible that this
is a cumulative effect of both visual and mental
extrapolation.
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